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Jun 8

Temporal Dynamics of Development Aid in Africa: Evidence from a Staggered Difference-in-Differences Study of China and World Bank Projects in Africa

Subnational studies of aid effectiveness often rely on repeated cross-sections or nighttime lights, making it difficult to separate local treatment effects from baseline differences and potentially favoring infrastructure-heavy projects. We address these limitations by studying World Bank and Chinese development projects in Africa with a balanced panel of 2,166 DHS clusters across 35 countries from 2002 to 2013. Geocoded AidData projects are linked to satellite-imputed International Wealth Index estimates, a household-centered measure of material living standards. We compare a conventional two-way fixed effects (TWFE) event-study with the switcher--stayer estimator of de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (dCdH), which avoids contaminated comparisons under staggered treatment timing. Pre-treatment diagnostics show that project placement is frequently selective: clusters that later receive projects often begin from weaker relative positions before treatment onset. Consequently, TWFE often implies larger post-treatment gains than the preferred staggered-treatment design supports. Under dCdH, the evidence becomes more selective and sector-specific. For the World Bank, positive evidence is strongest in Health, while Education shows positive but less cleanly identified gains. For China, Water Supply and Sanitation and Other Social Infrastructure and Services show positive associations with local wealth, although residual selection concerns remain. By contrast, Chinese Energy Generation and Supply appears strongly positive under TWFE but falls close to zero under dCdH. Overall, the results do not support a donor-wide claim that either the World Bank or China uniformly improves local wealth. Instead, estimated effects are concentrated in a limited set of donor--sector panels and depend strongly on how treatment timing, selection, and outcome measurement are handled.

Individually Fair Learning with One-Sided Feedback

We consider an online learning problem with one-sided feedback, in which the learner is able to observe the true label only for positively predicted instances. On each round, k instances arrive and receive classification outcomes according to a randomized policy deployed by the learner, whose goal is to maximize accuracy while deploying individually fair policies. We first extend the framework of Bechavod et al. (2020), which relies on the existence of a human fairness auditor for detecting fairness violations, to instead incorporate feedback from dynamically-selected panels of multiple, possibly inconsistent, auditors. We then construct an efficient reduction from our problem of online learning with one-sided feedback and a panel reporting fairness violations to the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit problem (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2009, Gy\"{o}rgy et al., 2007). Finally, we show how to leverage the guarantees of two algorithms in the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit setting: Exp2 (Bubeck et al., 2012) and the oracle-efficient Context-Semi-Bandit-FTPL (Syrgkanis et al., 2016), to provide multi-criteria no regret guarantees simultaneously for accuracy and fairness. Our results eliminate two potential sources of bias from prior work: the "hidden outcomes" that are not available to an algorithm operating in the full information setting, and human biases that might be present in any single human auditor, but can be mitigated by selecting a well chosen panel.

  • 2 authors
·
Jun 9, 2022