Daily Papers

We study single-error detection and correction for analog codes over R. The key performance measures are the parameters Γ_1(C) and Γ_2(C), which quantify, respectively, the minimum separation required between large outlying errors that must be detected or located and the magnitude of tolerable perturbations. First, we prove that every real linear [n,k] code C satisfies \[ Γ_1(C)\ge 2\left\lceiln{n-k}\right\rceil. \] Moreover, when k=n-2, we prove that every real linear [n,n-2] code C satisfies \[ Γ_2(C)\ge 1{\sin^2(π/2n)}. \] Together, these two lower bounds settle all four open problems of Roth concerning the optimality of single-error-detecting and single-error-correcting analog codes. The proof of the first bound is based on a double-induction argument, while the proof of the second combines a zonotope-based geometric characterization of Γ_2(C) with a cyclic sine-product inequality. In addition, we construct analog codes with higher fixed redundancy and show that, for every fixed rge 2, there exists a class of linear [n,ge n-r] codes over R such that \[ Γ_2(C)\le O\left(n^{1+1{r-1}}\right). \] This gives a new upper bound in the fixed-redundancy regime, which was not covered by previously known constructions.

Hypothetical induction is recognized as the main reasoning type when scientists make observations about the world and try to propose hypotheses to explain those observations. Past research on hypothetical induction is under a constrained setting: (1) the observation annotations in the dataset are carefully manually handpicked sentences (resulting in a close-domain setting); and (2) the ground truth hypotheses are mostly commonsense knowledge, making the task less challenging. In this work, we tackle these problems by proposing the first dataset for social science academic hypotheses discovery, with the final goal to create systems that automatically generate valid, novel, and helpful scientific hypotheses, given only a pile of raw web corpus. Unlike previous settings, the new dataset requires (1) using open-domain data (raw web corpus) as observations; and (2) proposing hypotheses even new to humanity. A multi-module framework is developed for the task, including three different feedback mechanisms to boost performance, which exhibits superior performance in terms of both GPT-4 based and expert-based evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work showing that LLMs are able to generate novel (''not existing in literature'') and valid (''reflecting reality'') scientific hypotheses.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable improvements in reasoning and many existing benchmarks have been addressed by models such as o1 and o3 either fully or partially. However, a majority of these benchmarks emphasize deductive reasoning, including mathematical and coding tasks in which rules such as mathematical axioms or programming syntax are clearly defined, based on which LLMs can plan and apply these rules to arrive at a solution. In contrast, inductive reasoning, where one infers the underlying rules from observed data, remains less explored. Such inductive processes lie at the heart of scientific discovery, as they enable researchers to extract general principles from empirical observations. To assess whether LLMs possess this capacity, we introduce InductionBench, a new benchmark designed to evaluate the inductive reasoning ability of LLMs. Our experimental findings reveal that even the most advanced models available struggle to master the simplest complexity classes within the subregular hierarchy of functions, highlighting a notable deficiency in current LLMs' inductive reasoning capabilities. Coda and data are available https://github.com/Wenyueh/inductive_reasoning_benchmark.

We present a set-theoretic, proof-irrelevant model for Calculus of Constructions (CC) with predicative induction and judgmental equality in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with an axiom for countably many inaccessible cardinals. We use Aczel's trace encoding which is universally defined for any function type, regardless of being impredicative. Direct and concrete interpretations of simultaneous induction and mutually recursive functions are also provided by extending Dybjer's interpretations on the basis of Aczel's rule sets. Our model can be regarded as a higher-order generalization of the truth-table methods. We provide a relatively simple consistency proof of type theory, which can be used as the basis for a theorem prover.

Large language models demonstrate the intriguing ability to perform unseen tasks via in-context learning. However, it remains unclear what mechanisms inside the model drive such task-level generalization. In this work, we approach this question through the lens of off-by-one addition (i.e., 1+1=3, 2+2=5, 3+3=?), a two-step, counterfactual task with an unexpected +1 function as a second step. Leveraging circuit-style interpretability techniques such as path patching, we analyze the models' internal computations behind their performance and present three key findings. First, we uncover a function induction mechanism that explains the model's generalization from standard addition to off-by-one addition. This mechanism resembles the structure of the induction head mechanism found in prior work and elevates it to a higher level of abstraction. Second, we show that the induction of the +1 function is governed by multiple attention heads in parallel, each of which emits a distinct piece of the +1 function. Finally, we find that this function induction mechanism is reused in a broader range of tasks, including synthetic tasks such as shifted multiple-choice QA and algorithmic tasks such as base-8 addition. Overall, our findings offer deeper insights into how reusable and composable structures within language models enable task-level generalization.

A recent paper (van Rooij et al. 2024) claims to have proved that achieving human-like intelligence using learning from data is intractable in a complexity-theoretic sense. We identify that the proof relies on an unjustified assumption about the distribution of (input, output) pairs to the system. We briefly discuss that assumption in the context of two fundamental barriers to repairing the proof: the need to precisely define ``human-like," and the need to account for the fact that a particular machine learning system will have particular inductive biases that are key to the analysis.

Argument mining involves multiple sub-tasks that automatically identify argumentative elements, such as claim detection, evidence extraction, stance classification, etc. However, each subtask alone is insufficient for a thorough understanding of the argumentative structure and reasoning process. To learn a complete view of an argument essay and capture the interdependence among argumentative components, we need to know what opinions people hold (i.e., claims), why those opinions are valid (i.e., supporting evidence), which source the evidence comes from (i.e., evidence type), and how those claims react to the debating topic (i.e., stance). In this work, we for the first time propose a challenging argument quadruplet extraction task (AQE), which can provide an all-in-one extraction of four argumentative components, i.e., claims, evidence, evidence types, and stances. To support this task, we construct a large-scale and challenging dataset. However, there is no existing method that can solve the argument quadruplet extraction. To fill this gap, we propose a novel quad-tagging augmented generative approach, which leverages a quadruplet tagging module to augment the training of the generative framework. The experimental results on our dataset demonstrate the empirical superiority of our proposed approach over several strong baselines.

Conducting contamination-free evaluation of mathematical capabilities can be difficult for two reasons: models may memorize a test set once it is made public, and current mathematical benchmarks are prone to overfitting due to having limited diversity of symbols and rules, coupled with closed-ended answers. This paper proposes a method to leverage these shortcomings as useful features to a construct dynamic, counterfactual benchmark, which can be used to both reveal overfitting and measure true reasoning. We demonstrate this via MatheMagic, which generates math test instances with the interpretations of numbers and operators altered, yet has automatically verifiable answers. Test instances are randomly seeded and constructed at test time to evaluate a model's induction or deduction capability, offering stability, extensibility, comparability, and robustness to overfitting. Our experiments find that models solve deduction more easily than induction, but they revert to standard math. Further analysis reveals that math-adapted models fail to exhibit a general "skill" of reasoning, and fine-tuning on induction tasks generalizes poorly.

Reasoning encompasses two typical types: deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning. Despite extensive research into the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), most studies have failed to rigorously differentiate between inductive and deductive reasoning, leading to a blending of the two. This raises an essential question: In LLM reasoning, which poses a greater challenge - deductive or inductive reasoning? While the deductive reasoning capabilities of LLMs, (i.e. their capacity to follow instructions in reasoning tasks), have received considerable attention, their abilities in true inductive reasoning remain largely unexplored. To investigate into the true inductive reasoning capabilities of LLMs, we propose a novel framework, SolverLearner. This framework enables LLMs to learn the underlying function (i.e., y = f_w(x)), that maps input data points (x) to their corresponding output values (y), using only in-context examples. By focusing on inductive reasoning and separating it from LLM-based deductive reasoning, we can isolate and investigate inductive reasoning of LLMs in its pure form via SolverLearner. Our observations reveal that LLMs demonstrate remarkable inductive reasoning capabilities through SolverLearner, achieving near-perfect performance with ACC of 1 in most cases. Surprisingly, despite their strong inductive reasoning abilities, LLMs tend to relatively lack deductive reasoning capabilities, particularly in tasks involving ``counterfactual'' reasoning.

Double descent presents a counter-intuitive aspect within the machine learning domain, and researchers have observed its manifestation in various models and tasks. While some theoretical explanations have been proposed for this phenomenon in specific contexts, an accepted theory to account for its occurrence in deep learning remains yet to be established. In this study, we revisit the phenomenon of double descent and demonstrate that its occurrence is strongly influenced by the presence of noisy data. Through conducting a comprehensive analysis of the feature space of learned representations, we unveil that double descent arises in imperfect models trained with noisy data. We argue that double descent is a consequence of the model first learning the noisy data until interpolation and then adding implicit regularization via over-parameterization acquiring therefore capability to separate the information from the noise.

Leveraging mathematical Large Language Models (LLMs) for proof generation is a fundamental topic in LLMs research. We argue that the ability of current LLMs to prove statements largely depends on whether they have encountered the relevant proof process during training. This reliance limits their deeper understanding of mathematical theorems and related concepts. Inspired by the pedagogical method of "proof by counterexamples" commonly used in human mathematics education, our work aims to enhance LLMs' ability to conduct mathematical reasoning and proof through counterexamples. Specifically, we manually create a high-quality, university-level mathematical benchmark, CounterMATH, which requires LLMs to prove mathematical statements by providing counterexamples, thereby assessing their grasp of mathematical concepts. Additionally, we develop a data engineering framework to automatically obtain training data for further model improvement. Extensive experiments and detailed analyses demonstrate that CounterMATH is challenging, indicating that LLMs, such as OpenAI o1, have insufficient counterexample-driven proof capabilities. Moreover, our exploration into model training reveals that strengthening LLMs' counterexample-driven conceptual reasoning abilities is crucial for improving their overall mathematical capabilities. We believe that our work offers new perspectives on the community of mathematical LLMs.

The ability to derive underlying principles from a handful of observations and then generalize to novel situations -- known as inductive reasoning -- is central to human intelligence. Prior work suggests that language models (LMs) often fall short on inductive reasoning, despite achieving impressive success on research benchmarks. In this work, we conduct a systematic study of the inductive reasoning capabilities of LMs through iterative hypothesis refinement, a technique that more closely mirrors the human inductive process than standard input-output prompting. Iterative hypothesis refinement employs a three-step process: proposing, selecting, and refining hypotheses in the form of textual rules. By examining the intermediate rules, we observe that LMs are phenomenal hypothesis proposers (i.e., generating candidate rules), and when coupled with a (task-specific) symbolic interpreter that is able to systematically filter the proposed set of rules, this hybrid approach achieves strong results across inductive reasoning benchmarks that require inducing causal relations, language-like instructions, and symbolic concepts. However, they also behave as puzzling inductive reasoners, showing notable performance gaps between rule induction (i.e., identifying plausible rules) and rule application (i.e., applying proposed rules to instances), suggesting that LMs are proposing hypotheses without being able to actually apply the rules. Through empirical and human analyses, we further reveal several discrepancies between the inductive reasoning processes of LMs and humans, shedding light on both the potentials and limitations of using LMs in inductive reasoning tasks.

Deduction, induction, and abduction are fundamental reasoning paradigms, core for human logical thinking. Although improving Large Language Model (LLM) reasoning has attracted significant research efforts, the extent to which the fundamental paradigms induce generalization has yet to be systematically explored. In this study, we shed light on how the interplay between these core paradigms influences LLMs' reasoning behavior. To this end, we first collect a new dataset of reasoning trajectories from symbolic tasks, each targeting one of the three fundamental paradigms, to abstract from concrete world knowledge. Then, we investigate effective ways for inducing these skills into LLMs. We experiment with a battery of methods including simple fine-tuning, and more complex approaches to increase model depth, or transform a dense model to a mixture-of-experts. We comprehensively evaluate induced models on realistic out-of-domain tasks, that are entirely formulated in natural language and contain real-world knowledge. Our results reveal that our approach yields strong generalizability with substantial performance gains (up to 14.60) across realistic tasks.

The Machine Learning for Combinatorial Optimization (ML4CO) NeurIPS 2021 competition aims to improve state-of-the-art combinatorial optimization solvers by replacing key heuristic components with machine learning models. On the dual task, we design models to make branching decisions to promote the dual bound increase faster. We propose a knowledge inheritance method to generalize knowledge of different models from the dataset aggregation process, named KIDA. Our improvement overcomes some defects of the baseline graph-neural-networks-based methods. Further, we won the 1st Place on the dual task. We hope this report can provide useful experience for developers and researchers. The code is available at https://github.com/megvii-research/NeurIPS2021-ML4CO-KIDA.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has become the de facto method to elicit reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, to mitigate hallucinations in CoT that are notoriously difficult to detect, current methods such as process reward models (PRMs) or self-consistency operate as opaque boxes and do not provide checkable evidence for their judgments, possibly limiting their effectiveness. To address this issue, we draw inspiration from the idea that "the gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof". We propose a retrospective, step-aware formal verification framework Safe. Rather than assigning arbitrary scores, we strive to articulate mathematical claims in formal mathematical language Lean 4 at each reasoning step and provide formal proofs to identify hallucinations. We evaluate our framework Safe across multiple language models and various mathematical datasets, demonstrating a significant performance improvement while offering interpretable and verifiable evidence. We also propose FormalStep as a benchmark for step correctness theorem proving with 30,809 formal statements. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first endeavor to utilize formal mathematical language Lean 4 for verifying natural language content generated by LLMs, aligning with the reason why formal mathematical languages were created in the first place: to provide a robust foundation for hallucination-prone human-written proofs.

We show that a variety of modern deep learning tasks exhibit a "double-descent" phenomenon where, as we increase model size, performance first gets worse and then gets better. Moreover, we show that double descent occurs not just as a function of model size, but also as a function of the number of training epochs. We unify the above phenomena by defining a new complexity measure we call the effective model complexity and conjecture a generalized double descent with respect to this measure. Furthermore, our notion of model complexity allows us to identify certain regimes where increasing (even quadrupling) the number of train samples actually hurts test performance.

Transformers have been shown to emulate logical deduction over natural language theories (logical rules expressed in natural language), reliably assigning true/false labels to candidate implications. However, their ability to generate implications of a theory has not yet been demonstrated, and methods for reconstructing proofs of answers are imperfect. In this work we show that a generative model, called ProofWriter, can reliably generate both implications of a theory and the natural language proof(s) that support them. In particular, iterating a 1-step implication generator results in proofs that are highly reliable, and represent actual model decisions (rather than post-hoc rationalizations). On the RuleTaker dataset, the accuracy of ProofWriter's proofs exceed previous methods by +9% absolute, and in a way that generalizes to proof depths unseen in training and on out-of-domain problems. We also show that generative techniques can perform a type of abduction with high precision: Given a theory and an unprovable conclusion, identify a missing fact that allows the conclusion to be proved, along with a proof. These results significantly improve the viability of neural methods for systematically reasoning over natural language.

Mechanism-targeted synthetic data is increasingly proposed as a way to steer pretraining toward desirable capabilities, but it remains unclear how such interventions should be evaluated. We study this question for in-context learning (ICL) under matched compute (iso-FLOPs) using Bi-Induct, a lightweight data rewrite that interleaves short directional copy snippets into a natural pretraining stream: forward-copy (induction), backward-copy (anti-induction, as a directional control), or a balanced mix. Across 0.13B-1B decoder-only models, we evaluate (i) few-shot performance on standard LM benchmarks and function-style ICL probes, (ii) head-level copy telemetry, and (iii) held-out perplexity as a guardrail. Bi-Induct reliably increases induction-head activity, but this does not translate into consistent improvements in few-shot generalization: on standard LM benchmarks, Bi-Induct is largely performance-neutral relative to natural-only training, while on function-style probes the 1B natural-only model performs best. Despite explicit backward-copy cues, anti-induction scores remain near zero across scales, revealing a strong forward/backward asymmetry. Targeted ablations show a sharper distinction: removing the top 2% induction heads per layer harms ICL more than matched random ablations, with the largest relative drop occurring in the natural-only models. This indicates that natural-only training produces more centralized, load-bearing induction circuitry, whereas Bi-Induct tends to create more distributed and redundant induction activity. Our main conclusion is that eliciting a mechanism is not the same as making it load-bearing. For data-centric foundation model design, this suggests that synthetic data interventions should be evaluated not only by signature amplification, but by whether they create causally necessary computation while preserving natural-data modeling quality.

We resolve a $1000 Erdős prize problem, complete with formal verification generated by a large language model. In over a dozen papers, beginning in 1976 and spanning two decades, Paul Erdős repeatedly posed one of his "favourite" conjectures: every finite Sidon set can be extended to a finite perfect difference set. We establish that {1, 2, 4, 8, 13} is a counterexample to this conjecture. During the preparation of this paper, we discovered that although this problem was presumed to be open for half a century, Marshall Hall, Jr. published a different counterexample three decades before Erdős first posed the problem. With a healthy skepticism of this apparent oversight, and out of an abundance of caution, we used ChatGPT to vibe code a Lean proof of both Hall's and our counterexamples.

Generating novel and creative scientific hypotheses is a cornerstone in achieving Artificial General Intelligence. Large language and reasoning models have the potential to aid in the systematic creation, selection, and validation of scientifically informed hypotheses. However, current foundation models often struggle to produce scientific ideas that are both novel and feasible. One reason is the lack of a dedicated dataset that frames Scientific Hypothesis Generation (SHG) as a Natural Language Generation (NLG) task. In this paper, we introduce HypoGen, the first dataset of approximately 5500 structured problem-hypothesis pairs extracted from top-tier computer science conferences structured with a Bit-Flip-Spark schema, where the Bit is the conventional assumption, the Spark is the key insight or conceptual leap, and the Flip is the resulting counterproposal. HypoGen uniquely integrates an explicit Chain-of-Reasoning component that reflects the intellectual process from Bit to Flip. We demonstrate that framing hypothesis generation as conditional language modelling, with the model fine-tuned on Bit-Flip-Spark and the Chain-of-Reasoning (and where, at inference, we only provide the Bit), leads to improvements in the overall quality of the hypotheses. Our evaluation employs automated metrics and LLM judge rankings for overall quality assessment. We show that by fine-tuning on our HypoGen dataset we improve the novelty, feasibility, and overall quality of the generated hypotheses. The HypoGen dataset is publicly available at huggingface.co/datasets/UniverseTBD/hypogen-dr1.

Recent work on neural algorithmic reasoning has investigated the reasoning capabilities of neural networks, effectively demonstrating they can learn to execute classical algorithms on unseen data coming from the train distribution. However, the performance of existing neural reasoners significantly degrades on out-of-distribution (OOD) test data, where inputs have larger sizes. In this work, we make an important observation: there are many different inputs for which an algorithm will perform certain intermediate computations identically. This insight allows us to develop data augmentation procedures that, given an algorithm's intermediate trajectory, produce inputs for which the target algorithm would have exactly the same next trajectory step. Then, we employ a causal framework to design a corresponding self-supervised objective, and we prove that it improves the OOD generalisation capabilities of the reasoner. We evaluate our method on the CLRS algorithmic reasoning benchmark, where we show up to 3times improvements on the OOD test data.

Much research in machine learning involves finding appropriate inductive biases (e.g. convolutional neural networks, momentum-based optimizers, transformers) to promote generalization on tasks. However, quantification of the amount of inductive bias associated with these architectures and hyperparameters has been limited. We propose a novel method for efficiently computing the inductive bias required for generalization on a task with a fixed training data budget; formally, this corresponds to the amount of information required to specify well-generalizing models within a specific hypothesis space of models. Our approach involves modeling the loss distribution of random hypotheses drawn from a hypothesis space to estimate the required inductive bias for a task relative to these hypotheses. Unlike prior work, our method provides a direct estimate of inductive bias without using bounds and is applicable to diverse hypothesis spaces. Moreover, we derive approximation error bounds for our estimation approach in terms of the number of sampled hypotheses. Consistent with prior results, our empirical results demonstrate that higher dimensional tasks require greater inductive bias. We show that relative to other expressive model classes, neural networks as a model class encode large amounts of inductive bias. Furthermore, our measure quantifies the relative difference in inductive bias between different neural network architectures. Our proposed inductive bias metric provides an information-theoretic interpretation of the benefits of specific model architectures for certain tasks and provides a quantitative guide to developing tasks requiring greater inductive bias, thereby encouraging the development of more powerful inductive biases.

Inductive reasoning is a core problem-solving capacity: humans can identify underlying principles from a few examples, which can then be robustly generalized to novel scenarios. Recent work has evaluated large language models (LLMs) on inductive reasoning tasks by directly prompting them yielding "in context learning." This can work well for straightforward inductive tasks, but performs very poorly on more complex tasks such as the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC). In this work, we propose to improve the inductive reasoning ability of LLMs by generating explicit hypotheses at multiple levels of abstraction: we prompt the LLM to propose multiple abstract hypotheses about the problem, in natural language, then implement the natural language hypotheses as concrete Python programs. These programs can be directly verified by running on the observed examples and generalized to novel inputs. Because of the prohibitive cost of generation with state-of-the-art LLMs, we consider a middle step to filter the set of hypotheses that will be implemented into programs: we either ask the LLM to summarize into a smaller set of hypotheses, or ask human annotators to select a subset of the hypotheses. We verify our pipeline's effectiveness on the ARC visual inductive reasoning benchmark, its variant 1D-ARC, and string transformation dataset SyGuS. On a random 40-problem subset of ARC, our automated pipeline using LLM summaries achieves 27.5% accuracy, significantly outperforming the direct prompting baseline (accuracy of 12.5%). With the minimal human input of selecting from LLM-generated candidates, the performance is boosted to 37.5%. (And we argue this is a lower bound on the performance of our approach without filtering.) Our ablation studies show that abstract hypothesis generation and concrete program representations are both beneficial for LLMs to perform inductive reasoning tasks.

In math reasoning with large language models (LLMs), fine-tuning data augmentation by query evolution and diverse reasoning paths is empirically verified effective, profoundly narrowing the gap between open-sourced LLMs and cutting-edge proprietary LLMs. In this paper, we conduct an investigation for such data augmentation in math reasoning and are intended to answer: (1) What strategies of data augmentation are more effective; (2) What is the scaling relationship between the amount of augmented data and model performance; and (3) Can data augmentation incentivize generalization to out-of-domain mathematical reasoning tasks? To this end, we create a new dataset, AugGSM8K, by complicating and diversifying the queries from GSM8K and sampling multiple reasoning paths. We obtained a series of LLMs called MuggleMath by fine-tuning on subsets of AugGSM8K. MuggleMath substantially achieves new state-of-the-art on GSM8K (from 54% to 68.4% at the scale of 7B, and from 63.9% to 74.0% at the scale of 13B). A log-linear relationship is presented between MuggleMath's performance and the amount of augmented data. We also find that MuggleMath is weak in out-of-domain math reasoning generalization to MATH. This is attributed to the differences in query distribution between AugGSM8K and MATH which suggest that augmentation on a single benchmark could not help with overall math reasoning performance. Codes and AugGSM8K will be uploaded to https://github.com/OFA-Sys/gsm8k-ScRel.

In a recent paper, Erasmus et al. (2021) defend the idea that the ambiguity of the term "explanation" in explainable AI (XAI) can be solved by adopting any of four different extant accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science: the Deductive Nomological, Inductive Statistical, Causal Mechanical, and New Mechanist models. In this chapter, I show that the authors' claim that these accounts can be applied to deep neural networks as they would to any natural phenomenon is mistaken. I also provide a more general argument as to why the notion of explainability as it is currently used in the XAI literature bears little resemblance to the traditional concept of scientific explanation. It would be more fruitful to use the label "understandable AI" to avoid the confusion that surrounds the goal and purposes of XAI. In the second half of the chapter, I argue for a pragmatic conception of understanding that is better suited to play the central role attributed to explanation in XAI. Following Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015), the conditions of satisfaction for understanding an ML system are fleshed out in terms of an agent's success in using the system, in drawing correct inferences from it.

Inductive reasoning is an essential capability for large language models (LLMs) to achieve higher intelligence, which requires the model to generalize rules from observed facts and then apply them to unseen examples. We present MIRAGE, a synthetic dataset that addresses the limitations of previous work, specifically the lack of comprehensive evaluation and flexible test data. In it, we evaluate LLMs' capabilities in both the inductive and deductive stages, allowing for flexible variation in input distribution, task scenario, and task difficulty to analyze the factors influencing LLMs' inductive reasoning. Based on these multi-faceted evaluations, we demonstrate that the LLM is a poor rule-based reasoner. In many cases, when conducting inductive reasoning, they do not rely on a correct rule to answer the unseen case. From the perspectives of different prompting methods, observation numbers, and task forms, models tend to consistently conduct correct deduction without correct inductive rules. Besides, we find that LLMs are good neighbor-based reasoners. In the inductive reasoning process, the model tends to focus on observed facts that are close to the current test example in feature space. By leveraging these similar examples, the model maintains strong inductive capabilities within a localized region, significantly improving its deductive performance.

This paper takes a first step towards a critical thinking curriculum for neural auto-regressive language models. We introduce a synthetic corpus of deductively valid arguments, and generate artificial argumentative texts to train and evaluate GPT-2. Significant transfer learning effects can be observed: Training a model on three simple core schemes allows it to accurately complete conclusions of different, and more complex types of arguments, too. The language models generalize the core argument schemes in a correct way. Moreover, we obtain consistent and promising results for NLU benchmarks. In particular, pre-training on the argument schemes raises zero-shot accuracy on the GLUE diagnostics by up to 15 percentage points. The findings suggest that intermediary pre-training on texts that exemplify basic reasoning abilities (such as typically covered in critical thinking textbooks) might help language models to acquire a broad range of reasoning skills. The synthetic argumentative texts presented in this paper are a promising starting point for building such a "critical thinking curriculum for language models."

LLM-based formal proof assistants (e.g., in Lean) hold great promise for automating mathematical discovery. But beyond syntactic correctness, do these systems truly understand mathematical structure as humans do? We investigate this question through the lens of mathematical inequalities -- a fundamental tool across many domains. While modern provers can solve basic inequalities, we probe their ability to handle human-intuitive compositionality. We introduce Ineq-Comp, a benchmark built from elementary inequalities through systematic transformations, including variable duplication, algebraic rewriting, and multi-step composition. Although these problems remain easy for humans, we find that most provers -- including Goedel, STP, and Kimina-7B -- struggle significantly. DeepSeek-Prover-V2-7B shows relative robustness -- possibly because it is trained to decompose the problems into sub-problems -- but still suffers a 20\% performance drop (pass@32). Strikingly, performance remains poor for all models even when formal proofs of the constituent parts are provided in context, revealing that the source of weakness is indeed in compositional reasoning. Our results expose a persisting gap between the generalization behavior of current AI provers and human mathematical intuition.

Bold claims about AI's role in science-from "AGI will cure all diseases" to promises of radically accelerated discovery-raise a central epistemic question: do large language models (LLMs) truly generate new knowledge, or do they merely remix memorized fragments? We propose unlearning-as-ablation as a falsifiable probe of constructive scientific discovery. The idea is to systematically remove a target result together with its forget-closure (supporting lemmas, paraphrases, and multi-hop entailments) and then evaluate whether the model can re-derive the result from only permitted axioms and tools. Success would indicate generative capability beyond recall; failure would expose current limits. Unlike prevailing motivations for unlearning-privacy, copyright, or safety-our framing repositions it as an epistemic probe for AI-for-Science. We outline a minimal pilot in mathematics and algorithms to illustrate feasibility, and sketch how the same approach could later be extended to domains such as physics or chemistry. This is a position paper: our contribution is conceptual and methodological, not empirical. We aim to stimulate discussion on how principled ablation tests could help distinguish models that reconstruct knowledge from those that merely retrieve it, and how such probes might guide the next generation of AI-for-Science benchmarks.

Theorem proving in natural mathematical language - the mixture of symbolic and natural language used by humans - plays a central role in mathematical advances and education, and tests aspects of reasoning that are core to intelligence. Yet it has remained underexplored with modern generative models. We study large-scale language models on two new generation tasks: suggesting the next step in a mathematical proof, and full proof generation. We develop NaturalProver, a language model that generates proofs by conditioning on background references (e.g. theorems and definitions that are either retrieved or human-provided), and optionally enforces their presence with constrained decoding. On theorems from the NaturalProofs benchmark, NaturalProver improves the quality of next-step suggestions and generated proofs over fine-tuned GPT-3, according to human evaluations from university-level mathematics students. NaturalProver is capable of proving some theorems that require short (2-6 step) proofs, and providing next-step suggestions that are rated as correct and useful over 40% of the time, which is to our knowledge the first demonstration of these capabilities using neural language models.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Whether neural networks can learn abstract reasoning or whether they merely rely on superficial statistics is a topic of recent debate. Here, we propose a dataset and challenge designed to probe abstract reasoning, inspired by a well-known human IQ test. To succeed at this challenge, models must cope with various generalisation `regimes' in which the training and test data differ in clearly-defined ways. We show that popular models such as ResNets perform poorly, even when the training and test sets differ only minimally, and we present a novel architecture, with a structure designed to encourage reasoning, that does significantly better. When we vary the way in which the test questions and training data differ, we find that our model is notably proficient at certain forms of generalisation, but notably weak at others. We further show that the model's ability to generalise improves markedly if it is trained to predict symbolic explanations for its answers. Altogether, we introduce and explore ways to both measure and induce stronger abstract reasoning in neural networks. Our freely-available dataset should motivate further progress in this direction.

A key challenge in building theoretical foundations for deep learning is the complex optimization dynamics of neural networks, resulting from the high-dimensional interactions between the large number of network parameters. Such non-trivial dynamics lead to intriguing behaviors such as the phenomenon of "double descent" of the generalization error. The more commonly studied aspect of this phenomenon corresponds to model-wise double descent where the test error exhibits a second descent with increasing model complexity, beyond the classical U-shaped error curve. In this work, we investigate the origins of the less studied epoch-wise double descent in which the test error undergoes two non-monotonous transitions, or descents as the training time increases. By leveraging tools from statistical physics, we study a linear teacher-student setup exhibiting epoch-wise double descent similar to that in deep neural networks. In this setting, we derive closed-form analytical expressions for the evolution of generalization error over training. We find that double descent can be attributed to distinct features being learned at different scales: as fast-learning features overfit, slower-learning features start to fit, resulting in a second descent in test error. We validate our findings through numerical experiments where our theory accurately predicts empirical findings and remains consistent with observations in deep neural networks.

This paper considers the learning of logical (Boolean) functions with focus on the generalization on the unseen (GOTU) setting, a strong case of out-of-distribution generalization. This is motivated by the fact that the rich combinatorial nature of data in certain reasoning tasks (e.g., arithmetic/logic) makes representative data sampling challenging, and learning successfully under GOTU gives a first vignette of an 'extrapolating' or 'reasoning' learner. We then study how different network architectures trained by (S)GD perform under GOTU and provide both theoretical and experimental evidence that for a class of network models including instances of Transformers, random features models, and diagonal linear networks, a min-degree-interpolator (MDI) is learned on the unseen. We also provide evidence that other instances with larger learning rates or mean-field networks reach leaky MDIs. These findings lead to two implications: (1) we provide an explanation to the length generalization problem (e.g., Anil et al. 2022); (2) we introduce a curriculum learning algorithm called Degree-Curriculum that learns monomials more efficiently by incrementing supports.

When people reason about cause and effect, they often consider many competing "what if" scenarios before deciding which explanation fits best. Analogously, advanced language models capable of causal inference can consider multiple interventions and counterfactuals to judge the validity of causal claims. Crucially, this type of reasoning is less like a single calculation and more like an internal dialogue between alternative hypotheses. In this paper, we make this dialogue explicit through a dual-agent debate framework where one model provides a structured causal inference, and the other critically examines this reasoning for logical flaws. When disagreements arise, agents attempt to persuade each other, challenging each other's logic and revising their conclusions until they converge on a mutually agreed answer. To take advantage of this deliberative process, we specifically use reasoning language models, whose strengths in both causal inference and adversarial debate remain under-explored relative to standard large language models. We evaluate our approach on the CLadder dataset, a benchmark linking natural language questions to formally defined causal graphs across all three rungs of Pearl's ladder of causation. With Qwen3 and DeepSeek-R1 as debater agents, we demonstrate that multi-agent debate improves DeepSeek-R1's overall accuracy in causal inference from 78.03% to 87.45%, with the counterfactual category specifically improving from 67.94% to 80.04% accuracy. Similarly, Qwen3's overall accuracy improves from 84.16% to 89.41%, and counterfactual questions from 71.53% to 80.35%, showing that strong models can still benefit greatly from debate with weaker agents. Our results highlight the potential of reasoning models as building blocks for multi-agent systems in causal inference, and demonstrate the importance of diverse perspectives in causal problem-solving.

Inductive reasoning is a core component of human intelligence. In the past research of inductive reasoning within computer science, formal language is used as representations of knowledge (facts and rules, more specifically). However, formal language can cause systematic problems for inductive reasoning such as disability of handling raw input such as natural language, sensitiveness to mislabeled data, and incapacity to handle ambiguous input. To this end, we propose a new paradigm (task) for inductive reasoning, which is to induce natural language rules from natural language facts, and create a dataset termed DEER containing 1.2k rule-fact pairs for the task, where rules and facts are written in natural language. New automatic metrics are also proposed and analysed for the evaluation of this task. With DEER, we investigate a modern approach for inductive reasoning where we use natural language as representation for knowledge instead of formal language and use pretrained language models as ''reasoners''. Moreover, we provide the first and comprehensive analysis of how well pretrained language models can induce natural language rules from natural language facts. We also propose a new framework drawing insights from philosophy literature for this task, which we show in the experiment section that surpasses baselines in both automatic and human evaluations. We discuss about our future perspectives for inductive reasoning in Section 7. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/ZonglinY/Inductive_Reasoning.

Given the intractably large size of the space of proofs, any model that is capable of general deductive reasoning must generalize to proofs of greater complexity. Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) possess some abstract deductive reasoning ability given chain-of-thought prompts. However, they have primarily been tested on proofs using modus ponens or of a specific size, and from the same distribution as the in-context examples. To measure the general deductive reasoning ability of LLMs, we test on a broad set of deduction rules and measure their ability to generalize to more complex proofs from simpler demonstrations from multiple angles: depth-, width-, and compositional generalization. To facilitate systematic exploration, we construct a new synthetic and programmable reasoning dataset that enables control over deduction rules and proof complexity. Our experiments on four LLMs of various sizes and training objectives show that they are able to generalize to longer and compositional proofs. However, they require explicit demonstrations to produce hypothetical subproofs, specifically in proof by cases and proof by contradiction.

Reasoning in large language models (LLMs) tends to produce substantially longer token generation sequences than simpler language modeling tasks. This extended generation length reflects the multi-step, compositional nature of reasoning and is often correlated with higher solution accuracy. From an efficiency perspective, longer token generation exacerbates the inherently sequential and memory-bound decoding phase of LLMs. However, not all parts of this expensive reasoning process are equally difficult to generate. We leverage this observation by offloading only the most challenging parts of the reasoning process to a larger, more capable model, while performing most of the generation with a smaller, more efficient model; furthermore, we teach the smaller model to identify these difficult segments and independently trigger offloading when needed. To enable this behavior, we annotate difficult segments across 18k reasoning traces from the OpenR1-Math-220k chain-of-thought (CoT) dataset. We then apply supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning fine-tuning (RLFT) to a 1.5B-parameter reasoning model, training it to learn to offload the most challenging parts of its own reasoning process to a larger model. This approach improves AIME24 reasoning accuracy by 24% and 28.3% while offloading 1.35% and 5% of the generated tokens respectively. We open-source our SplitReason model, data, code and logs.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are powerful candidates for complex decision-making, leveraging vast encoded knowledge and remarkable zero-shot abilities. However, their adoption in high-stakes environments is hindered by their opacity; their outputs lack faithful explanations and cannot be effectively contested to correct errors, undermining trustworthiness. In this paper, we propose ART (Adaptive Reasoning Trees), a hierarchical method for claim verification. The process begins with a root claim, which branches into supporting and attacking child arguments. An argument's strength is determined bottom-up via a pairwise tournament of its children, adjudicated by a judge LLM, allowing a final, transparent and contestable verdict to be systematically derived which is missing in methods like Chain-of-Thought (CoT). We empirically validate ART on multiple datasets, analyzing different argument generators and comparison strategies. Our findings show that ART's structured reasoning outperforms strong baselines, establishing a new benchmark for explainable claim verification which is more reliable and ensures clarity in the overall decision making step.

The quality of many modern machine learning models improves as model complexity increases, an effect that has been quantified, for predictive performance, with the non-monotonic double descent learning curve. Here, we address the overarching question: is there an analogous theory of double descent for models which estimate uncertainty? We provide a partially affirmative and partially negative answer in the setting of Gaussian processes (GP). Under standard assumptions, we prove that higher model quality for optimally-tuned GPs (including uncertainty prediction) under marginal likelihood is realized for larger input dimensions, and therefore exhibits a monotone error curve. After showing that marginal likelihood does not naturally exhibit double descent in the input dimension, we highlight related forms of posterior predictive loss that do exhibit non-monotonicity. Finally, we verify empirically that our results hold for real data, beyond our considered assumptions, and we explore consequences involving synthetic covariates.

Despite the success of chain of thought in enhancing language model reasoning, the underlying process remains less well understood. Although logically sound reasoning appears inherently crucial for chain of thought, prior studies surprisingly reveal minimal impact when using invalid demonstrations instead. Furthermore, the conventional chain of thought does not inform language models on what mistakes to avoid, which potentially leads to more errors. Hence, inspired by how humans can learn from both positive and negative examples, we propose contrastive chain of thought to enhance language model reasoning. Compared to the conventional chain of thought, our approach provides both valid and invalid reasoning demonstrations, to guide the model to reason step-by-step while reducing reasoning mistakes. To improve generalization, we introduce an automatic method to construct contrastive demonstrations. Our experiments on reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that contrastive chain of thought can serve as a general enhancement of chain-of-thought prompting.

Within the limited scope of this paper, we argue that artificial general intelligence cannot emerge from current neural network paradigms regardless of scale, nor is such an approach healthy for the field at present. Drawing on various notions, discussions, present-day developments and observations, current debates and critiques, experiments, and so on in between philosophy, including the Chinese Room Argument and Gödelian argument, neuroscientific ideas, computer science, the theoretical consideration of artificial intelligence, and learning theory, we address conceptually that neural networks are architecturally insufficient for genuine understanding. They operate as static function approximators of a limited encoding framework - a 'sophisticated sponge' exhibiting complex behaviours without structural richness that constitute intelligence. We critique the theoretical foundations the field relies on and created of recent times; for example, an interesting heuristic as neural scaling law (as an example, arXiv:2001.08361 ) made prominent in a wrong way of interpretation, The Universal Approximation Theorem addresses the wrong level of abstraction and, in parts, partially, the question of current architectures lacking dynamic restructuring capabilities. We propose a framework distinguishing existential facilities (computational substrate) from architectural organization (interpretive structures), and outline principles for what genuine machine intelligence would require, and furthermore, a conceptual method of structuralizing the richer framework on which the principle of neural network system takes hold.

Current long chain-of-thought (long-CoT) models excel at mathematical reasoning but rely on slow and error-prone natural language traces. Tool-augmented agents address arithmetic via code execution, but often falter on complex logical tasks. We introduce a fine-tuning framework, DualDistill, that distills complementary reasoning strategies from multiple teachers into a unified student model. Using this approach, we train Agentic-R1, which dynamically selects the optimal strategy for each query, invoking tools for arithmetic and algorithmic problems, and using text-based reasoning for abstract ones. Our method improves accuracy across a range of tasks, including both computation-intensive and standard benchmarks, demonstrating the effectiveness of multi-strategy distillation in achieving robust and efficient reasoning. Our project is available at https://github.com/StigLidu/DualDistill

We introduce ProofGrid, a benchmark suite for evaluating LLM reasoning through machine-checkable proofs rather than final answers alone. ProofGrid contains 15 tasks spanning proof writing, proof checking, proof masking, and proof gap-filling. Tasks are expressed in minimal formal notation, especially NDL, a compact natural-deduction language that fits in short prompts and supports precise, auditable verification. This yields mechanical, reproducible, and fine-grained evaluation rather than judgments by humans or LLMs. ProofGrid covers a calibrated difficulty spectrum, from foundational reasoning tests to structurally rich challenge tasks that no current model solves, while minimizing reliance on domain knowledge, solver delegation, and long-context artifacts. We also develop a comparative framework for reasoning benchmarks and use it to situate ProofGrid relative to existing work in terms of representation, verification guarantees, and reasoning depth. Methodologically, we introduce an instrumented proof-checking pipeline that tolerates minor surface deviations while locating the first substantive reasoning failure, improving measurement resolution and separating proof planning from low-level execution noise. Using this pipeline, we evaluate a broad range of open and proprietary models. Results show rapid progress but substantial remaining limits: frontier models perform well on several foundational tasks, yet difficult tasks, especially those requiring global combinatorial reasoning or low-level proof synthesis, remain far from solved. We also identify epistemic instability, where models generate flawed proofs yet correctly reject those local inferences in isolation, and formalize this with an Epistemic Stability Index. Finally, we complement accuracy with 2PL IRT analyses, Wright maps, and a normalized task-discrimination measure based on Fisher information.

"Induction heads" are attention heads that implement a simple algorithm to complete token sequences like [A][B] ... [A] -> [B]. In this work, we present preliminary and indirect evidence for a hypothesis that induction heads might constitute the mechanism for the majority of all "in-context learning" in large transformer models (i.e. decreasing loss at increasing token indices). We find that induction heads develop at precisely the same point as a sudden sharp increase in in-context learning ability, visible as a bump in the training loss. We present six complementary lines of evidence, arguing that induction heads may be the mechanistic source of general in-context learning in transformer models of any size. For small attention-only models, we present strong, causal evidence; for larger models with MLPs, we present correlational evidence.

The development of artificial intelligence systems with advanced reasoning capabilities represents a persistent and long-standing research question. Traditionally, the primary strategy to address this challenge involved the adoption of symbolic approaches, where knowledge was explicitly represented by means of symbols and explicitly programmed rules. However, with the advent of machine learning, there has been a paradigm shift towards systems that can autonomously learn from data, requiring minimal human guidance. In light of this shift, in latest years, there has been increasing interest and efforts at endowing neural networks with the ability to reason, bridging the gap between data-driven learning and logical reasoning. Within this context, Neural Algorithmic Reasoning (NAR) stands out as a promising research field, aiming to integrate the structured and rule-based reasoning of algorithms with the adaptive learning capabilities of neural networks, typically by tasking neural models to mimic classical algorithms. In this dissertation, we provide theoretical and practical contributions to this area of research. We explore the connections between neural networks and tropical algebra, deriving powerful architectures that are aligned with algorithm execution. Furthermore, we discuss and show the ability of such neural reasoners to learn and manipulate complex algorithmic and combinatorial optimization concepts, such as the principle of strong duality. Finally, in our empirical efforts, we validate the real-world utility of NAR networks across different practical scenarios. This includes tasks as diverse as planning problems, large-scale edge classification tasks and the learning of polynomial-time approximate algorithms for NP-hard combinatorial problems. Through this exploration, we aim to showcase the potential integrating algorithmic reasoning in machine learning models.

The equivalence of realizable and agnostic learnability is a fundamental phenomenon in learning theory. With variants ranging from classical settings like PAC learning and regression to recent trends such as adversarially robust learning, it's surprising that we still lack a unified theory; traditional proofs of the equivalence tend to be disparate, and rely on strong model-specific assumptions like uniform convergence and sample compression. In this work, we give the first model-independent framework explaining the equivalence of realizable and agnostic learnability: a three-line blackbox reduction that simplifies, unifies, and extends our understanding across a wide variety of settings. This includes models with no known characterization of learnability such as learning with arbitrary distributional assumptions and more general loss functions, as well as a host of other popular settings such as robust learning, partial learning, fair learning, and the statistical query model. More generally, we argue that the equivalence of realizable and agnostic learning is actually a special case of a broader phenomenon we call property generalization: any desirable property of a learning algorithm (e.g. noise tolerance, privacy, stability) that can be satisfied over finite hypothesis classes extends (possibly in some variation) to any learnable hypothesis class.

We explore how generating a chain of thought -- a series of intermediate reasoning steps -- significantly improves the ability of large language models to perform complex reasoning. In particular, we show how such reasoning abilities emerge naturally in sufficiently large language models via a simple method called chain of thought prompting, where a few chain of thought demonstrations are provided as exemplars in prompting. Experiments on three large language models show that chain of thought prompting improves performance on a range of arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning tasks. The empirical gains can be striking. For instance, prompting a 540B-parameter language model with just eight chain of thought exemplars achieves state of the art accuracy on the GSM8K benchmark of math word problems, surpassing even finetuned GPT-3 with a verifier.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable abilities in structured reasoning and symbolic tasks, with coding emerging as a particular area of strength. This success has sparked growing interest in applying LLMs to mathematics, both in informal problem-solving and formal theorem proving. However, progress in formal mathematics has proven to be significantly more difficult, despite surface-level similarities between programming and proof construction. This discrepancy raises important questions about how LLMs ``reason'', how they are supervised, and whether they internally track a notion of computational or deductive state. In this article, we address the state-of-the-art of the discipline, focusing on recent models and benchmarks, and explore three central issues at the intersection of machine learning and mathematical cognition: (i) the trade-offs between formal and informal mathematics as training domains; (ii) the deeper reasons why proof generation remains more brittle than code synthesis; (iii) and the question of whether LLMs represent, or merely mimic, a notion of evolving logical state. Our goal is not to draw hard boundaries, but to identify where the current limits lie, and how they might be extended.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) learns interpretable logical rules from data. Existing methods are transductive: their learned parameters are bound to specific predicates and require retraining for each new task. We introduce Neural Rule Inducer (NRI), a pretrained model for zero-shot rule induction. Rather than encoding literal identities, NRI represents literals using domain-agnostic statistical properties such as class-conditional rates, entropy, and co-occurrence, which generalize across variable identities and counts without retraining. The model consists of a statistical encoder and a parallel slot-based decoder. Parallel decoding preserves the permutation invariance of logical disjunction; an autoregressive decoder would instead impose an arbitrary clause order. Product T-norm relaxation makes rule execution differentiable, allowing end-to-end training on prediction accuracy alone. We evaluate NRI on rule recovery, robustness to label noise and spurious correlations, and zero-shot transfer to real-world benchmarks, and we believe this work opens up the possibility of foundation models for symbolic reasoning. Code and the reference checkpoint are available at https://github.com/phuayj/neural-rule-inducer.

There has been a lot of recent interest in adopting machine learning methods for scientific and engineering applications. This has in large part been inspired by recent successes and advances in the domains of Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Image Classification (IC). However, scientific and engineering problems have their own unique characteristics and requirements raising new challenges for effective design and deployment of machine learning approaches. There is a strong need for further mathematical developments on the foundations of machine learning methods to increase the level of rigor of employed methods and to ensure more reliable and interpretable results. Also as reported in the recent literature on state-of-the-art results and indicated by the No Free Lunch Theorems of statistical learning theory incorporating some form of inductive bias and domain knowledge is essential to success. Consequently, even for existing and widely used methods there is a strong need for further mathematical work to facilitate ways to incorporate prior scientific knowledge and related inductive biases into learning frameworks and algorithms. We briefly discuss these topics and discuss some ideas proceeding in this direction.

Let F_{k,d}(n) be the maximal size of a set {A}subseteq [n] such that the equation \[a_1a_2\dots a_k=x^d, \; a_1<a_2<\ldots<a_k\] has no solution with a_1,a_2,ldots,a_kA and integer x. Erdos, S\'ark\"ozy and T. S\'os studied F_{k,2}, and gave bounds when k=2,3,4,6 and also in the general case. We study the problem for d=3, and provide bounds for k=2,3,4,6 and 9, furthermore, in the general case, as well. In particular, we refute an 18 years old conjecture of Verstra\"ete. We also introduce another function f_{k,d} closely related to F_{k,d}: While the original problem requires a_1, ldots , a_k to all be distinct, we can relax this and only require that the multiset of the a_i's cannot be partitioned into d-tuples where each d-tuple consists of d copies of the same number.

Recent years have witnessed meteoric progress in reasoning models: neural networks that generate intermediate reasoning traces (RTs) before producing a final output. Despite the rapid advancement, our understanding of how RTs support reasoning, and the limits of this paradigm, remain incomplete. To promote greater clarity, we introduce PITA: a novel large-scale dataset of over 23 million statements in propositional logic and their corresponding proofs. As a benchmark for robust reasoning, we focus on length generalization: if a model is trained to determine truth or falsity on statements with proofs up to fixed length, how well does it generalize to statements requiring longer proofs? We propose notions of (1) task depth and (2) task breadth, which measure respectively (1) the number of steps required to solve an example from a task and (2) the number of unique examples across a task. We vary these quantities across subsets of PITA, and find that RT models generalize well on broad and shallow subsets, while deteriorating on narrow and deep subsets relative to non-RT baselines. To determine whether our results are idiosyncratic to PITA or indicative of general phenomena, we compare our results to a simple synthetic task based on syllogisms. Our resulting theory suggests fundamental scalings that limit how well RT models perform on deep tasks, and highlights their generalization strengths on broad tasks. Our findings overall identify fundamental benefits and limitations inherent in using reasoning traces.

Models trained with counterfactually augmented data learn representations of the causal structure of tasks, enabling robust generalization. However, high-quality counterfactual data is scarce for most tasks and not easily generated at scale. When crowdsourced, such data is typically limited in scale and diversity; when generated using supervised methods, it is computationally expensive to extend to new counterfactual dimensions. In this work, we introduce DISCO (DIStilled COunterfactual Data), a new method for automatically generating high quality counterfactual data at scale. DISCO engineers prompts to generate phrasal perturbations with a large general language model. Then, a task-specific teacher model filters these generations to distill high-quality counterfactual data. While task-agnostic, we apply our pipeline to the task of natural language inference (NLI) and find that on challenging evaluations such as the NLI stress test, comparatively smaller student models trained with DISCO generated counterfactuals are more robust (6% absolute) and generalize better across distributions (2%) compared to models trained without data augmentation. Furthermore, DISCO augmented models are 10% more consistent between counterfactual pairs on three evaluation sets, demonstrating that DISCO augmentation enables models to more reliably learn causal representations. Our repository is available at: https://github.com/eric11eca/disco

We present an elementary, self-contained proof of Grothendieck's inequality that unifies the real and complex cases and yields both the Krivine and Haagerup bounds, the current best-known explicit bounds for the real and complex Grothendieck constants respectively. This article is intended to be pedagogical, combining and streamlining known ideas of Lindenstrauss--Pe{\l}czy\'nski, Krivine, and Haagerup into a proof that need only univariate calculus, basic complex variables, and a modicum of linear algebra as prerequisites.

Inequality proving, crucial across diverse scientific and mathematical fields, tests advanced reasoning skills such as discovering tight bounds and strategic theorem application. This makes it a distinct, demanding frontier for large language models (LLMs), offering insights beyond general mathematical problem-solving. Progress in this area is hampered by existing datasets that are often scarce, synthetic, or rigidly formal. We address this by proposing an informal yet verifiable task formulation, recasting inequality proving into two automatically checkable subtasks: bound estimation and relation prediction. Building on this, we release IneqMath, an expert-curated dataset of Olympiad-level inequalities, including a test set and training corpus enriched with step-wise solutions and theorem annotations. We also develop a novel LLM-as-judge evaluation framework, combining a final-answer judge with four step-wise judges designed to detect common reasoning flaws. A systematic evaluation of 29 leading LLMs on IneqMath reveals a surprising reality: even top models like o1 achieve less than 10% overall accuracy under step-wise scrutiny; this is a drop of up to 65.5% from their accuracy considering only final answer equivalence. This discrepancy exposes fragile deductive chains and a critical gap for current LLMs between merely finding an answer and constructing a rigorous proof. Scaling model size and increasing test-time computation yield limited gains in overall proof correctness. Instead, our findings highlight promising research directions such as theorem-guided reasoning and self-refinement. Code and data are available at https://ineqmath.github.io/.

Our understanding of the generalization capabilities of neural networks (NNs) is still incomplete. Prevailing explanations are based on implicit biases of gradient descent (GD) but they cannot account for the capabilities of models from gradient-free methods nor the simplicity bias recently observed in untrained networks. This paper seeks other sources of generalization in NNs. Findings. To understand the inductive biases provided by architectures independently from GD, we examine untrained, random-weight networks. Even simple MLPs show strong inductive biases: uniform sampling in weight space yields a very biased distribution of functions in terms of complexity. But unlike common wisdom, NNs do not have an inherent "simplicity bias". This property depends on components such as ReLUs, residual connections, and layer normalizations. Alternative architectures can be built with a bias for any level of complexity. Transformers also inherit all these properties from their building blocks. Implications. We provide a fresh explanation for the success of deep learning independent from gradient-based training. It points at promising avenues for controlling the solutions implemented by trained models.

It is well known that accurate probabilistic predictors can be trained through empirical risk minimisation with proper scoring rules as loss functions. While such learners capture so-called aleatoric uncertainty of predictions, various machine learning methods have recently been developed with the goal to let the learner also represent its epistemic uncertainty, i.e., the uncertainty caused by a lack of knowledge and data. An emerging branch of the literature proposes the use of a second-order learner that provides predictions in terms of distributions on probability distributions. However, recent work has revealed serious theoretical shortcomings for second-order predictors based on loss minimisation. In this paper, we generalise these findings and prove a more fundamental result: There seems to be no loss function that provides an incentive for a second-order learner to faithfully represent its epistemic uncertainty in the same manner as proper scoring rules do for standard (first-order) learners. As a main mathematical tool to prove this result, we introduce the generalised notion of second-order scoring rules.

The goal of two-sample tests is to assess whether two samples, S_P sim P^n and S_Q sim Q^m, are drawn from the same distribution. Perhaps intriguingly, one relatively unexplored method to build two-sample tests is the use of binary classifiers. In particular, construct a dataset by pairing the n examples in S_P with a positive label, and by pairing the m examples in S_Q with a negative label. If the null hypothesis "P = Q" is true, then the classification accuracy of a binary classifier on a held-out subset of this dataset should remain near chance-level. As we will show, such Classifier Two-Sample Tests (C2ST) learn a suitable representation of the data on the fly, return test statistics in interpretable units, have a simple null distribution, and their predictive uncertainty allow to interpret where P and Q differ. The goal of this paper is to establish the properties, performance, and uses of C2ST. First, we analyze their main theoretical properties. Second, we compare their performance against a variety of state-of-the-art alternatives. Third, we propose their use to evaluate the sample quality of generative models with intractable likelihoods, such as Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). Fourth, we showcase the novel application of GANs together with C2ST for causal discovery.

Logical reasoning, i.e., deductively inferring the truth value of a conclusion from a set of premises, is an important task for artificial intelligence with wide potential impacts on science, mathematics, and society. While many prompting-based strategies have been proposed to enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to do such reasoning more effectively, they still appear unsatisfactory, often failing in subtle and unpredictable ways. In this work, we investigate the validity of instead reformulating such tasks as modular neurosymbolic programming, which we call LINC: Logical Inference via Neurosymbolic Computation. In LINC, the LLM acts as a semantic parser, translating premises and conclusions from natural language to expressions in first-order logic. These expressions are then offloaded to an external theorem prover, which symbolically performs deductive inference. Leveraging this approach, we observe significant performance gains on FOLIO and a balanced subset of ProofWriter for three different models in nearly all experimental conditions we evaluate. On ProofWriter, augmenting the comparatively small open-source StarCoder+ (15.5B parameters) with LINC even outperforms GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting by an absolute 38% and 10%, respectively. When used with GPT-4, LINC scores 26% higher than CoT on ProofWriter while performing comparatively on FOLIO. Further analysis reveals that although both methods on average succeed roughly equally often on this dataset, they exhibit distinct and complementary failure modes. We thus provide promising evidence for how logical reasoning over natural language can be tackled through jointly leveraging LLMs alongside symbolic provers. All corresponding code is publicly available at https://github.com/benlipkin/linc

The technique of data augmentation (DA) is often used in machine learning for regularization purposes to better generalize under i.i.d. settings. In this work, we present a unifying framework with topics in causal inference to make a case for the use of DA beyond just the i.i.d. setting, but for generalization across interventions as well. Specifically, we argue that when the outcome generating mechanism is invariant to our choice of DA, then such augmentations can effectively be thought of as interventions on the treatment generating mechanism itself. This can potentially help to reduce bias in causal effect estimation arising from hidden confounders. In the presence of such unobserved confounding we typically make use of instrumental variables (IVs) -- sources of treatment randomization that are conditionally independent of the outcome. However, IVs may not be as readily available as DA for many applications, which is the main motivation behind this work. By appropriately regularizing IV based estimators, we introduce the concept of IV-like (IVL) regression for mitigating confounding bias and improving predictive performance across interventions even when certain IV properties are relaxed. Finally, we cast parameterized DA as an IVL regression problem and show that when used in composition can simulate a worst-case application of such DA, further improving performance on causal estimation and generalization tasks beyond what simple DA may offer. This is shown both theoretically for the population case and via simulation experiments for the finite sample case using a simple linear example. We also present real data experiments to support our case.

In order to avoid well-know paradoxes associated with self-referential definitions, higher-order dependent type theories stratify the theory using a countably infinite hierarchy of universes (also known as sorts), Type_0 : Type_1 : cdots . Such type systems are called cumulative if for any type A we have that A : Type_{i} implies A : Type_{i+1}. The predicative calculus of inductive constructions (pCIC) which forms the basis of the Coq proof assistant, is one such system. In this paper we present and establish the soundness of the predicative calculus of cumulative inductive constructions (pCuIC) which extends the cumulativity relation to inductive types.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown increasing competence in solving mathematical reasoning problems. However, many open-source LLMs still struggle with errors in calculation and semantic understanding during intermediate reasoning steps. In this work, we introduce Prove, a simple yet effective framework that leverages translated programs derived from natural language solutions as a verification mechanism to filter out potentially incorrect reasoning paths before aggregating final answers. Unlike vanilla majority voting, our approach filters out solutions whose corresponding program output is inconsistent with the generated solution, aggregating only those that pass verification. We conducted extensive experiments using 13 open-source LLMs from various model families and sizes, ranging from 0.5B to 13B parameters, across eight mathematical benchmarks. Our results show that Prove consistently outperforms vanilla majority voting as a heuristic for solving mathematical reasoning tasks across all model sizes and datasets, achieving improvements of up to 18% on GSM8K and 8% on MATH-500. Our codes are available at https://github.com/declare-lab/prove.

Formal mathematical reasoning remains a critical challenge for artificial intelligence, hindered by limitations of existing benchmarks in scope and scale. To address this, we present FormalMATH, a large-scale Lean4 benchmark comprising 5,560 formally verified problems spanning from high-school Olympiad challenges to undergraduate-level theorems across diverse domains (e.g., algebra, applied mathematics, calculus, number theory, and discrete mathematics). To mitigate the inefficiency of manual formalization, we introduce a novel human-in-the-loop autoformalization pipeline that integrates: (1) specialized large language models (LLMs) for statement autoformalization, (2) multi-LLM semantic verification, and (3) negation-based disproof filtering strategies using off-the-shelf LLM-based provers. This approach reduces expert annotation costs by retaining 72.09% of statements before manual verification while ensuring fidelity to the original natural-language problems. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art LLM-based theorem provers reveals significant limitations: even the strongest models achieve only 16.46% success rate under practical sampling budgets, exhibiting pronounced domain bias (e.g., excelling in algebra but failing in calculus) and over-reliance on simplified automation tactics. Notably, we identify a counterintuitive inverse relationship between natural-language solution guidance and proof success in chain-of-thought reasoning scenarios, suggesting that human-written informal reasoning introduces noise rather than clarity in the formal reasoning settings. We believe that FormalMATH provides a robust benchmark for benchmarking formal mathematical reasoning.

Exploiting large language models (LLMs) to tackle deductive reasoning has garnered growing attention. It still remains highly challenging to achieve satisfactory results in complex deductive problems, characterized by plenty of premises (i.e., facts or rules) entailing intricate relationships among entities and requiring multi-hop reasoning. One intuitive solution is to decompose the original task into smaller sub-tasks, and then chain the multiple casual reasoning steps together in a forward (e.g., Selection-Inference) or backward (e.g., LAMBADA) direction. However, these techniques inevitably necessitate a large number of overall stages, leading to computationally expensive operations and a higher possibility of making misleading steps. In addition to stage-by-stage decomposition, we draw inspiration from another aspect of human problem-solving. Humans tend to distill the most relevant information and organize their thoughts systematically (e.g., creating mind maps), which assists them in answering questions or drawing conclusions precisely and quickly. In light of this, we propose a novel reasoning approach named Concise and Organized Perception (COP). COP carefully analyzes the given statements to efficiently identify the most pertinent information while eliminating redundancy. It then prompts the LLMs in a more organized form that adapts to the model's inference process. By perceiving concise and organized proofs, the deductive reasoning abilities of LLMs can be better elicited, and the risk of acquiring errors caused by excessive reasoning stages is mitigated. Furthermore, our approach can be combined with the aforementioned ones to further boost their performance. Extensive experimental results on three popular deductive benchmarks (i.e., ProofWriter, PrOntoQA and PrOntoQA-OOD) show that COP significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) Prompting is a dominant paradigm in Large Language Models (LLMs) to enhance complex reasoning. It guides LLMs to present multi-step reasoning, rather than generating the final answer directly. However, CoT encounters difficulties when key information required for reasoning is implicit or missing. This occurs because CoT emphasizes the sequence of reasoning steps while overlooking the early extraction of essential information. We propose a pre-prompting method called Iterative Summarization Pre-Prompting (ISP^2) to refine LLM reasoning when key information is not explicitly provided. First, entities and their corresponding descriptions are extracted to form potential key information pairs. Next, we use a reliability rating to assess these pairs, then merge the two lowest-ranked pairs into a new entity description. This process is repeated until a unique key information pair is obtained. Finally, that pair, along with the original question, is fed into LLMs to produce the answer. Extensive experiments demonstrate a 7.1% improvement compared to existing methods. Unlike traditional prompting, ISP^2 adopts an inductive approach with pre-prompting, offering flexible integration into diverse reasoning frameworks. The code is available at https://github.com/zdhgreat/ISP-2.

We consider the problem of how a trusted, but computationally bounded agent (a 'verifier') can learn to interact with one or more powerful but untrusted agents ('provers') in order to solve a given task. More specifically, we study the case in which agents are represented using neural networks and refer to solutions of this problem as neural interactive proofs. First we introduce a unifying framework based on prover-verifier games, which generalises previously proposed interaction protocols. We then describe several new protocols for generating neural interactive proofs, and provide a theoretical comparison of both new and existing approaches. Finally, we support this theory with experiments in two domains: a toy graph isomorphism problem that illustrates the key ideas, and a code validation task using large language models. In so doing, we aim to create a foundation for future work on neural interactive proofs and their application in building safer AI systems.

Mathematical reasoning has long represented one of the most fundamental and challenging frontiers in artificial intelligence research. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant advances in this area. This survey examines the development of mathematical reasoning abilities in LLMs through two high-level cognitive phases: comprehension, where models gain mathematical understanding via diverse pretraining strategies, and answer generation, which has progressed from direct prediction to step-by-step Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. We review methods for enhancing mathematical reasoning, ranging from training-free prompting to fine-tuning approaches such as supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning, and discuss recent work on extended CoT and "test-time scaling". Despite notable progress, fundamental challenges remain in terms of capacity, efficiency, and generalization. To address these issues, we highlight promising research directions, including advanced pretraining and knowledge augmentation techniques, formal reasoning frameworks, and meta-generalization through principled learning paradigms. This survey tries to provide some insights for researchers interested in enhancing reasoning capabilities of LLMs and for those seeking to apply these techniques to other domains.

Investigating the reasoning abilities of transformer models, and discovering new challenging tasks for them, has been a topic of much interest. Recent studies have found these models to be surprisingly strong at performing deductive reasoning over formal logical theories expressed in natural language. A shortcoming of these studies, however, is that they do not take into account that logical theories, when sampled uniformly at random, do not necessarily lead to hard instances. We propose a new methodology for creating challenging algorithmic reasoning datasets that focus on natural language satisfiability (NLSat) problems. The key idea is to draw insights from empirical sampling of hard propositional SAT problems and from complexity-theoretic studies of language. This methodology allows us to distinguish easy from hard instances, and to systematically increase the complexity of existing reasoning benchmarks such as RuleTaker. We find that current transformers, given sufficient training data, are surprisingly robust at solving the resulting NLSat problems of substantially increased difficulty. They also exhibit some degree of scale-invariance - the ability to generalize to problems of larger size and scope. Our results, however, reveal important limitations too: a careful sampling of training data is crucial for building models that generalize to larger problems, and transformer models' limited scale-invariance suggests they are far from learning robust deductive reasoning algorithms.

To augment language models with the ability to reason, researchers usually prompt or finetune them to produce chain of thought reasoning steps before producing the final answer. However, although people use natural language to reason effectively, it may be that LMs could reason more effectively with some intermediate computation that is not in natural language. In this work, we explore an alternative reasoning approach: instead of explicitly producing the chain of thought reasoning steps, we use the language model's internal hidden states to perform implicit reasoning. The implicit reasoning steps are distilled from a teacher model trained on explicit chain-of-thought reasoning, and instead of doing reasoning "horizontally" by producing intermediate words one-by-one, we distill it such that the reasoning happens "vertically" among the hidden states in different layers. We conduct experiments on a multi-digit multiplication task and a grade school math problem dataset and find that this approach enables solving tasks previously not solvable without explicit chain-of-thought, at a speed comparable to no chain-of-thought.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have exhibited an impressive capability to perform reasoning tasks, especially if they are encouraged to generate a sequence of intermediate steps. Reasoning performance can be improved by suitably combining multiple LLM responses, generated either in parallel in a single query, or via sequential interactions with LLMs throughout the reasoning process. Existing strategies for combination, such as self-consistency and progressive-hint-prompting, make inefficient usage of the LLM responses. We present Hint Marginalization, a novel and principled algorithmic framework to enhance the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. Our approach can be viewed as an iterative sampling strategy for forming a Monte Carlo approximation of an underlying distribution of answers, with the goal of identifying the mode the most likely answer. Empirical evaluation on several benchmark datasets for arithmetic reasoning demonstrates the superiority of the proposed approach.

Humans have a powerful and mysterious capacity to reason. By working through a series of purely mental steps, we can make inferences we would not be capable of making directly -- despite the fact that we get no additional data from the world. Similarly, when large language models generate a series of intermediate steps (a chain of thought) before answering a question, they often produce better answers than they otherwise would. We investigate why and how chain-of-thought reasoning is useful in language models, testing the hypothesis that reasoning is effective when training data consists of local clusters of variables that influence each other strongly. These training conditions enable the chaining of accurate local inferences in order to estimate relationships between variables that were not seen together in training. We prove that there will exist a "reasoning gap", where reasoning through intermediate variables improves inference, for the simple case of an autoregressive density estimator trained on local samples from a chain-structured probabilistic model. We then test our hypothesis empirically in more complex models, training an autoregressive language model on samples from Bayes nets but only including a subset of variables in each sample. We test language models' ability to match conditional probabilities with and without intermediate reasoning steps, finding that intermediate steps are only helpful when the training data is locally structured with respect to dependencies between variables and that the combination of locally-structured observations and reasoning is much more data-efficient than training on all variables. Our results illustrate how the effectiveness of reasoning step by step is rooted in the local statistical structure of the training data.

A dangerous assumption that can be made from prior work on the bias transfer hypothesis (BTH) is that biases do not transfer from pre-trained large language models (LLMs) to adapted models. We invalidate this assumption by studying the BTH in causal models under prompt adaptations, as prompting is an extremely popular and accessible adaptation strategy used in real-world applications. In contrast to prior work, we find that biases can transfer through prompting and that popular prompt-based mitigation methods do not consistently prevent biases from transferring. Specifically, the correlation between intrinsic biases and those after prompt adaptation remain moderate to strong across demographics and tasks -- for example, gender (rho >= 0.94) in co-reference resolution, and age (rho >= 0.98) and religion (rho >= 0.69) in question answering. Further, we find that biases remain strongly correlated when varying few-shot composition parameters, such as sample size, stereotypical content, occupational distribution and representational balance (rho >= 0.90). We evaluate several prompt-based debiasing strategies and find that different approaches have distinct strengths, but none consistently reduce bias transfer across models, tasks or demographics. These results demonstrate that correcting bias, and potentially improving reasoning ability, in intrinsic models may prevent propagation of biases to downstream tasks.

We resolve an open problem of Hanneke on the subject of universally consistent online learning with non-i.i.d. processes and unbounded losses. The notion of an optimistically universal learning rule was defined by Hanneke in an effort to study learning theory under minimal assumptions. A given learning rule is said to be optimistically universal if it achieves a low long-run average loss whenever the data generating process makes this goal achievable by some learning rule. Hanneke posed as an open problem whether, for every unbounded loss, the family of processes admitting universal learning are precisely those having a finite number of distinct values almost surely. In this paper, we completely resolve this problem, showing that this is indeed the case. As a consequence, this also offers a dramatically simpler formulation of an optimistically universal learning rule for any unbounded loss: namely, the simple memorization rule already suffices. Our proof relies on constructing random measurable partitions of the instance space and could be of independent interest for solving other open questions. We extend the results to the non-realizable setting thereby providing an optimistically universal Bayes consistent learning rule.

When prompted with a few examples and intermediate steps, large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance in various reasoning tasks. However, prompting methods that rely on implicit knowledge in an LLM often generate incorrect answers when the implicit knowledge is wrong or inconsistent with the task. To tackle this problem, we present Hypotheses-to-Theories (HtT), a framework that learns a rule library for reasoning with LLMs. HtT contains two stages, an induction stage and a deduction stage. In the induction stage, an LLM is first asked to generate and verify rules over a set of training examples. Rules that appear and lead to correct answers sufficiently often are collected to form a rule library. In the deduction stage, the LLM is then prompted to employ the learned rule library to perform reasoning to answer test questions. Experiments on relational reasoning, numerical reasoning and concept learning problems show that HtT improves existing prompting methods, with an absolute gain of 10-30% in accuracy. The learned rules are also transferable to different models and to different forms of the same problem.

The aim of Logic2Text is to generate controllable and faithful texts conditioned on tables and logical forms, which not only requires a deep understanding of the tables and logical forms, but also warrants symbolic reasoning over the tables. State-of-the-art methods based on pre-trained models have achieved remarkable performance on the standard test dataset. However, we question whether these methods really learn how to perform logical reasoning, rather than just relying on the spurious correlations between the headers of the tables and operators of the logical form. To verify this hypothesis, we manually construct a set of counterfactual samples, which modify the original logical forms to generate counterfactual logical forms with rarely co-occurred table headers and logical operators. SOTA methods give much worse results on these counterfactual samples compared with the results on the original test dataset, which verifies our hypothesis. To deal with this problem, we firstly analyze this bias from a causal perspective, based on which we propose two approaches to reduce the model's reliance on the shortcut. The first one incorporates the hierarchical structure of the logical forms into the model. The second one exploits automatically generated counterfactual data for training. Automatic and manual experimental results on the original test dataset and the counterfactual dataset show that our method is effective to alleviate the spurious correlation. Our work points out the weakness of previous methods and takes a further step toward developing Logic2Text models with real logical reasoning ability.

People overthink; language models over-sample, and the extra effort can talk both into a worse answer. Reasoning systems answer a hard question by sampling it many times (test-time scaling), and the more they draw, the more often a correct answer turns up somewhere, so coverage, the fraction of problems with at least one correct try, climbs and appears to be progress. But a deployed system must return one answer, and choosing it, not knowing which try is right, is selection; selection is capped, and past a point extra samples only make the model surer of a confident mistake, even as every draw adds cost. The gap between climbing coverage and stalled selection, the identifiability gap, is the answer a model can produce but not pick. So the real question is not whether to sample but how far, and the answer is: not far. For picking an answer, the vote has already settled within a few dozen draws, the modal ceiling; for scoring a benchmark, sooner still, the correlation ceiling. Beyond that, extra draws cost compute and add nothing, and can even make the answer worse. This paper turns the cutoff into a single number, the effective number of samples, that any sampling run already reveals. The bottleneck is recognizing a right answer, not generating one.

Invertible neural networks based on coupling flows (CF-INNs) have various machine learning applications such as image synthesis and representation learning. However, their desirable characteristics such as analytic invertibility come at the cost of restricting the functional forms. This poses a question on their representation power: are CF-INNs universal approximators for invertible functions? Without a universality, there could be a well-behaved invertible transformation that the CF-INN can never approximate, hence it would render the model class unreliable. We answer this question by showing a convenient criterion: a CF-INN is universal if its layers contain affine coupling and invertible linear functions as special cases. As its corollary, we can affirmatively resolve a previously unsolved problem: whether normalizing flow models based on affine coupling can be universal distributional approximators. In the course of proving the universality, we prove a general theorem to show the equivalence of the universality for certain diffeomorphism classes, a theoretical insight that is of interest by itself.

Deep neural networks are often seen as different from other model classes by defying conventional notions of generalization. Popular examples of anomalous generalization behaviour include benign overfitting, double descent, and the success of overparametrization. We argue that these phenomena are not distinct to neural networks, or particularly mysterious. Moreover, this generalization behaviour can be intuitively understood, and rigorously characterized, using long-standing generalization frameworks such as PAC-Bayes and countable hypothesis bounds. We present soft inductive biases as a key unifying principle in explaining these phenomena: rather than restricting the hypothesis space to avoid overfitting, embrace a flexible hypothesis space, with a soft preference for simpler solutions that are consistent with the data. This principle can be encoded in many model classes, and thus deep learning is not as mysterious or different from other model classes as it might seem. However, we also highlight how deep learning is relatively distinct in other ways, such as its ability for representation learning, phenomena such as mode connectivity, and its relative universality.

Neural networks can approximate complex functions, but they struggle to perform exact arithmetic operations over real numbers. The lack of inductive bias for arithmetic operations leaves neural networks without the underlying logic necessary to extrapolate on tasks such as addition, subtraction, and multiplication. We present two new neural network components: the Neural Addition Unit (NAU), which can learn exact addition and subtraction; and the Neural Multiplication Unit (NMU) that can multiply subsets of a vector. The NMU is, to our knowledge, the first arithmetic neural network component that can learn to multiply elements from a vector, when the hidden size is large. The two new components draw inspiration from a theoretical analysis of recently proposed arithmetic components. We find that careful initialization, restricting parameter space, and regularizing for sparsity is important when optimizing the NAU and NMU. Our proposed units NAU and NMU, compared with previous neural units, converge more consistently, have fewer parameters, learn faster, can converge for larger hidden sizes, obtain sparse and meaningful weights, and can extrapolate to negative and small values.

Mathematical reasoning lies at the heart of artificial intelligence, underpinning applications in education, program verification, and research-level mathematical discovery. Mathematical competitions, in particular, present two challenging problem types: theorem proving, which requires rigorous proofs of stated conclusions, and answer construction, which involves hypothesizing and formally verifying mathematical objects. Large Language Models (LLMs) effectively generate creative candidate answers but struggle with formal verification, while symbolic provers ensure rigor but cannot efficiently handle creative conjecture generation. We introduce the Enumerate-Conjecture-Prove (ECP) framework, a modular neuro-symbolic method integrating LLM-based enumeration and pattern-driven conjecturing with formal theorem proving. We present ConstructiveBench, a dataset of 3,431 answer-construction problems in various math competitions with verified Lean formalizations. On the ConstructiveBench dataset, ECP improves the accuracy of answer construction from a Chain-of-Thought (CoT) baseline of 14.54% to 45.06% with the gpt-4.1-mini model. Moreover, combined with ECP's constructed answers, the state-of-the-art DeepSeek-Prover-V2-7B model generates correct proofs for 858 of the 3,431 constructive problems in Lean, achieving 25.01% accuracy compared to 9.86% for symbolic-only baselines. Our code and dataset are publicly available at https://github.com/JackSun200312/ECP.

Mathematical reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence and is applicable in various fields, including science, engineering, finance, and everyday life. The development of artificial intelligence (AI) systems capable of solving math problems and proving theorems has garnered significant interest in the fields of machine learning and natural language processing. For example, mathematics serves as a testbed for aspects of reasoning that are challenging for powerful deep learning models, driving new algorithmic and modeling advances. On the other hand, recent advances in large-scale neural language models have opened up new benchmarks and opportunities to use deep learning for mathematical reasoning. In this survey paper, we review the key tasks, datasets, and methods at the intersection of mathematical reasoning and deep learning over the past decade. We also evaluate existing benchmarks and methods, and discuss future research directions in this domain.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

Training on model-generated synthetic data is a promising approach for finetuning LLMs, but it remains unclear when it helps or hurts. In this paper, we investigate this question for math reasoning via an empirical study, followed by building a conceptual understanding of our observations. First, we find that while the typical approach of finetuning a model on synthetic correct or positive problem-solution pairs generated by capable models offers modest performance gains, sampling more correct solutions from the finetuned learner itself followed by subsequent fine-tuning on this self-generated data doubles the efficiency of the same synthetic problems. At the same time, training on model-generated positives can amplify various spurious correlations, resulting in flat or even inverse scaling trends as the amount of data increases. Surprisingly, we find that several of these issues can be addressed if we also utilize negative responses, i.e., model-generated responses that are deemed incorrect by a final answer verifier. Crucially, these negatives must be constructed such that the training can appropriately recover the utility or advantage of each intermediate step in the negative response. With this per-step scheme, we are able to attain consistent gains over only positive data, attaining performance similar to amplifying the amount of synthetic data by 8 times. We show that training on per-step negatives can help to unlearn spurious correlations in the positive data, and is equivalent to advantage-weighted reinforcement learning (RL), implying that it inherits robustness benefits of RL over imitating positive data alone.

Scientific reasoning relies not only on logical inference but also on activating prior knowledge and experiential structures. Memory can efficiently reuse knowledge and enhance reasoning consistency and stability. However, existing benchmarks mainly evaluate final answers or step-by-step coherence, overlooking the memory-driven mechanisms that underlie human reasoning, which involves activating anchors and attractors, then integrating them into multi-step inference. To address this gap, we propose A^3-Bench~ https://a3-bench.github.io, a benchmark designed to evaluate scientific reasoning through dual-scale memory-driven activation, grounded in Anchor and Attractor Activation. First, we annotate 2,198 science reasoning problems across domains using the SAPM process(subject, anchor & attractor, problem, and memory developing). Second, we introduce a dual-scale memory evaluation framework utilizing anchors and attractors, along with the AAUI(Anchor--Attractor Utilization Index) metric to measure memory activation rates. Finally, through experiments with various base models and paradigms, we validate A^3-Bench and analyze how memory activation impacts reasoning performance, providing insights into memory-driven scientific reasoning.

We present semantic correctness proofs of Automatic Differentiation (AD). We consider a forward-mode AD method on a higher order language with algebraic data types, and we characterise it as the unique structure preserving macro given a choice of derivatives for basic operations. We describe a rich semantics for differentiable programming, based on diffeological spaces. We show that it interprets our language, and we phrase what it means for the AD method to be correct with respect to this semantics. We show that our characterisation of AD gives rise to an elegant semantic proof of its correctness based on a gluing construction on diffeological spaces. We explain how this is, in essence, a logical relations argument. Finally, we sketch how the analysis extends to other AD methods by considering a continuation-based method.

Pre-trained large language model (LLM) is under exploration to perform NLP tasks that may require logical reasoning. Logic-driven data augmentation for representation learning has been shown to improve the performance of tasks requiring logical reasoning, but most of these data rely on designed templates and therefore lack generalization. In this regard, we propose an AMR-based logical equivalence-driven data augmentation method (AMR-LE) for generating logically equivalent data. Specifically, we first parse a text into the form of an AMR graph, next apply four logical equivalence laws (contraposition, double negation, commutative and implication laws) on the AMR graph to construct a logically equivalent/inequivalent AMR graph, and then convert it into a logically equivalent/inequivalent sentence. To help the model to better learn these logical equivalence laws, we propose a logical equivalence-driven contrastive learning training paradigm, which aims to distinguish the difference between logical equivalence and inequivalence. Our AMR-LE (Ensemble) achieves #2 on the ReClor leaderboard https://eval.ai/web/challenges/challenge-page/503/leaderboard/1347 . Our model shows better performance on seven downstream tasks, including ReClor, LogiQA, MNLI, MRPC, RTE, QNLI, and QQP. The source code and dataset are public at https://github.com/Strong-AI-Lab/Logical-Equivalence-driven-AMR-Data-Augmentation-for-Representation-Learning .

Inductive Reasoning (IR), the ability to summarize rules from examples and apply on new ones, has long been viewed as a primal ability for general intelligence and widely studied by cognitive science and AI researchers. Many benchmarks have been proposed to measure such ability for Large Language Models (LLMs); however, they focus on few-shot (usually <10) setting and lack evaluation for aggregating many pieces of information from long contexts. On the other hand, the ever-growing context length of LLMs have brought forth the novel paradigm of many-shot In-Context Learning (ICL), which addresses new tasks with hundreds to thousands of examples without expensive and inefficient fine-tuning. However, many-shot evaluations are mostly focused on classification (a very limited aspect of IR), and popular long-context LLM tasks such as Needle-In-A-Haystack (NIAH) seldom require complicated intelligence for integrating many pieces of information. To fix the issues from both worlds, we propose MIR-Bench, the first many-shot in-context inductive reasoning benchmark that asks LLM to induce output via input-output examples from underlying functions with diverse data format. Based on MIR-Bench, we study many novel problems for inductive reasoning and many-shot ICL, including robustness against erroneous shots and the effect of Chain-of-Thought (CoT), and acquired insightful findings.

The concept of causal abstraction got recently popularised to demystify the opaque decision-making processes of machine learning models; in short, a neural network can be abstracted as a higher-level algorithm if there exists a function which allows us to map between them. Notably, most interpretability papers implement these maps as linear functions, motivated by the linear representation hypothesis: the idea that features are encoded linearly in a model's representations. However, this linearity constraint is not required by the definition of causal abstraction. In this work, we critically examine the concept of causal abstraction by considering arbitrarily powerful alignment maps. In particular, we prove that under reasonable assumptions, any neural network can be mapped to any algorithm, rendering this unrestricted notion of causal abstraction trivial and uninformative. We complement these theoretical findings with empirical evidence, demonstrating that it is possible to perfectly map models to algorithms even when these models are incapable of solving the actual task; e.g., on an experiment using randomly initialised language models, our alignment maps reach 100% interchange-intervention accuracy on the indirect object identification task. This raises the non-linear representation dilemma: if we lift the linearity constraint imposed to alignment maps in causal abstraction analyses, we are left with no principled way to balance the inherent trade-off between these maps' complexity and accuracy. Together, these results suggest an answer to our title's question: causal abstraction is not enough for mechanistic interpretability, as it becomes vacuous without assumptions about how models encode information. Studying the connection between this information-encoding assumption and causal abstraction should lead to exciting future work.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in proving formal theorems using proof assistants such as Lean. However, existing methods are difficult to reproduce or build on, due to private code, data, and large compute requirements. This has created substantial barriers to research on machine learning methods for theorem proving. This paper removes these barriers by introducing LeanDojo: an open-source Lean playground consisting of toolkits, data, models, and benchmarks. LeanDojo extracts data from Lean and enables interaction with the proof environment programmatically. It contains fine-grained annotations of premises in proofs, providing valuable data for premise selection: a key bottleneck in theorem proving. Using this data, we develop ReProver (Retrieval-Augmented Prover): the first LLM-based prover that is augmented with retrieval for selecting premises from a vast math library. It is inexpensive and needs only one GPU week of training. Our retriever leverages LeanDojo's program analysis capability to identify accessible premises and hard negative examples, which makes retrieval much more effective. Furthermore, we construct a new benchmark consisting of 96,962 theorems and proofs extracted from Lean's math library. It features challenging data split requiring the prover to generalize to theorems relying on novel premises that are never used in training. We use this benchmark for training and evaluation, and experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of ReProver over non-retrieval baselines and GPT-4. We thus provide the first set of open-source LLM-based theorem provers without any proprietary datasets and release it under a permissive MIT license to facilitate further research.

While reasoning-enhanced Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable advances in complex tasks such as mathematics and coding, their effectiveness across universal multimodal scenarios remains uncertain. The trend of releasing parallel "Instruct" and "Thinking" models by leading developers serves merely as a resource-intensive workaround, stemming from the lack of a criterion for determining when reasoning is truly beneficial. In this paper, we propose Dual Tuning, a framework designed to assess whether reasoning yields positive gains for target tasks under given base models and datasets. By jointly fine-tuning on paired Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Direct-Answer (DA) data under controlled prompts, we systematically quantify and compare the gains of both training modes using the proposed metrics, and establish the "Thinking Boundary" to evaluate the suitability of reasoning training across diverse multimodal tasks, including spatial, mathematical, and multi-disciplinary domains. We further explore the impact of reinforcement training and thinking patterns on reasoning suitability, and validate whether the "Thinking Boundary" can guide data refinement. Our findings challenge the "reasoning-for-all" paradigm, providing practical guidance for identifying appropriate data and training strategies, and motivating the development of resource-efficient, adaptive auto-think systems.

Complex reasoning is an impressive ability shown by large language models (LLMs). Most LLMs are skilled in deductive reasoning, such as chain-of-thought prompting or iterative tool-using to solve challenging tasks step-by-step. In this paper, we hope to focus on evaluating and teaching LLMs to conduct inductive reasoning, that is, LLMs are supposed to infer underlying rules by observing examples or sequential transformations. However, collecting large-scale and diverse human-generated inductive data is challenging. We focus on data synthesis in the code domain and propose a Case2Code task by exploiting the expressiveness and correctness of programs. Specifically, we collect a diverse set of executable programs, synthesize input-output transformations for each program, and force LLMs to infer the underlying code implementations based on the synthetic I/O cases. We first evaluate representative LLMs on the synthesized Case2Code task and demonstrate that the Case-to-code induction is challenging for LLMs. Then, we synthesize large-scale Case2Code training samples to train LLMs to perform inductive reasoning. Experimental results show that such induction training benefits not only in distribution Case2Code performance but also enhances various coding abilities of trained LLMs, demonstrating the great potential of learning inductive reasoning via synthetic data.

Reasoning is a distinctive human capacity, enabling us to address complex problems by breaking them down into a series of manageable cognitive steps. Yet, complex logical reasoning is still cumbersome for language models. Based on the dual process theory in cognitive science, we are the first to unravel the cognitive reasoning abilities of language models. Our framework employs an iterative methodology to construct a Cognitive Tree (CogTree). The root node of this tree represents the initial query, while the leaf nodes consist of straightforward questions that can be answered directly. This construction involves two main components: the implicit extraction module (referred to as the intuitive system) and the explicit reasoning module (referred to as the reflective system). The intuitive system rapidly generates multiple responses by utilizing in-context examples, while the reflective system scores these responses using comparative learning. The scores guide the intuitive system in its subsequent generation step. Our experimental results on two popular and challenging reasoning tasks indicate that it is possible to achieve a performance level comparable to that of GPT-3.5 (with 175B parameters), using a significantly smaller language model that contains fewer parameters (<=7B) than 5% of GPT-3.5.

Three paradigmatic forms of inference recur across scientific reasoning: deduction, induction, and causal abduction. Reliably evaluating LLMs on these in scientific settings is currently out of reach: scientific benchmarks built on human annotations are costly and lack mechanistic ground truth, while synthetic logical-reasoning benchmarks do not resemble real scientific documents. We introduce SciR, a benchmark that combines multi-paradigm reasoning with controllable scientific rendering, anchored on three paradigmatic scientific problems. Tasks are generated from formal objects (deduction tree, inductive rule hypothesis, causal graph) to guarantee verifiable answers, then rendered into multi-document scientific discourse via per-track domain-tuned genres. The construction lets us independently vary two difficulty axes: how hard it is to extract the key information needed for inference, and how hard the principled inference itself is. We test six models. Both axes hurt every model, and their effects compound. The rendering even hurts neurosymbolic pipelines, which hand inference to a verified solver. The two axes yield a per-model extraction-vs-inference profile: for instance, reasoning models like deepseek-r1 mostly surpass non-reasoning instruct models on the inference axis. To our knowledge, SciR is the first multi-paradigm scientific-reasoning benchmark with parametric control on both extraction and inference difficulty.

Argumentation is one of society's foundational pillars, and, sparked by advances in NLP and the vast availability of text data, automated mining of arguments receives increasing attention. A decisive property of arguments is their strength or quality. While there are works on the automated estimation of argument strength, their scope is narrow: they focus on isolated datasets and neglect the interactions with related argument mining tasks, such as argument identification, evidence detection, or emotional appeal. In this work, we close this gap by approaching argument quality estimation from multiple different angles: Grounded on rich results from thorough empirical evaluations, we assess the generalization capabilities of argument quality estimation across diverse domains, the interplay with related argument mining tasks, and the impact of emotions on perceived argument strength. We find that generalization depends on a sufficient representation of different domains in the training part. In zero-shot transfer and multi-task experiments, we reveal that argument quality is among the more challenging tasks but can improve others. Finally, we show that emotions play a minor role in argument quality than is often assumed.

In the propositional modal (and algebraic) treatment of two-variable first-order logic equality is modelled by a `diagonal' constant, interpreted in square products of universal frames as the identity (also known as the `diagonal') relation. Here we study the decision problem of products of two arbitrary modal logics equipped with such a diagonal. As the presence or absence of equality in two-variable first-order logic does not influence the complexity of its satisfiability problem, one might expect that adding a diagonal to product logics in general is similarly harmless. We show that this is far from being the case, and there can be quite a big jump in complexity, even from decidable to the highly undecidable. Our undecidable logics can also be viewed as new fragments of first- order logic where adding equality changes a decidable fragment to undecidable. We prove our results by a novel application of counter machine problems. While our formalism apparently cannot force reliable counter machine computations directly, the presence of a unique diagonal in the models makes it possible to encode both lossy and insertion-error computations, for the same sequence of instructions. We show that, given such a pair of faulty computations, it is then possible to reconstruct a reliable run from them.

Much research has been carried out on large language models (LLMs) and LLM-powered agentic workflows. However, many works within the field state emergence of, ascribe to, or assume, generalised anthropomorphic attributes to them (e.g., morality or understanding of natural language). Our goal is not to argue in favour or against the existence of these attributes, but to point out that these conclusions could be incorrect. For this we build and train a simple neural network on the videogame Age of Empires II, and note that any entity in a sufficiently-powerful substrate, such as LEGO or the Greater Boston Area, could also present such attributes. Hence, the purported anthropomorphic attributes of LLMs are empirically non-unique: although some properties (e.g., responses to prompts) could remain invariant, others, such as the interpretation of their perceived behaviour, might change with the substrate. Thus, any empirically-grounded discussion on these attributes requires explicit measurement criteria; otherwise the interpretation is left to the representation. We then show that assuming that these attributes exist or not in a system, independent of the substrate and in a generalised way, leads to either circular or uninformative conclusions. This is regardless of the experimenter's viewpoint on the subject, or whether the outcome shows existence or non-existence. Finally we propose a 'null' assumption, where one assumes LLM non-uniqueness instead of assuming anthropomorphic attributes to set up an experiment, along with examples of it. We also discuss potential objections to our work, briefly survey the field, and prove that Age of Empires II is functionally- and Turing-complete.

We present Generative Logic (GL), a deterministic architecture that begins from user-supplied axiomatic definitions -- written in a minimalist Mathematical Programming Language (MPL) -- and systematically explores their deductive neighborhood. Definitions are compiled into a distributed grid of simple Logic Blocks (LBs) that exchange messages; any time several expressions unify under an inference rule, a new fact is emitted with full provenance to its sources, yielding replayable, auditable proof graphs. A prototype software implementation instantiates the workflow on first-order Peano arithmetic. Starting only from the Peano axioms, GL enumerates candidate implications, applies normalization and type filters, and automatically reconstructs machine-checkable proofs of foundational arithmetic laws including associativity and commutativity of addition, associativity and commutativity of multiplication, and distributivity. Generated proofs export to navigable HTML so that every inference step can be inspected independently. We outline a hardware-software co-design path toward massively parallel realizations and describe prospective integration with probabilistic models (e.g., Large Language Models (LLMs)) for autoformalization and conjecture seeding. The Python and MPL code to reproduce the Peano experiments, along with the full HTML proof graphs, are available in the project's GitHub repository at https://github.com/Generative-Logic/GL/tree/35a111ea9ba53afe051703d6050be0c3923e9724 and are permanently archived at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.16408441. We invite community feedback and collaboration.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has been shown to improve Large Language Model (LLM) performance on various tasks. With this approach, LLMs appear to produce human-like reasoning steps before providing answers (a.k.a., CoT reasoning), which often leads to the perception that they engage in deliberate inferential processes. However, some initial findings suggest that CoT reasoning may be more superficial than it appears, motivating us to explore further. In this paper, we study CoT reasoning via a data distribution lens and investigate if CoT reasoning reflects a structured inductive bias learned from in-distribution data, allowing the model to conditionally generate reasoning paths that approximate those seen during training. Thus, its effectiveness is fundamentally bounded by the degree of distribution discrepancy between the training data and the test queries. With this lens, we dissect CoT reasoning via three dimensions: task, length, and format. To investigate each dimension, we design DataAlchemy, an isolated and controlled environment to train LLMs from scratch and systematically probe them under various distribution conditions. Our results reveal that CoT reasoning is a brittle mirage that vanishes when it is pushed beyond training distributions. This work offers a deeper understanding of why and when CoT reasoning fails, emphasizing the ongoing challenge of achieving genuine and generalizable reasoning.

There is an analogy that is often made between deep neural networks and actual brains, suggested by the nomenclature itself: the "neurons" in deep neural networks should correspond to neurons (or nerve cells, to avoid confusion) in the brain. We claim, however, that this analogy doesn't even type check: it is structurally flawed. In agreement with the slightly glib summary of Hebbian learning as "cells that fire together wire together", this article makes the case that the analogy should be different. Since the "neurons" in deep neural networks are managing the changing weights, they are more akin to the synapses in the brain; instead, it is the wires in deep neural networks that are more like nerve cells, in that they are what cause the information to flow. An intuition that nerve cells seem like more than mere wires is exactly right, and is justified by a precise category-theoretic analogy which we will explore in this article. Throughout, we will continue to highlight the error in equating artificial neurons with nerve cells by leaving "neuron" in quotes or by calling them artificial neurons. We will first explain how to view deep neural networks as nested dynamical systems with a very restricted sort of interaction pattern, and then explain a more general sort of interaction for dynamical systems that is useful throughout engineering, but which fails to adapt to changing circumstances. As mentioned, an analogy is then forced upon us by the mathematical formalism in which they are both embedded. We call the resulting encompassing generalization deeply interacting learning systems: they have complex interaction as in control theory, but adaptation to circumstances as in deep neural networks.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

Recent advances in formal theorem proving have focused on Olympiad-level mathematics, leaving undergraduate domains largely unexplored. Optimization, fundamental to machine learning, operations research, and scientific computing, remains underserved by existing provers. Its reliance on domain-specific formalisms (convexity, optimality conditions, and algorithmic analysis) creates significant distribution shift, making naive domain transfer ineffective. We present OptProver, a trained model that achieves robust transfer from Olympiad to undergraduate optimization. Starting from a strong Olympiad-level prover, our pipeline mitigates distribution shift through two key innovations. First, we employ large-scale optimization-focused data curation via expert iteration. Second, we introduce a specialized preference learning objective that integrates perplexity-weighted optimization with a mechanism to penalize valid but non-progressing proof steps. This not only addresses distribution shifts but also guides the search toward efficient trajectories. To enable rigorous evaluation, we construct a novel benchmark in Lean 4 focused on optimization. On this benchmark, OptProver achieves state-of-the-art Pass@1 and Pass@32 among comparably sized models while maintaining competitive performance on general theorem-proving tasks, demonstrating effective domain transfer without catastrophic forgetting.

Many machine learning algorithms are trained and evaluated by splitting data from a single source into training and test sets. While such focus on in-distribution learning scenarios has led to interesting advancement, it has not been able to tell if models are relying on dataset biases as shortcuts for successful prediction (e.g., using snow cues for recognising snowmobiles), resulting in biased models that fail to generalise when the bias shifts to a different class. The cross-bias generalisation problem has been addressed by de-biasing training data through augmentation or re-sampling, which are often prohibitive due to the data collection cost (e.g., collecting images of a snowmobile on a desert) and the difficulty of quantifying or expressing biases in the first place. In this work, we propose a novel framework to train a de-biased representation by encouraging it to be different from a set of representations that are biased by design. This tactic is feasible in many scenarios where it is much easier to define a set of biased representations than to define and quantify bias. We demonstrate the efficacy of our method across a variety of synthetic and real-world biases; our experiments show that the method discourages models from taking bias shortcuts, resulting in improved generalisation. Source code is available at https://github.com/clovaai/rebias.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained to imitate humans to explain human decisions. However, do LLMs explain themselves? Can they help humans build mental models of how LLMs process different inputs? To answer these questions, we propose to evaluate counterfactual simulatability of natural language explanations: whether an explanation can enable humans to precisely infer the model's outputs on diverse counterfactuals of the explained input. For example, if a model answers "yes" to the input question "Can eagles fly?" with the explanation "all birds can fly", then humans would infer from the explanation that it would also answer "yes" to the counterfactual input "Can penguins fly?". If the explanation is precise, then the model's answer should match humans' expectations. We implemented two metrics based on counterfactual simulatability: precision and generality. We generated diverse counterfactuals automatically using LLMs. We then used these metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) on two tasks: multi-hop factual reasoning and reward modeling. We found that LLM's explanations have low precision and that precision does not correlate with plausibility. Therefore, naively optimizing human approvals (e.g., RLHF) may not be a sufficient solution.

The lottery ticket hypothesis (Frankle and Carbin, 2018), states that a randomly-initialized network contains a small subnetwork such that, when trained in isolation, can compete with the performance of the original network. We prove an even stronger hypothesis (as was also conjectured in Ramanujan et al., 2019), showing that for every bounded distribution and every target network with bounded weights, a sufficiently over-parameterized neural network with random weights contains a subnetwork with roughly the same accuracy as the target network, without any further training.

The ability to extrapolate from short problem instances to longer ones is an important form of out-of-distribution generalization in reasoning tasks, and is crucial when learning from datasets where longer problem instances are rare. These include theorem proving, solving quantitative mathematics problems, and reading/summarizing novels. In this paper, we run careful empirical studies exploring the length generalization capabilities of transformer-based language models. We first establish that naively finetuning transformers on length generalization tasks shows significant generalization deficiencies independent of model scale. We then show that combining pretrained large language models' in-context learning abilities with scratchpad prompting (asking the model to output solution steps before producing an answer) results in a dramatic improvement in length generalization. We run careful failure analyses on each of the learning modalities and identify common sources of mistakes that highlight opportunities in equipping language models with the ability to generalize to longer problems.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in complex problem-solving, often benefiting from training on difficult mathematical problems that stimulate intricate reasoning. Recent efforts have explored automated synthesis of mathematical problems by prompting proprietary models or large-scale open-source models from seed data or inherent mathematical concepts. However, scaling up these methods remains challenging due to their high computational/API cost, complexity of prompting, and limited difficulty level of the generated problems. To overcome these limitations, we propose ScaleDiff, a simple yet effective pipeline designed to scale the creation of difficult problems. We efficiently identify difficult problems from existing datasets with only a single forward pass using an adaptive thinking model, which can perceive problem difficulty and automatically switch between "Thinking" and "NoThinking" modes. We then train a specialized difficult problem generator (DiffGen-8B) on this filtered difficult data, which can produce new difficult problems in large scale, eliminating the need for complex, per-instance prompting and its associated high API costs. Fine-tuning Qwen2.5-Math-7B-Instruct on the ScaleDiff-Math dataset yields a substantial performance increase of 11.3% compared to the original dataset and achieves a 65.9% average accuracy on AIME'24, AIME'25, HMMT-Feb'25, BRUMO'25, and MATH500, outperforming recent strong LRMs like OpenThinker3. Notably, this performance is achieved using the cost-efficient Qwen3-8B model as a teacher, demonstrating that our pipeline can effectively transfer advanced reasoning capabilities without relying on larger, more expensive teacher models. Furthermore, we observe a clear scaling phenomenon in model performance on difficult benchmarks as the quantity of difficult problems increases. Code: https://github.com/QizhiPei/ScaleDiff.

In this paper, we present and implement a multi-dimensional, modular framework for performing deep argument analysis (DeepA2) using current pre-trained language models (PTLMs). ArgumentAnalyst -- a T5 model (Raffel et al. 2020) set up and trained within DeepA2 -- reconstructs argumentative texts, which advance an informal argumentation, as valid arguments: It inserts, e.g., missing premises and conclusions, formalizes inferences, and coherently links the logical reconstruction to the source text. We create a synthetic corpus for deep argument analysis, and evaluate ArgumentAnalyst on this new dataset as well as on existing data, specifically EntailmentBank (Dalvi et al. 2021). Our empirical findings vindicate the overall framework and highlight the advantages of a modular design, in particular its ability to emulate established heuristics (such as hermeneutic cycles), to explore the model's uncertainty, to cope with the plurality of correct solutions (underdetermination), and to exploit higher-order evidence.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory -- the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems -- leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.

The dominant industry response to AI-generated code quality problems is to deploy AI reviewers. This paper argues that this response is structurally circular when executable specifications are absent: without an external reference, both the generating agent and the reviewing agent reason from the same artefact, share the same training distribution, and exhibit correlated failures. The review checks code against itself, not against intent. Three hypotheses are developed. First, that correlated errors in homogeneous LLM pipelines echo rather than cancel, a claim supported by convergent empirical evidence from multiple 2025-2026 studies and by three small contrived experiments reported here. The first two experiments are same-family (Claude reviewing Claude-generated code); the third extends to a cross-family panel of four models from three families. All use a planted bug corpus rather than a natural defect sample; they are directional evidence, not a controlled demonstration. Second, that executable specifications perform a domain transition in the Cynefin sense, converting enabling constraints into governing constraints and moving the problem from the complex domain to the complicated domain, a transition that AI makes economically viable at scale. Third, that the defect classes lying outside the reach of executable specifications form a well-defined residual, which is the legitimate and bounded target for AI review. The combined argument implies an architecture: specifications first, deterministic verification pipeline second, AI review only for the structural and architectural residual. This is not a claim that AI review is valueless. It is a claim about what it is actually for, and about what happens when it is deployed without the foundation that makes it non-circular.

Formal proofs are challenging to write even for experienced experts. Recent progress in Neural Theorem Proving (NTP) shows promise in expediting this process. However, the formal corpora available on the Internet are limited compared to the general text, posing a significant data scarcity challenge for NTP. To address this issue, this work proposes Alchemy, a general framework for data synthesis that constructs formal theorems through symbolic mutation. Specifically, for each candidate theorem in Mathlib, we identify all invocable theorems that can be used to rewrite or apply to it. Subsequently, we mutate the candidate theorem by replacing the corresponding term in the statement with its equivalent form or antecedent. As a result, our method increases the number of theorems in Mathlib by an order of magnitude, from 110k to 6M. Furthermore, we perform continual pretraining and supervised finetuning on this augmented corpus for large language models. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, achieving a 5% absolute performance improvement on Leandojo benchmark. Additionally, our synthetic data achieve a 2.5% absolute performance gain on the out-of-distribution miniF2F benchmark. To provide further insights, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of synthetic data composition and the training paradigm, offering valuable guidance for developing a strong theorem prover.

We explore the application of transformer-based language models to automated theorem proving. This work is motivated by the possibility that a major limitation of automated theorem provers compared to humans -- the generation of original mathematical terms -- might be addressable via generation from language models. We present an automated prover and proof assistant, GPT-f, for the Metamath formalization language, and analyze its performance. GPT-f found new short proofs that were accepted into the main Metamath library, which is to our knowledge, the first time a deep-learning based system has contributed proofs that were adopted by a formal mathematics community.

In this paper, we present a novel framework for the analysis of Riemann Hypothesis [27], which is composed of three key components: a) probabilistic modeling with cross entropy optimization and reasoning; b) the application of the law of large numbers; c) the application of mathematical inductions. The analysis is mainly conducted by virtue of probabilistic modeling of cross entropy optimization and reasoning with rare event simulation techniques. The application of the law of large numbers [2, 3, 6] and the application of mathematical inductions make the analysis of Riemann Hypothesis self-contained and complete to make sure that the whole complex plane is covered as conjectured in Riemann Hypothesis. We also discuss the method of enhanced top-p sampling with large language models (LLMs) for reasoning, where next token prediction is not just based on the estimated probabilities of each possible token in the current round but also based on accumulated path probabilities among multiple top-k chain of thoughts (CoTs) paths. The probabilistic modeling of cross entropy optimization and reasoning may suit well with the analysis of Riemann Hypothesis as Riemann Zeta functions are inherently dealing with the sums of infinite components of a complex number series. We hope that our analysis in this paper could shed some light on some of the insights of Riemann Hypothesis. The framework and techniques presented in this paper, coupled with recent developments with chain of thought (CoT) or diagram of thought (DoT) reasoning in large language models (LLMs) with reinforcement learning (RL) [1, 7, 18, 21, 24, 34, 39-41], could pave the way for eventual proof of Riemann Hypothesis [27].

Although the existing causal inference literature focuses on the forward-looking perspective by estimating effects of causes, the backward-looking perspective can provide insights into causes of effects. In backward-looking causal inference, the probability of necessity measures the probability that a certain event is caused by the treatment given the observed treatment and outcome. Most existing results focus on binary outcomes. Motivated by applications with ordinal outcomes, we propose a general definition of the probability of necessity. However, identifying the probability of necessity is challenging because it involves the joint distribution of the potential outcomes. We propose a novel assumption of monotonic incremental treatment effect to identify the probability of necessity with ordinal outcomes. We also discuss the testable implications of this key identification assumption. When it fails, we derive explicit formulas of the sharp large-sample bounds on the probability of necessity.

We present a generic framework for creating differentially private versions of any hypothesis test in a black-box way. We analyze the resulting tests analytically and experimentally. Most crucially, we show good practical performance for small data sets, showing that at epsilon = 1 we only need 5-6 times as much data as in the fully public setting. We compare our work to the one existing framework of this type, as well as to several individually-designed private hypothesis tests. Our framework is higher power than other generic solutions and at least competitive with (and often better than) individually-designed tests.

Recent advances in AI -- including generative approaches -- have resulted in technology that can support humans in scientific discovery and decision support but may also disrupt democracies and target individuals. The responsible use of AI increasingly shows the need for human-AI teaming, necessitating effective interaction between humans and machines. A crucial yet often overlooked aspect of these interactions is the different ways in which humans and machines generalise. In cognitive science, human generalisation commonly involves abstraction and concept learning. In contrast, AI generalisation encompasses out-of-domain generalisation in machine learning, rule-based reasoning in symbolic AI, and abstraction in neuro-symbolic AI. In this perspective paper, we combine insights from AI and cognitive science to identify key commonalities and differences across three dimensions: notions of generalisation, methods for generalisation, and evaluation of generalisation. We map the different conceptualisations of generalisation in AI and cognitive science along these three dimensions and consider their role in human-AI teaming. This results in interdisciplinary challenges across AI and cognitive science that must be tackled to provide a foundation for effective and cognitively supported alignment in human-AI teaming scenarios.