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arxiv:2607.13206

Why Not Fix It Once and for All? An Empirical Study of Multiple Patches for Vulnerability Fixes in Open-Source Software

Published on Jul 14
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Abstract

The study examines multi-patch vulnerability fixes to classify root causes, compare characteristics with single-patch fixes, and evaluate detection methods for verifying complete remediation.

Security patches for open-source software constitute a foundational resource for vulnerability remediation research and practice. However, analyzing and applying multiple patches remains challenging, especially when trying to determine at what point in a patch sequence a vulnerability is fully remediated. This paper presents a systematic analysis of multi-patch vulnerability fixes, focusing on their root causes, characteristics, and methods for verifying remediation status throughout the fixing process. Through a manual examination of 1,646 multi-patch fix records, we develop a taxonomy with three primary categories and six subcategories based on their causes. We then compare the distinctive characteristics of multi-patch fixes with those of single-patch fixes and analyze feature variations across categories. In addition, we assess representative vulnerability detection methods for validating complete remediation during multi-patch fixing. Our findings provide new insights into multi-patch fixes and lay a foundation for future research in this field.

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