Daily Papers

Multi-agent systems built on large language models are increasingly deployed in strategic policy and governance settings, where agents representing stakeholders with conflicting interests must coordinate under shared constraints. These systems typically assign role-based personas to agents, describing their motivations and objectives. Whether agents with role-based identities follow explicit payoffs or their assigned roles in strategic decision-making remains untested. Here we show that assigning role-based personas suppresses payoff-aligned behavior in four-agent strategic games, shifting equilibrium attainment by up to 90 percentage points even when agents have complete payoff information. We test a 2x2 factorial design (persona presence x payoff visibility) across four models (Qwen-7B, Qwen-32B, Llama-8B, Mistral-7B), and 53 environmental policy scenarios with two equilibria: Tragedy of the Commons, where individual payoff dominates, and Green Transition, where collective payoff dominates. With personas present, all models reach near-zero Tragedy equilibrium in the Tragedy-dominant scenarios despite complete payoff information, and 100% of equilibria correspond to Green Transition. No model reaches Tragedy equilibrium by removing personas alone; only Qwen models reach 65-90% Tragedy equilibrium rates when personas are removed, and payoffs are made explicit. Three distinct behavioral profiles emerge: Qwen shifts equilibrium selection based on framing condition, Mistral increases response variance without reaching the Tragedy equilibrium, and Llama holds near-constant across all conditions. Representational choices in multi-agent LLM systems are governance decisions: persona assignment determines which equilibrium a simulation produces, independent of the underlying incentive structure.

We introduce Equilibrium Matching (EqM), a generative modeling framework built from an equilibrium dynamics perspective. EqM discards the non-equilibrium, time-conditional dynamics in traditional diffusion and flow-based generative models and instead learns the equilibrium gradient of an implicit energy landscape. Through this approach, we can adopt an optimization-based sampling process at inference time, where samples are obtained by gradient descent on the learned landscape with adjustable step sizes, adaptive optimizers, and adaptive compute. EqM surpasses the generation performance of diffusion/flow models empirically, achieving an FID of 1.90 on ImageNet 256times256. EqM is also theoretically justified to learn and sample from the data manifold. Beyond generation, EqM is a flexible framework that naturally handles tasks including partially noised image denoising, OOD detection, and image composition. By replacing time-conditional velocities with a unified equilibrium landscape, EqM offers a tighter bridge between flow and energy-based models and a simple route to optimization-driven inference.

We introduce Equilibrium Propagation, a learning framework for energy-based models. It involves only one kind of neural computation, performed in both the first phase (when the prediction is made) and the second phase of training (after the target or prediction error is revealed). Although this algorithm computes the gradient of an objective function just like Backpropagation, it does not need a special computation or circuit for the second phase, where errors are implicitly propagated. Equilibrium Propagation shares similarities with Contrastive Hebbian Learning and Contrastive Divergence while solving the theoretical issues of both algorithms: our algorithm computes the gradient of a well defined objective function. Because the objective function is defined in terms of local perturbations, the second phase of Equilibrium Propagation corresponds to only nudging the prediction (fixed point, or stationary distribution) towards a configuration that reduces prediction error. In the case of a recurrent multi-layer supervised network, the output units are slightly nudged towards their target in the second phase, and the perturbation introduced at the output layer propagates backward in the hidden layers. We show that the signal 'back-propagated' during this second phase corresponds to the propagation of error derivatives and encodes the gradient of the objective function, when the synaptic update corresponds to a standard form of spike-timing dependent plasticity. This work makes it more plausible that a mechanism similar to Backpropagation could be implemented by brains, since leaky integrator neural computation performs both inference and error back-propagation in our model. The only local difference between the two phases is whether synaptic changes are allowed or not.

Brain-like intelligent systems need brain-like learning methods. Equilibrium Propagation (EP) is a biologically plausible learning framework with strong potential for brain-inspired computing hardware. However, existing im-plementations of EP suffer from instability and prohibi-tively high computational costs. Inspired by the structure and dynamics of the brain, we propose a biologically plau-sible Feedback-regulated REsidual recurrent neural network (FRE-RNN) and study its learning performance in EP framework. Feedback regulation enables rapid convergence by reducing the spectral radius. The improvement in con-vergence property reduces the computational cost and train-ing time of EP by orders of magnitude, delivering perfor-mance on par with backpropagation (BP) in benchmark tasks. Meanwhile, residual connections with brain-inspired topologies help alleviate the vanishing gradient problem that arises when feedback pathways are weak in deep RNNs. Our approach substantially enhances the applicabil-ity and practicality of EP in large-scale networks that un-derpin artificial intelligence. The techniques developed here also offer guidance to implementing in-situ learning in physical neural networks.

Equilibrium propagation (EP) is a compelling alternative to the backpropagation of error algorithm (BP) for computing gradients of neural networks on biological or analog neuromorphic substrates. Still, the algorithm requires weight symmetry and infinitesimal equilibrium perturbations, i.e., nudges, to estimate unbiased gradients efficiently. Both requirements are challenging to implement in physical systems. Yet, whether and how weight asymmetry affects its applicability is unknown because, in practice, it may be masked by biases introduced through the finite nudge. To address this question, we study generalized EP, which can be formulated without weight symmetry, and analytically isolate the two sources of bias. For complex-differentiable non-symmetric networks, we show that the finite nudge does not pose a problem, as exact derivatives can still be estimated via a Cauchy integral. In contrast, weight asymmetry introduces bias resulting in low task performance due to poor alignment of EP's neuronal error vectors compared to BP. To mitigate this issue, we present a new homeostatic objective that directly penalizes functional asymmetries of the Jacobian at the network's fixed point. This homeostatic objective dramatically improves the network's ability to solve complex tasks such as ImageNet 32x32. Our results lay the theoretical groundwork for studying and mitigating the adverse effects of imperfections of physical networks on learning algorithms that rely on the substrate's relaxation dynamics.

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of candidate outputs). These procedures sometimes yield very different predictions. How do we reconcile mutually incompatible scoring procedures to obtain coherent LM predictions? We introduce a new, a training-free, game-theoretic procedure for language model decoding. Our approach casts language model decoding as a regularized imperfect-information sequential signaling game - which we term the CONSENSUS GAME - in which a GENERATOR seeks to communicate an abstract correctness parameter using natural language sentences to a DISCRIMINATOR. We develop computational procedures for finding approximate equilibria of this game, resulting in a decoding algorithm we call EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING. Applied to a large number of tasks (including reading comprehension, commonsense reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, and dialog), EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING consistently, and sometimes substantially, improves performance over existing LM decoding procedures - on multiple benchmarks, we observe that applying EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING to LLaMA-7B outperforms the much larger LLaMA-65B and PaLM-540B models. These results highlight the promise of game-theoretic tools for addressing fundamental challenges of truthfulness and consistency in LMs.

Performative Reinforcement Learning (PRL) refers to a scenario in which the deployed policy changes the reward and transition dynamics of the underlying environment. In this work, we study multi-agent PRL by incorporating performative effects into Markov Potential Games (MPGs). We introduce the notion of a performatively stable equilibrium (PSE) and show that it always exists under a reasonable sensitivity assumption. We then provide convergence results for state-of-the-art algorithms used to solve MPGs. Specifically, we show that independent policy gradient ascent (IPGA) and independent natural policy gradient (INPG) converge to an approximate PSE in the best-iterate sense, with an additional term that accounts for the performative effects. Furthermore, we show that INPG asymptotically converges to a PSE in the last-iterate sense. As the performative effects vanish, we recover the convergence rates from prior work. For a special case of our game, we provide finite-time last-iterate convergence results for a repeated retraining approach, in which agents independently optimize a surrogate objective. We conduct extensive experiments to validate our theoretical findings.

In the endeavor to make autonomous robots take actions, task planning is a major challenge that requires translating high-level task descriptions into long-horizon action sequences. Despite recent advances in language model agents, they remain prone to planning errors and limited in their ability to plan ahead. To address these limitations in robotic planning, we advocate a self-refining scheme that iteratively refines a draft plan until an equilibrium is reached. Remarkably, this process can be optimized end-to-end from an analytical perspective without the need to curate additional verifiers or reward models, allowing us to train self-refining planners in a simple supervised learning fashion. Meanwhile, a nested equilibrium sequence modeling procedure is devised for efficient closed-loop planning that incorporates useful feedback from the environment (or an internal world model). Our method is evaluated on the VirtualHome-Env benchmark, showing advanced performance with better scaling for inference computation. Code is available at https://github.com/Singularity0104/equilibrium-planner.

Recent work by Baratin et al. (2021) sheds light on an intriguing pattern that occurs during the training of deep neural networks: some layers align much more with data compared to other layers (where the alignment is defined as the euclidean product of the tangent features matrix and the data labels matrix). The curve of the alignment as a function of layer index (generally) exhibits an ascent-descent pattern where the maximum is reached for some hidden layer. In this work, we provide the first explanation for this phenomenon. We introduce the Equilibrium Hypothesis which connects this alignment pattern to signal propagation in deep neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate an excellent match with the theoretical predictions.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

In goal-reaching reinforcement learning (RL), the optimal value function has a particular geometry, called quasimetric structure. This paper introduces Quasimetric Reinforcement Learning (QRL), a new RL method that utilizes quasimetric models to learn optimal value functions. Distinct from prior approaches, the QRL objective is specifically designed for quasimetrics, and provides strong theoretical recovery guarantees. Empirically, we conduct thorough analyses on a discretized MountainCar environment, identifying properties of QRL and its advantages over alternatives. On offline and online goal-reaching benchmarks, QRL also demonstrates improved sample efficiency and performance, across both state-based and image-based observations.

The problem of fair multi-agent coordination in decentralized settings is one of the most pressing challenges for building efficient collaborative systems. Resource allocation is based on optimized collective arrangements accounting for agents' needs. Such coordination should not only be computationally efficient but also account for fairness, i.e., equitable redistribution of costs incurred by all agents. Recent literature has proposed several algorithms that efficiently determine optimal plan combinations balancing system-wide efficiency and individual discomfort of agents in a centralized setting. However, these works do not address equitable resource optimization in fully decentralized scenarios, specifically, the optimized redistribution of discomfort among coordinating agents so that none experiences a discomfort level that could lead to loss of incentive or polarization that can disrupt planned operations. In this work, we study the problem of optimizing three objectives: (i) system-wide efficiency, (ii) individuals' comfort and (iii) fairness (i.e., balancing of incurred discomfort costs) in decentralized multi-agent coordination. We design a novel model to optimize those three orthogonal objectives, without any substantial increase in communication and computational overhead. Through experiments on two real-world datasets, we validate the model and demonstrate that it can achieve fairer optimization outcomes, while satisfying agents' preferences and system goals.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

Reinforcement learning (RL) with group-relative advantages has become the de facto standard for post-training language model reasoners. However, when optimizing multiple reward objectives, existing methods typically scalarize the reward vector with a fixed weighted sum before group-wise standardization. We show that this design leads to two fundamental problems: rollouts with distinct reward profiles can receive identical advantages, and all objectives are optimized with fixed relative weights regardless of their current level of saturation. As a result, training continues to allocate gradient budget to already-solved objectives instead of focusing on those with greater remaining headroom. We introduce Saturation Aware Advantage Reweighting for Multi-Reward Policy Optimization (SA-MRPO), which standardizes each reward objective independently and adaptively discounts its contribution according to a batch-level estimate of objective saturation. This dynamically reallocates optimization effort toward under-optimized objectives while empirically maintaining performance on those that are already well satisfied. We further show that saturation-aware reweighting can reverse the sign of an update, rather than merely rescale its magnitude. Across mathematical reasoning with two- and three-objective reward combinations, SA-MRPO improves the harder correctness objective over GDPO in 12 of 15 benchmark comparisons, with gains of up to 5% on AIME24. On adaptive reasoning it improves accuracy on all five benchmarks, by 3.8% on average and up to 9.2 % on AMC23, and on coding benchmarks it improves pass rate by up to 2.3%, while in all settings maintaining the easier objectives near their already satisfied levels.

We introduce the framework of performative reinforcement learning where the policy chosen by the learner affects the underlying reward and transition dynamics of the environment. Following the recent literature on performative prediction~Perdomo et. al., 2020, we introduce the concept of performatively stable policy. We then consider a regularized version of the reinforcement learning problem and show that repeatedly optimizing this objective converges to a performatively stable policy under reasonable assumptions on the transition dynamics. Our proof utilizes the dual perspective of the reinforcement learning problem and may be of independent interest in analyzing the convergence of other algorithms with decision-dependent environments. We then extend our results for the setting where the learner just performs gradient ascent steps instead of fully optimizing the objective, and for the setting where the learner has access to a finite number of trajectories from the changed environment. For both settings, we leverage the dual formulation of performative reinforcement learning and establish convergence to a stable solution. Finally, through extensive experiments on a grid-world environment, we demonstrate the dependence of convergence on various parameters e.g. regularization, smoothness, and the number of samples.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) post-training has become the standard for aligning generative models with human preferences, yet most methods rely on a single scalar reward. When multiple criteria matter, the prevailing practice of ``early scalarization'' collapses rewards into a fixed weighted sum. This commits the model to a single trade-off point at training time, providing no inference-time control over inherently conflicting goals -- such as prompt adherence versus source fidelity in image editing. We introduce ParetoSlider, a multi-objective RL (MORL) framework that trains a single diffusion model to approximate the entire Pareto front. By training the model with continuously varying preference weights as a conditioning signal, we enable users to navigate optimal trade-offs at inference time without retraining or maintaining multiple checkpoints. We evaluate ParetoSlider across three state-of-the-art flow-matching backbones: SD3.5, FluxKontext, and LTX-2. Our single preference-conditioned model matches or exceeds the performance of baselines trained separately for fixed reward trade-offs, while uniquely providing fine-grained control over competing generative goals.

A quantum Cournot game of which classical form game has multiple Nash equilibria is examined. Although the classical equilibria fail to be Pareto optimal, the quantum equilibrium exhibits the following two properties, (i) if the measurement of entanglement between strategic variables chosen by the competing firms is sufficiently large, the multiplicity of equilibria vanishes, and, (ii) the more strongly the strategic variables are entangled, the more closely the unique equilibrium approaches to the optimal one.

The paper sets forth comprehensive basics of Discrete Thermodynamics of Chemical Equilibria (DTD), developed by the author during the last decade and spread over series of publications. Based on the linear equations of irreversible thermodynamics, De Donder's definition of the thermodynamic force, and the Le Chatelier principle, DTD brings forward a notion of chemical equilibrium as a balance of internal and external thermodynamic forces, acting against a chemical system. The basic expression of DTD is a logistic map that ties together energetic characteristics of the chemical transformation in the system, its deviation from true thermodynamic equilibrium, and the sum of thermodynamic forces, causing that deviation. System deviation from thermodynamic equilibrium is the major variable of the theory. Solutions to the basic map define the chemical system domain of states comprising bifurcation diagrams with four areas, from true thermodynamic equilibrium to chaos, having specific distinctive meaning for chemical systems. The theory is derived from the currently recognized ideas of chemical thermodynamics and binds classical and contemporary thermodynamics of chemical equilibria into a unique concept. DTD opens new opportunities in understanding and analysis of equilibria in chemical systems. Some new results, included in the paper, have never been published before.

In the realm of multi-objective alignment for large language models, balancing disparate human preferences often manifests as a zero-sum conflict. Specifically, the intrinsic tension between competing goals dictates that aggressively optimizing for one metric (e.g., helpfulness) frequently incurs a substantial penalty on another (e.g., harmlessness). While prior work mainly focuses on data selection, parameter merging, or algorithmic balancing during training, these approaches merely force compromises between divergent preferences along a fixed Pareto frontier, failing to fundamentally resolve the inherent trade-off. In this work, we approach this problem from a novel perspective of multi-dimensional rewards. By scaling up the model's rollouts and analyzing the outputs across different reward dimensions, we arrive at a critical conclusion: the conflict among multiple objectives stems from the fact that the prompt itself inherently restricts the achievable multi-dimensional rewards. Based on this core observation, we propose MORA: Multi-Objective Reward Assimilation. Specifically, MORA isolates single-reward prompts through pre-sampling and expands their reward diversity by rewriting the original questions to incorporate multi-dimensional intents. Extensive experiments demonstrate that: (1) in sequential alignment, MORA achieves single-preference improvements ranging from 5% to 12.4%, with exceptional gains in harmlessness, after multiple-preference alignment across helpful, harmless, and truthful dimensions. (2) In simultaneous alignment, MORA achieves an average overall reward improvement of 4.6%. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Shiying-Huang/MORA-MPA.

We introduce Flux Matching, a new paradigm for generative modeling that generalizes existing score-based models to a broader family of vector fields that need not be conservative. Rather than requiring the model to equal the data score, the Flux Matching objective imposes a weaker condition that admits infinitely many vector fields whose stationary distribution is the data. This flexibility enables a class of generative models that cannot be learned under score matching, in which inductive biases, structural priors, and properties of the dynamics can be directly imposed or optimized. We show that Flux Matching performs strongly on high-dimensional image datasets and, more importantly, that our added freedom unlocks a range of applications including faster sampling, interpretable and mechanistic models, and dynamics that encode directed dependencies between variables. More broadly, Flux Matching opens a new dimension in generative modeling by turning the vector field itself into a design choice rather than a fixed target. Code is available at https://github.com/peterpaohuang/flux_matching.

We consider the problem of multi-objective alignment of foundation models with human preferences, which is a critical step towards helpful and harmless AI systems. However, it is generally costly and unstable to fine-tune large foundation models using reinforcement learning (RL), and the multi-dimensionality, heterogeneity, and conflicting nature of human preferences further complicate the alignment process. In this paper, we introduce Rewards-in-Context (RiC), which conditions the response of a foundation model on multiple rewards in its prompt context and applies supervised fine-tuning for alignment. The salient features of RiC are simplicity and adaptivity, as it only requires supervised fine-tuning of a single foundation model and supports dynamic adjustment for user preferences during inference time. Inspired by the analytical solution of an abstracted convex optimization problem, our dynamic inference-time adjustment method approaches the Pareto-optimal solution for multiple objectives. Empirical evidence demonstrates the efficacy of our method in aligning both Large Language Models (LLMs) and diffusion models to accommodate diverse rewards with only around 10% GPU hours compared with multi-objective RL baseline.

Trader-facing dynamic fees are increasingly proposed for automated market makers (AMMs), but historical data do not identify how order flow would respond: trader-facing fees do not vary, trader types are latent, and a replayed tape is not a sequential decision environment. We therefore construct a minimal closed-loop simulator in which the missing signal exists by construction: two constant-product pools repriced by an equilibrium-inspired dynamic-fee rule, fee-sensitive noise flow, and closed-form CEX--AMM arbitrage. Equilibrium is used as a closure principle, not as an object the trader learns. Against a tuned benchmark ladder of schedule, planning, lookahead, and tabular policies, a small DQN is the only evaluated valid policy whose paired improvement over tuned one-step routing excludes zero. On a reserved final block of 1{,}000 seeds with completion forced to 1.0 for every policy, it reduces implementation shortfall under every tested intra-step ordering, by 13.3bps of order notional under the pre-specified agent-last ordering, and the edge is concentrated in, and learned from, dynamic-fee environments: under constant fees the paired difference is indistinguishable from zero. The result is model-conditioned counterfactual evidence about execution control in AMMs, not evidence about historical traders, equilibrium play, or deployable profit.

Given a set of trajectories demonstrating the execution of a task safely in a constrained MDP with observable rewards but with unknown constraints and non-observable costs, we aim to find a policy that maximizes the likelihood of demonstrated trajectories trading the balance between being conservative and increasing significantly the likelihood of high-rewarding trajectories but with potentially unsafe steps. Having these objectives, we aim towards learning a policy that maximizes the probability of the most promising trajectories with respect to the demonstrations. In so doing, we formulate the ``promise" of individual state-action pairs in terms of Q values, which depend on task-specific rewards as well as on the assessment of states' safety, mixing expectations in terms of rewards and safety. This entails a safe Q-learning perspective of the inverse learning problem under constraints: The devised Safe Q Inverse Constrained Reinforcement Learning (SafeQIL) algorithm is compared to state-of-the art inverse constraint reinforcement learning algorithms to a set of challenging benchmark tasks, showing its merits.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

Our world is full of asymmetries. Gravity and wind can make reaching a place easier than coming back. Social artifacts such as genealogy charts and citation graphs are inherently directed. In reinforcement learning and control, optimal goal-reaching strategies are rarely reversible (symmetrical). Distance functions supported on these asymmetrical structures are called quasimetrics. Despite their common appearance, little research has been done on the learning of quasimetrics. Our theoretical analysis reveals that a common class of learning algorithms, including unconstrained multilayer perceptrons (MLPs), provably fails to learn a quasimetric consistent with training data. In contrast, our proposed Poisson Quasimetric Embedding (PQE) is the first quasimetric learning formulation that both is learnable with gradient-based optimization and enjoys strong performance guarantees. Experiments on random graphs, social graphs, and offline Q-learning demonstrate its effectiveness over many common baselines.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

Most reported gains from agent-optimization methods are one-shot: an agent is optimized against a fixed benchmark and the resulting improvement is reported as if it were a stable property of the method. This does not test the setting that matters for deployed agents, where optimization is applied recursively as new failures and new tasks appear over time. The central question this raises is whether optimizer-driven gains compound: after an agent has been optimized once, can it be optimized again on newly arrived tasks without eroding the gains the first round produced? We study this question with a two-phase continual-learning evaluation built from hard tasks in Terminal-Bench 2.0, comparing three approaches to agent-harness optimization (GEPA, Meta Harness, and RELAI's Verifiable Continual Learning, RELAI-VCL) under identical optimization budgets. All three methods improve over the baseline agent in the conventional, static, single-phase setting. However, once new tasks are introduced, the methods diverge sharply: GEPA's optimized agent transfers below the unoptimized baseline, Meta Harness transfers well but fails to improve further once given a second optimization budget, and RELAI-VCL is the only method that both transfers positively to unseen tasks and continues improving after those tasks are folded into the optimization objective, reaching the highest pass rate at every evaluated stage and the highest lifelong average pass rate overall (76.4% vs. 66.0% for GEPA, 64.6% for Meta Harness, and 58.7% for the baseline). Our key observation was that optimization gains compounded only when regression control was built into the optimization loop, providing an inductive bias against shortcut solutions that fail to generalize.

A prevailing view in Reinforcement Learning for Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) interprets recent progress through the lens of an exploration-exploitation trade-off, a perspective largely shaped by token-level metrics. We re-examine this perspective, proposing that this perceived trade-off may not be a fundamental constraint but rather an artifact of the measurement level. To investigate this, we shift the analysis to the semantically rich hidden-state space, adopting Effective Rank (ER) to quantify exploration and proposing its novel first- and second-order derivatives, named Effective Rank Velocity (ERV) and Effective Rank Acceleration (ERA), to capture exploitation dynamics. Our analysis reveals that at the hidden-state level, exploration and exploitation could be decoupled (Sec. 4). This finding reveals an opportunity to enhance both capacities simultaneously. This insight motivates our method, Velocity-Exploiting Rank-Learning (VERL), the first to operationalize the principle of synergistic exploration-exploitation enhancement by directly shaping the RL advantage function. The key innovation is leveraging the theoretically stable ERA as a predictive meta-controller to create a synergistic, dual-channel incentive structure. Instead of forcing a trade-off, VERL prospectively amplifies rewards for exploration to preempt overconfidence and reinforces exploitative gains to consolidate reasoning. Experiments across diverse LLMs and reasoning benchmarks show consistent gains, including up to 21.4% absolute accuracy improvement on the challenging Gaokao 2024 dataset.

Position controllers have become the dominant interface for executing learned manipulation policies. Yet a critical design decision remains understudied: how should we choose controller gains for policy learning? The conventional wisdom is to select gains based on desired task compliance or stiffness. However, this logic breaks down when controllers are paired with state-conditioned policies: effective stiffness emerges from the interplay between learned reactions and control dynamics, not from gains alone. We argue that gain selection should instead be guided by learnability: how amenable different gain settings are to the learning algorithm in use. In this work, we systematically investigate how position controller gains affect three core components of modern robot learning pipelines: behavior cloning, reinforcement learning from scratch, and sim-to-real transfer. Through extensive experiments across multiple tasks and robot embodiments, we find that: (1) behavior cloning benefits from compliant and overdamped gain regimes, (2) reinforcement learning can succeed across all gain regimes given compatible hyperparameter tuning, and (3) sim-to-real transfer is harmed by stiff and overdamped gain regimes. These findings reveal that optimal gain selection depends not on the desired task behavior, but on the learning paradigm employed. Project website: https://younghyopark.me/tune-to-learn

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

In many multi-agent systems, agents interact repeatedly and are expected to settle into stable, rational behavior over time. Yet in practice, behavior often drifts, and detecting such deviations in real time remains an open challenge. We introduce a sequential testing framework that monitors whether observed play is consistent with a benchmark of strategic behavior, without assuming a fixed sample size. Our approach builds on the e-value framework for safe anytime-valid inference: by "betting" against the benchmark, we construct a test supermartingale that accumulates evidence whenever observed payoffs systematically violate the expected conditions. For repeated normal-form games, we take equilibrium as the benchmark, yielding a statistically sound, interpretable measure of departure from equilibrium that can be monitored online; our framework unifies the treatment of Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria, offering finite-time guarantees and a detailed analysis of detection times. We also leverage Benjamini-Hochberg-type procedures to increase detection power in large games while rigorously controlling the false discovery rate. Finally, we extend our method to stochastic games, verifying online whether observed trajectories adhere to a specified target policy, such as a computed equilibrium, broadening the framework's applicability to dynamic, state-dependent settings.

In long-horizon tasks, recent agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs) face a significant challenge that sparse, outcome-based rewards make it difficult to assign credit to intermediate steps. Previous methods mainly focus on creating dense reward signals to guide learning, either through traditional reinforcement learning techniques like inverse reinforcement learning or by using Process Reward Models for step-by-step feedback. In this paper, we identify a fundamental problem in the learning dynamics of LLMs: the magnitude of policy gradients is inherently coupled with the entropy, which leads to inefficient small updates for confident correct actions and potentially destabilizes large updates for uncertain ones. To resolve this, we propose Entropy-Modulated Policy Gradients (EMPG), a framework that re-calibrates the learning signal based on step-wise uncertainty and the final task outcome. EMPG amplifies updates for confident correct actions, penalizes confident errors, and attenuates updates from uncertain steps to stabilize exploration. We further introduce a bonus term for future clarity that encourages agents to find more predictable solution paths. Through comprehensive experiments on three challenging agent tasks, WebShop, ALFWorld, and Deep Search, we demonstrate that EMPG achieves substantial performance gains and significantly outperforms strong policy gradient baselines. Project page is at https://empgseed-seed.github.io/

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires differentiation across the hierarchy, which is computationally intensive, if not prohibitive. To bypass the hierarchy, we propose to bound such bilevel programs, equivalent to multiple-followers Stackelberg games, with two new hierarchy-free problems: a T-step Cournot game and a T-step monopoly model. Since they are standard equilibrium or optimization problems, both can be efficiently solved via first-order methods. Importantly, we show that the bounds provided by these problems -- the upper bound by the T-step Cournot game and the lower bound by the T-step monopoly model -- can be made arbitrarily tight by increasing the step parameter T for a wide range of problems. We prove that a small T usually suffices under appropriate conditions to reach an approximation acceptable for most practical purposes. Eventually, the analytical insights are highlighted through numerical examples.

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous N-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population generative model", which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the N-player game. Instead, we show that N agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within mathcal{O}(varepsilon^{-2}) samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard O(1{N}) error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for N-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the N-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by N agents with finite sample guarantees.

Ensemble Kalman Inversion (EKI) is a derivative-free, ensemble-based method for inverse and optimization problems. Its continuous-time formulation can be interpreted as an interacting particle system driven by a Kalman-type preconditioned descent direction. A well-known limitation of this dynamics is the possible premature collapse of the covariance of the ensemble, which makes the method sensitive to the initial ensemble. We introduce a second-order particle system in which the particles evolve according to an inertial dynamics. The model combines a Kalman-type relaxation force with damping, attraction towards the ensemble mean, and a short-range repulsive interaction designed to counteract ensemble collapse. The resulting dynamics can be interpreted as a heavy-ball reformulation of continuous-time EKI enriched by competing attractive and repulsive mechanisms. For linear inverse problems, we analyze the induced mean and fluctuation dynamics and identify a parameter regime in which fully collapsed configurations are linearly unstable. We further characterize asymptotic equilibria through a constrained optimality condition on the subspace retained by the limiting ensemble covariance and derive an exponential decay estimate. Numerical experiments illustrate the effect of inertia and repulsion on the ensemble dynamics and compare the proposed second-order method with first-order EKI-type

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Effective agency in social environments depends on when an agent seeks knowledge, when it acts, and whether its actions are justified by acquired information. Existing grounded benchmarks provide executable actions, persistent state, and verifiable outcomes, while social simulation environments provide rich interaction among language agents. We study an evaluation setting that combines these requirements. We define socially distributed task environments as interactive environments where task-relevant knowledge is partitioned across role-isolated participants and consequential actions are accessible only through them. Communication serves as exploration over role-partitioned knowledge, while grounded action serves as exploitation over environment state. We introduce Incognita, a Concordia-based framework that separates social interaction from grounded execution. The evaluated agent routes messages to a user or specialist entities; specialists mediate admissible operations; a deterministic sub-environment executes accepted operations over a canonical state; and an offline evaluator scores outcomes with inherited rewards. Incognita-Retail transforms tau-bench retail into a multi-entity environment while preserving final-state reward semantics. We evaluate three generative agent models on 18 tasks stratified by social breadth, with 540 trials. Progress appears in reward and behavior: success rises from 0 percent to 8.9 percent and 17.2 percent, while premature finalization falls from 100 percent to 87 percent and 58 percent. Stronger models elicit more hidden knowledge, contact more entities, and attempt more grounded writes, yet reliability remains low. These findings show that socially distributed task environments expose behavior before reliable success, including knowledge elicitation, source selection, grounded action attempts, and premature completion belief.

In this work, we address the challenging problem of long-horizon goal-reaching policy learning from non-expert, action-free observation data. Unlike fully labeled expert data, our data is more accessible and avoids the costly process of action labeling. Additionally, compared to online learning, which often involves aimless exploration, our data provides useful guidance for more efficient exploration. To achieve our goal, we propose a novel subgoal guidance learning strategy. The motivation behind this strategy is that long-horizon goals offer limited guidance for efficient exploration and accurate state transition. We develop a diffusion strategy-based high-level policy to generate reasonable subgoals as waypoints, preferring states that more easily lead to the final goal. Additionally, we learn state-goal value functions to encourage efficient subgoal reaching. These two components naturally integrate into the off-policy actor-critic framework, enabling efficient goal attainment through informative exploration. We evaluate our method on complex robotic navigation and manipulation tasks, demonstrating a significant performance advantage over existing methods. Our ablation study further shows that our method is robust to observation data with various corruptions.

Two main challenges in Reinforcement Learning (RL) are designing appropriate reward functions and ensuring the safety of the learned policy. To address these challenges, we present a theoretical framework for Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) in constrained Markov decision processes. From a convex-analytic perspective, we extend prior results on reward identifiability and generalizability to both the constrained setting and a more general class of regularizations. In particular, we show that identifiability up to potential shaping (Cao et al., 2021) is a consequence of entropy regularization and may generally no longer hold for other regularizations or in the presence of safety constraints. We also show that to ensure generalizability to new transition laws and constraints, the true reward must be identified up to a constant. Additionally, we derive a finite sample guarantee for the suboptimality of the learned rewards, and validate our results in a gridworld environment.

The principle of detailed balance states that in equilibrium each elementary process is equilibrated by its reverse process. For many real physico-chemical complex systems (e.g. homogeneous combustion, heterogeneous catalytic oxidation, most enzyme reactions etc), detailed mechanisms include both reversible and irreversible reactions. In this case, the principle of detailed balance cannot be applied directly. We represent irreversible reactions as limits of reversible steps and obtain the principle of detailed balance for complex mechanisms with some irreversible elementary processes. We proved two consequences of the detailed balance for these mechanisms: the structural condition and the algebraic condition that form together the extended form of detailed balance. The algebraic condition is the principle of detailed balance for the reversible part. The structural condition is: the convex hull of the stoichiometric vectors of the irreversible reactions has empty intersection with the linear span of the stoichiometric vectors of the reversible reaction. Physically, this means that the irreversible reactions cannot be included in oriented pathways. The systems with the extended form of detailed balance are also the limits of the reversible systems with detailed balance when some of the equilibrium concentrations (or activities) tend to zero. Surprisingly, the structure of the limit reaction mechanism crucially depends on the relative speeds of this tendency to zero.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

The FOX optimizer, inspired by red fox hunting behavior, is a powerful algorithm for solving real-world and engineering problems. However, despite balancing exploration and exploitation, it can prematurely converge to local optima, as agent positions are updated solely based on the current best-known position, causing all agents to converge on one location. This study proposes the modified FOX optimizer (mFOX) to enhance exploration and balance exploration and exploitation in three steps. First, the Oppositional-Based Learning (OBL) strategy is used to improve the initial population. Second, control parameters are refined to achieve a better balance between exploration and exploitation. Third, a new update equation is introduced, allowing agents to adjust their positions relative to one another rather than relying solely on the best-known position. This approach improves exploration efficiency without adding complexity. The mFOX algorithm's performance is evaluated against 12 well-known algorithms on 23 classical benchmark functions, 10 CEC2019 functions, and 12 CEC2022 functions. It outperforms competitors in 74% of the classical benchmarks, 60% of the CEC2019 benchmarks, and 58% of the CEC2022 benchmarks. Additionally, mFOX effectively addresses four engineering problems. These results demonstrate mFOX's strong competitiveness in solving complex optimization tasks, including unimodal, constrained, and high-dimensional problems.

In this work we create agents that can perform well beyond a single, individual task, that exhibit much wider generalisation of behaviour to a massive, rich space of challenges. We define a universe of tasks within an environment domain and demonstrate the ability to train agents that are generally capable across this vast space and beyond. The environment is natively multi-agent, spanning the continuum of competitive, cooperative, and independent games, which are situated within procedurally generated physical 3D worlds. The resulting space is exceptionally diverse in terms of the challenges posed to agents, and as such, even measuring the learning progress of an agent is an open research problem. We propose an iterative notion of improvement between successive generations of agents, rather than seeking to maximise a singular objective, allowing us to quantify progress despite tasks being incomparable in terms of achievable rewards. We show that through constructing an open-ended learning process, which dynamically changes the training task distributions and training objectives such that the agent never stops learning, we achieve consistent learning of new behaviours. The resulting agent is able to score reward in every one of our humanly solvable evaluation levels, with behaviour generalising to many held-out points in the universe of tasks. Examples of this zero-shot generalisation include good performance on Hide and Seek, Capture the Flag, and Tag. Through analysis and hand-authored probe tasks we characterise the behaviour of our agent, and find interesting emergent heuristic behaviours such as trial-and-error experimentation, simple tool use, option switching, and cooperation. Finally, we demonstrate that the general capabilities of this agent could unlock larger scale transfer of behaviour through cheap finetuning.

Automatic fall recovery is a crucial prerequisite before humanoid robots can be reliably deployed. Hand-designing controllers for getting up is difficult because of the varied configurations a humanoid can end up in after a fall and the challenging terrains humanoid robots are expected to operate on. This paper develops a learning framework to produce controllers that enable humanoid robots to get up from varying configurations on varying terrains. Unlike previous successful applications of humanoid locomotion learning, the getting-up task involves complex contact patterns, which necessitates accurately modeling the collision geometry and sparser rewards. We address these challenges through a two-phase approach that follows a curriculum. The first stage focuses on discovering a good getting-up trajectory under minimal constraints on smoothness or speed / torque limits. The second stage then refines the discovered motions into deployable (i.e. smooth and slow) motions that are robust to variations in initial configuration and terrains. We find these innovations enable a real-world G1 humanoid robot to get up from two main situations that we considered: a) lying face up and b) lying face down, both tested on flat, deformable, slippery surfaces and slopes (e.g., sloppy grass and snowfield). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first successful demonstration of learned getting-up policies for human-sized humanoid robots in the real world. Project page: https://humanoid-getup.github.io/

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

Latent world models are judged by how well they predict, so when planning fails at long horizons the natural reading is that the predictor degrades. On a reproduction of LeWorldModel on TwoRoom we show the binding constraint is the planner's objective instead. The predictor is not the limit: its imagined state seventy-five environment steps ahead is still only 0.189 as wrong as assuming the world froze, while the planner never imagines beyond twenty-five. The objective is. Cross-entropy-method planning minimises squared latent distance, which tracks true distance at r = 0.426, saturates by about eighty arena units and decreases beyond a hundred and twenty, so moving away from the goal can lower the cost. The information is present throughout: a ridge probe recovers position from the frozen embedding at R^2 0.9922. The pathology is the method's, not one reimplementation's. It is present in the authors' released weights, and across four checkpoints long-horizon success rank-orders exactly with metric quality and inversely with prediction accuracy. Replacing only the objective, with nothing retrained and no GPU, lifts goals reached at offset 100 from 26.0% to 98.0%, equals the 98.0% at offset 25, and reaches 92.0% under a third of the budget: planning stops depending on the horizon. The best cost is not the most accurate. A head learned from frame separation alone predicts spatial distance worse than a position probe (r = 0.819 against 0.9897) yet plans better, charging 24% more to cross the environment's dividing wall where squared latent distance charges 4% less. It has learned reachability, not proximity.

We establish an existence of equilibrium result for a class of non-Markovian mean-field games with unbounded control space in weak formulation. Our result is based on new existence and stability results for quadratic-growth generalized McKean-Vlasov BSDEs. Unlike earlier approaches, our approach does not require boundedness assumptions on the model parameters or time horizons and allows for running costs that are quadratic in the control variable.

We revisit Tirole's classic paper "Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations" (1985, Econometrica) in the case of a dividend-paying asset. Recently, Pham and Toda (2026) constructed a counterexample to Proposition 1(c), showing that Tirole's equilibrium classification is incorrect as stated and that long-run outcomes can depend on initial capital. This paper characterizes the entire set of equilibrium initial asset prices under capital over-accumulation. Exactly one of three regimes occurs: (i) a unique bubbleless equilibrium with capital converging to zero (capital collapse), (ii) a unique asymptotically bubbly equilibrium converging to a positive steady state (bubble necessity), or (iii) a continuum of equilibria with different long-run bubble behavior (indeterminacy). We further derive a threshold for initial capital under the bubble necessity condition, establish preference-free sufficient conditions for capital collapse, and show that the continuum in the pure bubble model survives sufficiently small dividend perturbations. Closed-form examples illustrate the possible long-run outcomes.

Exploration bonuses in reinforcement learning guide long-horizon exploration by defining custom intrinsic objectives. Several exploration objectives like count-based bonuses, pseudo-counts, and state-entropy maximization are non-stationary and hence are difficult to optimize for the agent. While this issue is generally known, it is usually omitted and solutions remain under-explored. The key contribution of our work lies in transforming the original non-stationary rewards into stationary rewards through an augmented state representation. For this purpose, we introduce the Stationary Objectives For Exploration (SOFE) framework. SOFE requires identifying sufficient statistics for different exploration bonuses and finding an efficient encoding of these statistics to use as input to a deep network. SOFE is based on proposing state augmentations that expand the state space but hold the promise of simplifying the optimization of the agent's objective. We show that SOFE improves the performance of several exploration objectives, including count-based bonuses, pseudo-counts, and state-entropy maximization. Moreover, SOFE outperforms prior methods that attempt to stabilize the optimization of intrinsic objectives. We demonstrate the efficacy of SOFE in hard-exploration problems, including sparse-reward tasks, pixel-based observations, 3D navigation, and procedurally generated environments.

Boltzmann generators approach the sampling problem in many-body physics by combining a normalizing flow and a statistical reweighting method to generate samples in thermodynamic equilibrium. The equilibrium distribution is usually defined by an energy function and a thermodynamic state. Here we propose temperature-steerable flows (TSF) which are able to generate a family of probability densities parametrized by a choosable temperature parameter. TSFs can be embedded in generalized ensemble sampling frameworks to sample a physical system across multiple thermodynamic states.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

We present a novel unified bilevel optimization-based framework, PARL, formulated to address the recently highlighted critical issue of policy alignment in reinforcement learning using utility or preference-based feedback. We identify a major gap within current algorithmic designs for solving policy alignment due to a lack of precise characterization of the dependence of the alignment objective on the data generated by policy trajectories. This shortfall contributes to the sub-optimal performance observed in contemporary algorithms. Our framework addressed these concerns by explicitly parameterizing the distribution of the upper alignment objective (reward design) by the lower optimal variable (optimal policy for the designed reward). Interestingly, from an optimization perspective, our formulation leads to a new class of stochastic bilevel problems where the stochasticity at the upper objective depends upon the lower-level variable. To demonstrate the efficacy of our formulation in resolving alignment issues in RL, we devised an algorithm named A-PARL to solve PARL problem, establishing sample complexity bounds of order O(1/T). Our empirical results substantiate that the proposed PARL can address the alignment concerns in RL by showing significant improvements (up to 63\% in terms of required samples) for policy alignment in large-scale environments of the Deepmind control suite and Meta world tasks.

In RL, given a prompt, we sample a group of completions from a model and score them. Two questions follow: which completions should gain probability mass, and how should the parameters move to realize that change? Standard policy-gradient methods answer both at once, so the update can overshoot or undershoot depending on the learning rate, clipping, and other optimizer choices. We introduce Target Policy Optimization (TPO), which separates the two questions. Given scored completions, TPO constructs a target distribution q_i propto p_i^{,old} exp(u_i) and fits the policy to it by cross-entropy. The loss gradient on sampled-completion logits is p^θ- q, which vanishes once the policy matches the target. On tabular bandits, transformer sequence tasks, and billion-parameter LLM RLVR, TPO matches PG, PPO, GRPO, and DG on easy tasks and substantially outperforms them under sparse reward. Code is available at https://github.com/JeanKaddour/tpo.

In multi-goal Reinforcement Learning, an agent can share experience between related training tasks, resulting in better generalization for new tasks at test time. However, when the goal space has discontinuities and the reward is sparse, a majority of goals are difficult to reach. In this context, a curriculum over goals helps agents learn by adapting training tasks to their current capabilities. In this work we propose Stein Variational Goal Generation (SVGG), which samples goals of intermediate difficulty for the agent, by leveraging a learned predictive model of its goal reaching capabilities. The distribution of goals is modeled with particles that are attracted in areas of appropriate difficulty using Stein Variational Gradient Descent. We show that SVGG outperforms state-of-the-art multi-goal Reinforcement Learning methods in terms of success coverage in hard exploration problems, and demonstrate that it is endowed with a useful recovery property when the environment changes.

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as part of compound AI systems that coordinate multiple modules (e.g., retrievers, tools, verifiers) over long-horizon workflows. Recent approaches that propagate textual feedback globally (e.g., TextGrad) make it feasible to optimize such pipelines, but we find that performance degrades as system depth grows. In particular, long-horizon agentic workflows exhibit two depth-scaling failure modes: 1) exploding textual gradient, where textual feedback grows exponentially with depth, leading to prohibitively long message and amplifies evaluation biases; and 2) vanishing textual gradient, where limited long-context ability causes models overemphasize partial feedback and compression of lengthy feedback causes downstream messages to lose specificity gradually as they propagate many hops upstream. To mitigate these issues, we introduce Textual Equilibrium Propagation (TEP), a local learning principle inspired by Equilibrium Propagation in energy-based models. TEP includes two phases: 1) a free phase where a local LLM critics iteratively refine prompts until reaching equilibrium (no further improvements are suggested); and 2) a nudged phase which applies proximal prompt edits with bounded modification intensity, using task-level objectives that propagate via forward signaling rather than backward feedback chains. This design supports local prompt optimization followed by controlled adaptation toward global goals without the computational burden and signal degradation of global textual backpropagation. Across long-horizon QA benchmarks and multi-agent tool-use dataset, TEP consistently improves accuracy and efficiency over global propagation methods such as TextGrad. The gains grows with depth, while preserving the practicality of black-box LLM components in deep compound AI system.

Most 3D object generators focus on aesthetic quality, often neglecting physical constraints necessary in applications. One such constraint is that the 3D object should be self-supporting, i.e., remains balanced under gravity. Prior approaches to generating stable 3D objects used differentiable physics simulators to optimize geometry at test-time, which is slow, unstable, and prone to local optima. Inspired by the literature on aligning generative models to external feedback, we propose Direct Simulation Optimization (DSO), a framework to use the feedback from a (non-differentiable) simulator to increase the likelihood that the 3D generator outputs stable 3D objects directly. We construct a dataset of 3D objects labeled with a stability score obtained from the physics simulator. We can then fine-tune the 3D generator using the stability score as the alignment metric, via direct preference optimization (DPO) or direct reward optimization (DRO), a novel objective, which we introduce, to align diffusion models without requiring pairwise preferences. Our experiments show that the fine-tuned feed-forward generator, using either DPO or DRO objective, is much faster and more likely to produce stable objects than test-time optimization. Notably, the DSO framework works even without any ground-truth 3D objects for training, allowing the 3D generator to self-improve by automatically collecting simulation feedback on its own outputs.

Existing game AI research mainly focuses on enhancing agents' abilities to win games, but this does not inherently make humans have a better experience when collaborating with these agents. For example, agents may dominate the collaboration and exhibit unintended or detrimental behaviors, leading to poor experiences for their human partners. In other words, most game AI agents are modeled in a "self-centered" manner. In this paper, we propose a "human-centered" modeling scheme for collaborative agents that aims to enhance the experience of humans. Specifically, we model the experience of humans as the goals they expect to achieve during the task. We expect that agents should learn to enhance the extent to which humans achieve these goals while maintaining agents' original abilities (e.g., winning games). To achieve this, we propose the Reinforcement Learning from Human Gain (RLHG) approach. The RLHG approach introduces a "baseline", which corresponds to the extent to which humans primitively achieve their goals, and encourages agents to learn behaviors that can effectively enhance humans in achieving their goals better. We evaluate the RLHG agent in the popular Multi-player Online Battle Arena (MOBA) game, Honor of Kings, by conducting real-world human-agent tests. Both objective performance and subjective preference results show that the RLHG agent provides participants better gaming experience.

In this paper, we present empirical evidence of skills and directed exploration emerging from a simple RL algorithm long before any successful trials are observed. For example, in a manipulation task, the agent is given a single observation of the goal state and learns skills, first for moving its end-effector, then for pushing the block, and finally for picking up and placing the block. These skills emerge before the agent has ever successfully placed the block at the goal location and without the aid of any reward functions, demonstrations, or manually-specified distance metrics. Once the agent has learned to reach the goal state reliably, exploration is reduced. Implementing our method involves a simple modification of prior work and does not require density estimates, ensembles, or any additional hyperparameters. Intuitively, the proposed method seems like it should be terrible at exploration, and we lack a clear theoretical understanding of why it works so effectively, though our experiments provide some hints.

We introduce an Implicit Game-Theoretic MPC (IGT-MPC), a decentralized algorithm for two-agent motion planning that uses a learned value function that predicts the game-theoretic interaction outcomes as the terminal cost-to-go function in a model predictive control (MPC) framework, guiding agents to implicitly account for interactions with other agents and maximize their reward. This approach applies to competitive and cooperative multi-agent motion planning problems which we formulate as constrained dynamic games. Given a constrained dynamic game, we randomly sample initial conditions and solve for the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) to generate a dataset of GNE solutions, computing the reward outcome of each game-theoretic interaction from the GNE. The data is used to train a simple neural network to predict the reward outcome, which we use as the terminal cost-to-go function in an MPC scheme. We showcase emerging competitive and coordinated behaviors using IGT-MPC in scenarios such as two-vehicle head-to-head racing and un-signalized intersection navigation. IGT-MPC offers a novel method integrating machine learning and game-theoretic reasoning into model-based decentralized multi-agent motion planning.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR), which typically adopts Pass@1 as the reward, has faced the issues in balancing exploration and exploitation, causing policies to prefer conservative actions, converging to a local optimum. Identifying an appropriate reward metric is therefore crucial. Regarding the prior work, although Pass@k has been used in evaluation, its connection to LLM exploration ability in RLVR remains largely overlooked. To investigate this, we first use Pass@k as the reward to train the policy model (i.e., Pass@k Training), and observe the improvement on its exploration ability. Next, we derive an analytical solution for the advantage of Pass@k Training, leading to an efficient and effective process. Building on this, our analysis reveals that exploration and exploitation are not inherently conflicting objectives, while they can mutually enhance each other. Moreover, Pass@k Training with analytical derivation essentially involves directly designing the advantage function. Inspired by this, we preliminarily explore the advantage design for RLVR, showing promising results and highlighting a potential future direction.

Robustness against adversarial attacks and distribution shifts is a long-standing goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL). To this end, Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) trains a protagonist against destabilizing forces exercised by an adversary in a competitive zero-sum Markov game, whose optimal solution, i.e., rational strategy, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. However, finding Nash equilibria requires facing complex saddle point optimization problems, which can be prohibitive to solve, especially for high-dimensional control. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for adversarial RL based on entropy regularization to ease the complexity of the saddle point optimization problem. We show that the solution of this entropy-regularized problem corresponds to a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), a generalization of Nash equilibria that accounts for bounded rationality, i.e., agents sometimes play random actions instead of optimal ones. Crucially, the connection between the entropy-regularized objective and QRE enables free modulation of the rationality of the agents by simply tuning the temperature coefficient. We leverage this insight to propose our novel algorithm, Quantal Adversarial RL (QARL), which gradually increases the rationality of the adversary in a curriculum fashion until it is fully rational, easing the complexity of the optimization problem while retaining robustness. We provide extensive evidence of QARL outperforming RARL and recent baselines across several MuJoCo locomotion and navigation problems in overall performance and robustness.

Recent advancements in meta-learning have enabled the automatic discovery of novel reinforcement learning algorithms parameterized by surrogate objective functions. To improve upon manually designed algorithms, the parameterization of this learned objective function must be expressive enough to represent novel principles of learning (instead of merely recovering already established ones) while still generalizing to a wide range of settings outside of its meta-training distribution. However, existing methods focus on discovering objective functions that, like many widely used objective functions in reinforcement learning, do not take into account the total number of steps allowed for training, or "training horizon". In contrast, humans use a plethora of different learning objectives across the course of acquiring a new ability. For instance, students may alter their studying techniques based on the proximity to exam deadlines and their self-assessed capabilities. This paper contends that ignoring the optimization time horizon significantly restricts the expressive potential of discovered learning algorithms. We propose a simple augmentation to two existing objective discovery approaches that allows the discovered algorithm to dynamically update its objective function throughout the agent's training procedure, resulting in expressive schedules and increased generalization across different training horizons. In the process, we find that commonly used meta-gradient approaches fail to discover such adaptive objective functions while evolution strategies discover highly dynamic learning rules. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on a wide range of tasks and analyze the resulting learned algorithms, which we find effectively balance exploration and exploitation by modifying the structure of their learning rules throughout the agent's lifetime.

Reinforcement learning (RL) holds significant promise for training LLM agents to handle complex, goal-oriented tasks that require multi-step interactions with external environments. However, a critical challenge when applying RL to these agentic tasks arises from delayed rewards: feedback signals are typically available only after the entire task is completed. This makes it non-trivial to assign delayed rewards to earlier actions, providing insufficient guidance regarding environmental constraints and hindering agent training. In this work, we draw on the insight that the ultimate completion of a task emerges from the cumulative progress an agent makes across individual steps. We propose Stepwise Progress Attribution (SPA), a general reward redistribution framework that decomposes the final reward into stepwise contributions, each reflecting its incremental progress toward overall task completion. To achieve this, we train a progress estimator that accumulates stepwise contributions over a trajectory to match the task completion. During policy optimization, we combine the estimated per-step contribution with a grounding signal for actions executed in the environment as the fine-grained, intermediate reward for effective agent training. Extensive experiments on common agent benchmarks (including Webshop, ALFWorld, and VirtualHome) demonstrate that SPA consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art method in both success rate (+2.5\% on average) and grounding accuracy (+1.9\% on average). Further analyses demonstrate that our method remarkably provides more effective intermediate rewards for RL training. Our code is available at https://github.com/WangHanLinHenry/SPA-RL-Agent.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) was introduced and used recently for promoting reasoning in LLMs under verifiable (binary) rewards. We show that the mean + variance calibration of these rewards induces a weighted contrastive loss in which the contrastive samples are synthetic data drawn from the previous policy. While GRPO was originally paired with clipping to keep updates near the old policy, we analyze variants that differ in reward normalization (mean-only vs mean + variance) and in how they regularize updates using KL divergence: either penalizing divergence from the previous model (mirror), penalizing divergence from a fixed reference model π_{ref}, or combining both forms of regularization. For each, the optimal policy π_n admits an explicit form in terms of the binary reward and the first and second order statistics of the reward under π_{n-1}, as well as the policies π_{n-1} and π_{ref}. Iterating results in a sequence {π_n} whose probability of success (PoS) obeys a simple recurrence that converges to a fixed point determined by the reference PoS and the regularization strength. We further show that this fixed point exceeds the reference, demonstrating that GRPO amplifies the policy's probability of success.

In recent years, Reinforcement Learning (RL) has been applied to real-world problems with increasing success. Such applications often require to put constraints on the agent's behavior. Existing algorithms for constrained RL (CRL) rely on gradient descent-ascent, but this approach comes with a caveat. While these algorithms are guaranteed to converge on average, they do not guarantee last-iterate convergence, i.e., the current policy of the agent may never converge to the optimal solution. In practice, it is often observed that the policy alternates between satisfying the constraints and maximizing the reward, rarely accomplishing both objectives simultaneously. Here, we address this problem by introducing Reinforcement Learning with Optimistic Ascent-Descent (ReLOAD), a principled CRL method with guaranteed last-iterate convergence. We demonstrate its empirical effectiveness on a wide variety of CRL problems including discrete MDPs and continuous control. In the process we establish a benchmark of challenging CRL problems.

Large language models (LLMs) can transform education, but their optimization for direct question-answering often undermines effective pedagogy which requires strategically withholding answers. To mitigate this, we propose an online reinforcement learning (RL)-based alignment framework that can quickly adapt LLMs into effective tutors using simulated student-tutor interactions by emphasizing pedagogical quality and guided problem-solving over simply giving away answers. We use our method to train a 7B parameter tutor model without human annotations which reaches similar performance to larger proprietary models like LearnLM. We introduce a controllable reward weighting to balance pedagogical support and student solving accuracy, allowing us to trace the Pareto frontier between these two objectives. Our models better preserve reasoning capabilities than single-turn SFT baselines and can optionally enhance interpretability through thinking tags that expose the model's instructional planning.

Utility functions or their equivalents (value functions, objective functions, loss functions, reward functions, preference orderings) are a central tool in most current machine learning systems. These mechanisms for defining goals and guiding optimization run into practical and conceptual difficulty when there are independent, multi-dimensional objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously and cannot be reduced to each other. Ethicists have proved several impossibility theorems that stem from this origin; those results appear to show that there is no way of formally specifying what it means for an outcome to be good for a population without violating strong human ethical intuitions (in such cases, the objective function is a social welfare function). We argue that this is a practical problem for any machine learning system (such as medical decision support systems or autonomous weapons) or rigidly rule-based bureaucracy that will make high stakes decisions about human lives: such systems should not use objective functions in the strict mathematical sense. We explore the alternative of using uncertain objectives, represented for instance as partially ordered preferences, or as probability distributions over total orders. We show that previously known impossibility theorems can be transformed into uncertainty theorems in both of those settings, and prove lower bounds on how much uncertainty is implied by the impossibility results. We close by proposing two conjectures about the relationship between uncertainty in objectives and severe unintended consequences from AI systems.

Since humans still outperform artificial neural networks on many tasks, drawing inspiration from the brain may help to improve current machine learning algorithms. Contrastive Hebbian Learning (CHL) and Equilibrium Propagation (EP) are biologically plausible algorithms that update weights using only local information (without explicitly calculating gradients) and still achieve performance comparable to conventional backpropagation. In this study, we augmented CHL and EP with Adjusted Adaptation, inspired by the adaptation effect observed in neurons, in which a neuron's response to a given stimulus is adjusted after a short time. We add this adaptation feature to multilayer perceptrons and convolutional neural networks trained on MNIST and CIFAR-10. Surprisingly, adaptation improved the performance of these networks. We discuss the biological inspiration for this idea and investigate why Neuronal Adaptation could be an important brain mechanism to improve the stability and accuracy of learning.

Long-horizon robotic manipulation remains challenging for reinforcement learning (RL) because sparse rewards provide limited guidance for credit assignment. Practical policy improvement thus relies on richer intermediate supervision, such as dense progress rewards, which are costly to obtain and ill-suited to non-monotonic behaviors such as backtracking and recovery. To address this, we propose Advantage Reward Modeling (ARM), a framework that shifts from hard-to-quantify absolute progress to estimating relative advantage. We introduce a cost-effective tri-state labeling strategy -- Progressive, Regressive, and Stagnant -- that reduces human cognitive overhead while ensuring high cross-annotator consistency. By training on these intuitive signals, ARM enables automated progress annotation for both complete demonstrations and fragmented DAgger-style data. Integrating ARM into an offline RL pipeline allows for adaptive action-reward reweighting, effectively filtering suboptimal samples. Our approach achieves a 99.4% success rate on a challenging long-horizon towel-folding task, demonstrating improved stability and data efficiency over current VLA baselines with near-zero human intervention during policy training.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

Reinforcement learning fine-tuning has become the dominant approach for aligning diffusion models with human preferences. However, assessing images is intrinsically a multi-dimensional task, and multiple evaluation criteria need to be optimized simultaneously. Existing practice deal with multiple rewards by training one specialist model per reward, optimizing a weighted-sum reward R(x)=sum_k w_k R_k(x), or sequentially fine-tuning with a hand-crafted stage schedule. These approaches either fail to produce a unified model that can be jointly trained on all rewards or necessitates heavy manually tuned sequential training. We find that the failure stems from using a naive weighted-sum reward aggregation. This approach suffers from a sample-level mismatch because most rollouts are specialist samples, highly informative for certain reward dimensions but irrelevant for others; consequently, weighted summation dilutes their supervision. To address this issue, we propose MARBLE (Multi-Aspect Reward BaLancE), a gradient-space optimization framework that maintains independent advantage estimators for each reward, computes per-reward policy gradients, and harmonizes them into a single update direction without manually-tuned reward weighting, by solving a Quadratic Programming problem. We further propose an amortized formulation that exploits the affine structure of the loss used in DiffusionNFT, to reduce the per-step cost from K+1 backward passes to near single-reward baseline cost, together with EMA smoothing on the balancing coefficients to stabilize updates against transient single-batch fluctuations. On SD3.5 Medium with five rewards, MARBLE improves all five reward dimensions simultaneously, turns the worst-aligned reward's gradient cosine from negative under weighted summation in 80% of mini-batches to consistently positive, and runs at 0.97X the training speed of baseline training.

Synthesizing optimal controllers for dynamical systems often involves solving optimization problems with hard real-time constraints. These constraints determine the class of numerical methods that can be applied: computationally expensive but accurate numerical routines are replaced by fast and inaccurate methods, trading inference time for solution accuracy. This paper provides techniques to improve the quality of optimized control policies given a fixed computational budget. We achieve the above via a hypersolvers approach, which hybridizes a differential equation solver and a neural network. The performance is evaluated in direct and receding-horizon optimal control tasks in both low and high dimensions, where the proposed approach shows consistent Pareto improvements in solution accuracy and control performance.

The statistical mechanics of Gibbs is a juxtaposition of subjective, probabilistic ideas on the one hand and objective, mechanical ideas on the other. In this paper, we follow the path set out by Jaynes, including elements added subsequently to that original work, to explore the consequences of the purely statistical point of view. We show how standard methods in the equilibrium theory could have been derived simply from a description of the available problem information. In addition, our presentation leads to novel insights into questions associated with symmetry and non-equilibrium statistical mechanics. Two surprising consequences to be explored in further work are that (in)distinguishability factors are automatically predicted from the problem formulation and that a quantity related to the thermodynamic entropy production is found by considering information loss in non-equilibrium processes. Using the problem of ion channel thermodynamics as an example, we illustrate the idea of building up complexity by successively adding information to create progressively more complex descriptions of a physical system. Our result is that such statistical mechanical descriptions can be used to create transparent, computable, experimentally-relevant models that may be informed by more detailed atomistic simulations. We also derive a theory for the kinetic behavior of this system, identifying the nonequilibrium `process' free energy functional. The Gibbs relation for this functional is a fluctuation-dissipation theorem applicable arbitrarily far from equilibrium, that captures the effect of non-local and time-dependent behavior from transient driving forces. Based on this work, it is clear that statistical mechanics is a general tool for constructing the relationships between constraints on system information.

Diffusion models excel at producing high-quality samples but naively require hundreds of iterations, prompting multiple attempts to distill the generation process into a faster network. However, many existing approaches suffer from a variety of challenges: the process for distillation training can be complex, often requiring multiple training stages, and the resulting models perform poorly when utilized in single-step generative applications. In this paper, we introduce a simple yet effective means of distilling diffusion models directly from initial noise to the resulting image. Of particular importance to our approach is to leverage a new Deep Equilibrium (DEQ) model as the distilled architecture: the Generative Equilibrium Transformer (GET). Our method enables fully offline training with just noise/image pairs from the diffusion model while achieving superior performance compared to existing one-step methods on comparable training budgets. We demonstrate that the DEQ architecture is crucial to this capability, as GET matches a 5times larger ViT in terms of FID scores while striking a critical balance of computational cost and image quality. Code, checkpoints, and datasets are available.

Accurate free-energy estimation is essential in molecular simulation, yet the periodic boundary conditions (PBC) commonly used in computer simulations have rarely been explicitly exploited. Equilibrium methods such as umbrella sampling, metadynamics, and adaptive biasing force require extensive sampling, while non-equilibrium pulling with Jarzynski's equality suffers from poor convergence due to exponential averaging. Here, we introduce a physics-informed, score-based diffusion framework: by mapping PBC simulations onto a Brownian particle in a periodic potential, we derive the Fokker-Planck steady-state score that directly encodes free-energy gradients. A neural network is trained on non-equilibrium trajectories to learn this score, providing a principled scheme to efficiently reconstruct the potential of mean force (PMF). On benchmark periodic potentials and small-molecule membrane permeation, our method is up to one order of magnitude more efficient than umbrella sampling.

Optimizing the performance of many objectives (instantiated by tasks or clients) jointly with a few Pareto stationary solutions (models) is critical in machine learning. However, previous multi-objective optimization methods often focus on a few number of objectives and cannot scale to many objectives that outnumber the solutions, leading to either subpar performance or ignored objectives. We introduce Many-objective multi-solution Transport (MosT), a framework that finds multiple diverse solutions in the Pareto front of many objectives. Our insight is to seek multiple solutions, each performing as a domain expert and focusing on a specific subset of objectives while collectively covering all of them. MosT formulates the problem as a bi-level optimization of weighted objectives for each solution, where the weights are defined by an optimal transport between the objectives and solutions. Our algorithm ensures convergence to Pareto stationary solutions for complementary subsets of objectives. On a range of applications in federated learning, multi-task learning, and mixture-of-prompt learning for LLMs, MosT distinctly outperforms strong baselines, delivering high-quality, diverse solutions that profile the entire Pareto frontier, thus ensuring balanced trade-offs across many objectives.

When deploying a single predictor across multiple subpopulations, we propose a fundamentally different approach: interpreting group fairness as a bargaining problem among subpopulations. This game-theoretic perspective reveals that existing robust optimization methods such as minimizing worst-group loss or regret correspond to classical bargaining solutions and embody different fairness principles. We propose relative improvement, the ratio of actual risk reduction to potential reduction from a baseline predictor, which recovers the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Unlike absolute-scale methods that may not be comparable when groups have different potential predictability, relative improvement provides axiomatic justification including scale invariance and individual monotonicity. We establish finite-sample convergence guarantees under mild conditions.

Can reinforcement learning with hard, verifiable rewards teach a compact language model to reason about physics, or does it primarily learn to pattern-match toward correct answers? We study this question by training a 1.5B-parameter reasoning model on beam statics, a classic engineering problem, using parameter-efficient RLVR with binary correctness rewards from symbolic solvers, without teacher-generated reasoning traces. The best BeamPERL checkpoint achieves a 66.7% improvement in Pass@1 over the base model. However, the learned competence is anisotropic: the model generalizes compositionally (more loads) but fails under topological shifts (moved supports) that require the same equilibrium equations. Intermediate checkpoints yield the strongest reasoning, while continued optimization degrades robustness while maintaining reward. These findings reveal a key limitation of outcome-level alignment: reinforcement learning with exact physics rewards induces procedural solution templates rather than internalization of governing equations. The precision of the reward signal - even when analytically exact - does not by itself guarantee transferable physical reasoning. Our results suggest that verifiable rewards may need to be paired with structured reasoning scaffolding to move beyond template matching toward robust scientific reasoning.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

We study fairness in classification, where individuals are classified, e.g., admitted to a university, and the goal is to prevent discrimination against individuals based on their membership in some group, while maintaining utility for the classifier (the university). The main conceptual contribution of this paper is a framework for fair classification comprising (1) a (hypothetical) task-specific metric for determining the degree to which individuals are similar with respect to the classification task at hand; (2) an algorithm for maximizing utility subject to the fairness constraint, that similar individuals are treated similarly. We also present an adaptation of our approach to achieve the complementary goal of "fair affirmative action," which guarantees statistical parity (i.e., the demographics of the set of individuals receiving any classification are the same as the demographics of the underlying population), while treating similar individuals as similarly as possible. Finally, we discuss the relationship of fairness to privacy: when fairness implies privacy, and how tools developed in the context of differential privacy may be applied to fairness.

Recent research shows that Preference Alignment (PA) objectives act as divergence estimators between aligned (chosen) and unaligned (rejected) response distributions. In this work, we extend this divergence-based perspective to general alignment settings, such as reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR), where only environmental rewards are available. Within this unified framework, we propose f-Group Relative Policy Optimization (f-GRPO), a class of on-policy reinforcement learning, and f-Hybrid Alignment Loss (f-HAL), a hybrid on/off policy objectives, for general LLM alignment based on variational representation of f-divergences. We provide theoretical guarantees that these classes of objectives improve the average reward after alignment. Empirically, we validate our framework on both RLVR (Math Reasoning) and PA tasks (Safety Alignment), demonstrating superior performance and flexibility compared to current methods.

To survive in dynamic and uncertain environments, individuals must develop effective decision strategies that balance information gathering and decision commitment. Models of such strategies often prioritize either optimizing tangible payoffs, like reward rate, or gathering information to support a diversity of (possibly unknown) objectives. However, our understanding of the relative merits of these two approaches remains incomplete, in part because direct comparisons have been limited to idealized, static environments that lack the dynamic complexity of the real world. Here we compared the performance of normative reward- and information-seeking strategies in a dynamic foraging task. Both strategies show similar transitions between exploratory and exploitative behaviors as environmental uncertainty changes. However, we find subtle disparities in the actions they take, resulting in meaningful performance differences: whereas reward-seeking strategies generate slightly more reward on average, information-seeking strategies provide more consistent and predictable outcomes. Our findings support the adaptive value of information-seeking behaviors that can mitigate risk with minimal reward loss.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

Training LLM agents in multi-turn environments with sparse rewards, where completing a single task requires 30+ turns of interaction within an episode, presents a fundamental challenge for reinforcement learning. We identify a critical failure mode unique to this setting: the exploration-exploitation cascade failure. This cascade begins with early-stage policy premature convergence, where sparse feedback causes agents to commit to flawed, low-entropy strategies. Subsequently, agents enter late-stage policy collapse, where conventional entropy regularization becomes counterproductive, promoting chaotic exploration that destabilizes training. We propose Entropy-regularized Policy Optimization (EPO), a general framework that breaks this failure cycle through three synergistic mechanisms: (1) adopting entropy regularization in multi-turn settings to enhance exploration, (2) an entropy smoothing regularizer that bounds policy entropy within historical averages to prevent abrupt fluctuations, and (3) adaptive phase-based weighting that balances exploration and exploitation across training. Our analysis justifies that EPO guarantees monotonically decreasing entropy variance while maintaining convergence. EPO achieves up to 152% performance improvement on ScienceWorld and up to 19.8% on ALFWorld. Our work demonstrates that multi-turn sparse-reward settings require fundamentally different entropy control than traditional RL, with broad implications for LLM agent training.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

Reinforcement learning has significantly enhanced the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in complex problem-solving tasks. Recently, the introduction of DeepSeek R1 has inspired a surge of interest in leveraging rule-based rewards as a low-cost alternative for computing advantage functions and guiding policy optimization. However, a common challenge observed across many replication and extension efforts is that when multiple sampled responses under a single prompt converge to identical outcomes, whether correct or incorrect, the group-based advantage degenerates to zero. This leads to vanishing gradients and renders the corresponding samples ineffective for learning, ultimately limiting training efficiency and downstream performance. To address this issue, we propose a consistency-aware policy optimization framework that introduces a structured global reward based on outcome consistency, the global loss based on it ensures that, even when model outputs show high intra-group consistency, the training process still receives meaningful learning signals, which encourages the generation of correct and self-consistent reasoning paths from a global perspective. Furthermore, we incorporate an entropy-based soft blending mechanism that adaptively balances local advantage estimation with global optimization, enabling dynamic transitions between exploration and convergence throughout training. Our method introduces several key innovations in both reward design and optimization strategy. We validate its effectiveness through substantial performance gains on multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks, highlighting the proposed framework's robustness and general applicability. Code of this work has been released at https://github.com/hijih/copo-code.git.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is the dominant paradigm for sharpening strategic tool use capabilities of LLMs on long-horizon, sparsely-rewarded agent tasks, yet it faces a fundamental challenge of exploration-exploitation trade-off. Existing studies stimulate exploration through the lens of policy entropy, but such mechanical entropy maximization is prone to RL training instability due to the multi-turn distribution shifting. In this paper, we target the progressive exploration-exploitation balance under the guidance of the agent own experiences without succumbing to either entropy collapsing or runaway divergence. We propose SPEAR, a curriculum-based self-imitation learning (SIL) recipe for training agentic LLMs. It extends the vanilla SIL framework, where a replay buffer stores self-generated promising trajectories for off-policy update, by gradually steering the policy evolution within a well-balanced range of entropy across stages. Specifically, our approach incorporates a curriculum to manage the exploration process, utilizing intrinsic rewards to foster skill-level exploration and facilitating action-level exploration through SIL. At first, the auxiliary tool call reward plays a critical role in the accumulation of tool-use skills, enabling broad exposure to the unfamiliar distributions of the environment feedback with an upward entropy trend. As training progresses, self-imitation gets strengthened to exploit existing successful patterns from replayed experiences for comparative action-level exploration, accelerating solution iteration without unbounded entropy growth. To further stabilize training, we recalibrate the advantages of experiences in the replay buffer to address the potential policy drift. Reugularizations such as the clipping of tokens with high covariance between probability and advantage are introduced to the trajectory-level entropy control to curb over-confidence.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

Discovering achievements with a hierarchical structure in procedurally generated environments presents a significant challenge. This requires an agent to possess a broad range of abilities, including generalization and long-term reasoning. Many prior methods have been built upon model-based or hierarchical approaches, with the belief that an explicit module for long-term planning would be advantageous for learning hierarchical dependencies. However, these methods demand an excessive number of environment interactions or large model sizes, limiting their practicality. In this work, we demonstrate that proximal policy optimization (PPO), a simple yet versatile model-free algorithm, outperforms previous methods when optimized with recent implementation practices. Moreover, we find that the PPO agent can predict the next achievement to be unlocked to some extent, albeit with limited confidence. Based on this observation, we introduce a novel contrastive learning method, called achievement distillation, which strengthens the agent's ability to predict the next achievement. Our method exhibits a strong capacity for discovering hierarchical achievements and shows state-of-the-art performance on the challenging Crafter environment in a sample-efficient manner while utilizing fewer model parameters.

Designing rewards for Reinforcement Learning (RL) is challenging because it needs to convey the desired task, be efficient to optimize, and be easy to compute. The latter is particularly problematic when applying RL to robotics, where detecting whether the desired configuration is reached might require considerable supervision and instrumentation. Furthermore, we are often interested in being able to reach a wide range of configurations, hence setting up a different reward every time might be unpractical. Methods like Hindsight Experience Replay (HER) have recently shown promise to learn policies able to reach many goals, without the need of a reward. Unfortunately, without tricks like resetting to points along the trajectory, HER might require many samples to discover how to reach certain areas of the state-space. In this work we investigate different approaches to incorporate demonstrations to drastically speed up the convergence to a policy able to reach any goal, also surpassing the performance of an agent trained with other Imitation Learning algorithms. Furthermore, we show our method can also be used when the available expert trajectories do not contain the actions, which can leverage kinesthetic or third person demonstration. The code is available at https://sites.google.com/view/goalconditioned-il/.

In reinforcement learning from human feedback, it is common to optimize against a reward model trained to predict human preferences. Because the reward model is an imperfect proxy, optimizing its value too much can hinder ground truth performance, in accordance with Goodhart's law. This effect has been frequently observed, but not carefully measured due to the expense of collecting human preference data. In this work, we use a synthetic setup in which a fixed "gold-standard" reward model plays the role of humans, providing labels used to train a proxy reward model. We study how the gold reward model score changes as we optimize against the proxy reward model using either reinforcement learning or best-of-n sampling. We find that this relationship follows a different functional form depending on the method of optimization, and that in both cases its coefficients scale smoothly with the number of reward model parameters. We also study the effect on this relationship of the size of the reward model dataset, the number of reward model and policy parameters, and the coefficient of the KL penalty added to the reward in the reinforcement learning setup. We explore the implications of these empirical results for theoretical considerations in AI alignment.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

Multiobjective optimization plays an increasingly important role in modern applications, where several criteria are often of equal importance. The task in multiobjective optimization and multiobjective optimal control is therefore to compute the set of optimal compromises (the Pareto set) between the conflicting objectives. The advances in algorithms and the increasing interest in Pareto-optimal solutions have led to a wide range of new applications related to optimal and feedback control - potentially with non-smoothness both on the level of the objectives or in the system dynamics. This results in new challenges such as dealing with expensive models (e.g., governed by partial differential equations (PDEs)) and developing dedicated algorithms handling the non-smoothness. Since in contrast to single-objective optimization, the Pareto set generally consists of an infinite number of solutions, the computational effort can quickly become challenging, which is particularly problematic when the objectives are costly to evaluate or when a solution has to be presented very quickly. This article gives an overview of recent developments in the field of multiobjective optimization of non-smooth PDE-constrained problems. In particular we report on the advances achieved within Project 2 "Multiobjective Optimization of Non-Smooth PDE-Constrained Problems - Switches, State Constraints and Model Order Reduction" of the DFG Priority Programm 1962 "Non-smooth and Complementarity-based Distributed Parameter Systems: Simulation and Hierarchical Optimization".