Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success, yet recent findings reveal that their deeper layers often contribute minimally and can be pruned without affecting overall performance. While some view this as an opportunity for model compression, we identify it as a training shortfall rooted in the widespread use of Pre-Layer Normalization (Pre-LN). We demonstrate that Pre-LN, commonly employed in models like GPT and LLaMA, leads to diminished gradient norms in its deeper layers, reducing their effectiveness. In contrast, Post-Layer Normalization (Post-LN) preserves larger gradient norms in deeper layers but suffers from vanishing gradients in earlier layers. To address this, we introduce Mix-LN, a novel normalization technique that combines the strengths of Pre-LN and Post-LN within the same model. Mix-LN applies Post-LN to the earlier layers and Pre-LN to the deeper layers, ensuring more uniform gradients across layers. This allows all parts of the network--both shallow and deep layers--to contribute effectively to training. Extensive experiments with various model sizes from 70M to 7B demonstrate that Mix-LN consistently outperforms both Pre-LN and Post-LN, promoting more balanced, healthier gradient norms throughout the network, and enhancing the overall quality of LLM pre-training. Furthermore, we demonstrate that models pre-trained with Mix-LN learn better compared to those using Pre-LN or Post-LN during supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), highlighting the critical importance of high-quality deep layers. By effectively addressing the inefficiencies of deep layers in current LLMs, Mix-LN unlocks their potential, enhancing model capacity without increasing model size. Our code is available at https://github.com/pixeli99/MixLN.

The Transformer is widely used in natural language processing tasks. To train a Transformer however, one usually needs a carefully designed learning rate warm-up stage, which is shown to be crucial to the final performance but will slow down the optimization and bring more hyper-parameter tunings. In this paper, we first study theoretically why the learning rate warm-up stage is essential and show that the location of layer normalization matters. Specifically, we prove with mean field theory that at initialization, for the original-designed Post-LN Transformer, which places the layer normalization between the residual blocks, the expected gradients of the parameters near the output layer are large. Therefore, using a large learning rate on those gradients makes the training unstable. The warm-up stage is practically helpful for avoiding this problem. On the other hand, our theory also shows that if the layer normalization is put inside the residual blocks (recently proposed as Pre-LN Transformer), the gradients are well-behaved at initialization. This motivates us to remove the warm-up stage for the training of Pre-LN Transformers. We show in our experiments that Pre-LN Transformers without the warm-up stage can reach comparable results with baselines while requiring significantly less training time and hyper-parameter tuning on a wide range of applications.

Designing Transformer architectures with the optimal layer normalization (LN) strategy that ensures large-scale training stability and expedite convergence has remained elusive, even in this era of large language models (LLMs). To this end, we present a comprehensive analytical foundation for understanding how different LN strategies influence training dynamics in large-scale Transformer training. Until recently, Pre-LN and Post-LN have long dominated standard practices despite their limitations in large-scale training. However, several open-source large-scale models have recently begun silently adopting a third strategy without much explanation. This strategy places layer normalization (LN) peripherally around sublayers, a design we term Peri-LN. While Peri-LN has demonstrated promising empirical performance, its precise mechanisms and benefits remain almost unexplored. Our in-depth analysis shows that Peri-LN strikes an ideal balance in variance growth -- unlike Pre-LN and Post-LN, which are prone to vanishing gradients and ``massive activations.'' To validate our theoretical insight, we conduct large-scale experiments on Transformers up to 3.2B parameters, showing that Peri-LN consistently achieves more balanced variance growth, steadier gradient flow, and convergence stability. Our results suggest that Peri-LN warrants broader consideration for large-scale Transformer architectures, providing renewed insights into the optimal placement and application of LN.

In recent years, the rise of machine learning (ML) in cybersecurity has brought new challenges, including the increasing threat of backdoor poisoning attacks on ML malware classifiers. For instance, adversaries could inject malicious samples into public malware repositories, contaminating the training data and potentially misclassifying malware by the ML model. Current countermeasures predominantly focus on detecting poisoned samples by leveraging disagreements within the outputs of a diverse set of ensemble models on training data points. However, these methods are not suitable for scenarios where Machine Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS) is used or when users aim to remove backdoors from a model after it has been trained. Addressing this scenario, we introduce PBP, a post-training defense for malware classifiers that mitigates various types of backdoor embeddings without assuming any specific backdoor embedding mechanism. Our method exploits the influence of backdoor attacks on the activation distribution of neural networks, independent of the trigger-embedding method. In the presence of a backdoor attack, the activation distribution of each layer is distorted into a mixture of distributions. By regulating the statistics of the batch normalization layers, we can guide a backdoored model to perform similarly to a clean one. Our method demonstrates substantial advantages over several state-of-the-art methods, as evidenced by experiments on two datasets, two types of backdoor methods, and various attack configurations. Notably, our approach requires only a small portion of the training data -- only 1\% -- to purify the backdoor and reduce the attack success rate from 100\% to almost 0\%, a 100-fold improvement over the baseline methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/judydnguyen/pbp-backdoor-purification-official.