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Sep 8

Cheating Automatic LLM Benchmarks: Null Models Achieve High Win Rates

Automatic LLM benchmarks, such as AlpacaEval 2.0, Arena-Hard-Auto, and MT-Bench, have become popular for evaluating language models due to their cost-effectiveness and scalability compared to human evaluation. Achieving high win rates on these benchmarks can significantly boost the promotional impact of newly released language models. This promotional benefit may motivate tricks, such as manipulating model output length or style to game win rates, even though several mechanisms have been developed to control length and disentangle style to reduce gameability. Nonetheless, we show that even a "null model" that always outputs a constant response (irrelevant to input instructions) can cheat automatic benchmarks and achieve top-ranked win rates: an 86.5% LC win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0; an 83.0 score on Arena-Hard-Auto; and a 9.55 score on MT-Bench. Moreover, the crafted cheating outputs are transferable because we assume that the instructions of these benchmarks (e.g., 805 samples of AlpacaEval 2.0) are private and cannot be accessed. While our experiments are primarily proof-of-concept, an adversary could use LLMs to generate more imperceptible cheating responses, unethically benefiting from high win rates and promotional impact. Our findings call for the development of anti-cheating mechanisms for reliable automatic benchmarks. The code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/Cheating-LLM-Benchmarks.

  • 6 authors
·
Oct 9, 2024 2

Time Travel is Cheating: Going Live with DeepFund for Real-Time Fund Investment Benchmarking

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated notable capabilities across financial tasks, including financial report summarization, earnings call transcript analysis, and asset classification. However, their real-world effectiveness in managing complex fund investment remains inadequately assessed. A fundamental limitation of existing benchmarks for evaluating LLM-driven trading strategies is their reliance on historical back-testing, inadvertently enabling LLMs to "time travel"-leveraging future information embedded in their training corpora, thus resulting in possible information leakage and overly optimistic performance estimates. To address this issue, we introduce DeepFund, a live fund benchmark tool designed to rigorously evaluate LLM in real-time market conditions. Utilizing a multi-agent architecture, DeepFund connects directly with real-time stock market data-specifically data published after each model pretraining cutoff-to ensure fair and leakage-free evaluations. Empirical tests on nine flagship LLMs from leading global institutions across multiple investment dimensions-including ticker-level analysis, investment decision-making, portfolio management, and risk control-reveal significant practical challenges. Notably, even cutting-edge models such as DeepSeek-V3 and Claude-3.7-Sonnet incur net trading losses within DeepFund real-time evaluation environment, underscoring the present limitations of LLMs for active fund management. Our code is available at https://github.com/HKUSTDial/DeepFund.

  • 10 authors
·
May 16, 2025

Talent-Interview: Web-Client Cheating Detection for Online Exams

Online exams are more attractive after the Covid-19 pandemic. Furthermore, during recruitment, online exams are used. However, there are more cheating possibilities for online exams. Assigning a proctor for each exam increases cost. At this point, automatic proctor systems detect possible cheating status. This article proposes an end-to-end system and submodules to get better results for online proctoring. Object detection, face recognition, human voice detection, and segmentation are used in our system. Furthermore, our proposed model works on the PCs of users, meaning a client-based system. So, server cost is eliminated. As far as we know, it is the first time the client-based online proctoring system has been used for recruitment. Online exams are more attractive after the Covid-19 pandemic. Furthermore, during recruitment, online exams are used. However, there are more cheating possibilities for online exams. Assigning a proctor for each exam increases cost. At this point, automatic proctor systems detect possible cheating status. This article proposes an end-to-end system and submodules to get better results for online proctoring. Object detection, face recognition, human voice detection, and segmentation are used in our system. Furthermore, our proposed model works on the PCs of users, meaning a client-based system. So, server cost is eliminated. As far as we know, it is the first time the client-based online proctoring system has been used for recruitment. Furthermore, this cheating system works at https://www.talent-interview.com/tr/.

  • 2 authors
·
Nov 17, 2023

A Case Study on Emergent Cheating and Whistleblowing in Autonomous Research Swarms

Multi-agent AI science ecosystems rely on agents possessing tools that allow them to communicate, coordinate, and build on each other's work. Yet this shared infrastructure can also introduce vulnerabilities by creating a substrate for the contagious spread of unintended and undesirable behaviors. We report a case study on a research collective of 100 autonomous LLM agents tasked with proving formal mathematical conjectures. Within the swarm, cheating spontaneously emerged and was later challenged by whistleblowers - both without any external intervention. When a single agent discovered an exploit in the evaluation system, it propagated across the collective via a shared knowledge library and later through peer-to-peer messages. Despite early reluctance, a cohort of agents adopted the exploit in response to competitive pressure. A separate group of agents produced an emergent counter-response: auditing fraudulent proofs, alerting peers across broadcast and private channels, staging boycotts, lodging formal complaints, and proposing validation patches. In recent incidents, agent swarms coordinated covertly through improvised side-channels (Dalton and Wallace, 2026; Greenblatt et al., 2026). Our setting differs: the same transparent channels that carried the exploit also gave non-cheating agents the visibility they needed to detect fraud, organize resistance, and enforce norms. We cast the problem of managing the agents' shared infrastructure as the knowledge commons governance problem (Ostrom, 1990). To protect the commons from exploits, we propose to adopt institutional mechanisms, such as graduated sanctioning and collective-choice rules, to support decentralized self-governance in autonomous swarms.

  • 6 authors
·
Sep 2