24 GAS: Improving Discretization of Diffusion ODEs via Generalized Adversarial Solver While diffusion models achieve state-of-the-art generation quality, they still suffer from computationally expensive sampling. Recent works address this issue with gradient-based optimization methods that distill a few-step ODE diffusion solver from the full sampling process, reducing the number of function evaluations from dozens to just a few. However, these approaches often rely on intricate training techniques and do not explicitly focus on preserving fine-grained details. In this paper, we introduce the Generalized Solver: a simple parameterization of the ODE sampler that does not require additional training tricks and improves quality over existing approaches. We further combine the original distillation loss with adversarial training, which mitigates artifacts and enhances detail fidelity. We call the resulting method the Generalized Adversarial Solver and demonstrate its superior performance compared to existing solver training methods under similar resource constraints. Code is available at https://github.com/3145tttt/GAS. Bayesian Methods Research Group · Oct 20 2
- Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism. 8 authors · Feb 13, 2023