Daily Papers

Agentic commerce is moving from concept to deployed infrastructure: payment networks, retailers, and AI platforms are setting the stage for agents to transact on behalf of merchants and consumers. Yet whether the LLMs behind these agents can price competently in real markets, where customer preferences are hidden, competitors adapt in real time, and demand can shift without warning, has not been systematically tested. We introduce Bazaar, a dynamic sealed-bid benchmark for multi-attribute auction under these conditions. Despite its dynamics, the benchmark is grounded in closed-form customer utilities, enabling exact evaluation. Across 11 frontier LLMs from four providers, the leading agents on customer acquisition (e.g. Gemini 3.1 Pro) are often not the leading agents on profit (e.g. Opus 4.6). The ranking shifts again under demand shocks: agents that learned fastest pre-shock are typically the slowest to revise their beliefs afterwards, while Gemini 3.1 Pro recovers fastest despite not leading on profit. However, even the strongest agent captures less than a third of hindsight-optimal profit, suggesting current LLMs are progressing in agentic commerce but leave substantial headroom.

In this paper, we introduce an underexplored problem in facial analysis: generating and recognizing multi-attribute natural language descriptions, containing facial action units (AUs), emotional states, and age estimation, for arbitrarily selected face regions (termed FaceFocalDesc). We argue that the system's ability to focus on individual facial areas leads to better understanding and control. To achieve this capability, we construct a new multi-attribute description dataset for arbitrarily selected face regions, providing rich region-level annotations and natural language descriptions. Further, we propose a fine-tuned vision-language model based on Qwen2.5-VL, called Focal-RegionFace for facial state analysis, which incrementally refines its focus on localized facial features through multiple progressively fine-tuning stages, resulting in interpretable age estimation, FAU and emotion detection. Experimental results show that Focal-RegionFace achieves the best performance on the new benchmark in terms of traditional and widely used metrics, as well as new proposed metrics. This fully verifies its effectiveness and versatility in fine-grained multi-attribute face region-focal analysis scenarios.

Multimodal LLMs are increasingly deployed as perceptual backbones for autonomous agents in 3D environments, from robotics to virtual worlds. These applications require agents to perceive rapid state changes, attribute actions to the correct entities, and reason about concurrent multi-agent behaviors from a first-person perspective, capabilities that existing benchmarks do not adequately evaluate. We introduce GameplayQA, a framework for evaluating agentic-centric perception and reasoning through video understanding. Specifically, we densely annotate multiplayer 3D gameplay videos at 1.22 labels/second, with time-synced, concurrent captions of states, actions, and events structured around a triadic system of Self, Other Agents, and the World, a natural decomposition for multi-agent environments. From these annotations, we refined 2.4K diagnostic QA pairs organized into three levels of cognitive complexity, accompanied by a structured distractor taxonomy that enables fine-grained analysis of where models hallucinate. Evaluation of frontier MLLMs reveals a substantial gap from human performance, with common failures in temporal and cross-video grounding, agent-role attribution, and handling the decision density of the game. We hope GameplayQA stimulates future research at the intersection of embodied AI, agentic perception, and world modeling.

Large language model-powered multi-agent systems have emerged as powerful tools for simulating complex human-like systems. The interactions within these systems often lead to extreme events whose origins remain obscured by the black box of emergence. Interpreting these events is critical for system safety. This paper proposes the first framework for explaining emergent extreme events in multi-agent systems, aiming to answer three fundamental questions: When does the event originate? Who drives it? And what behaviors contribute to it? Specifically, we adapt the Shapley value to faithfully attribute the occurrence of extreme events to each action taken by agents at different time steps, i.e., assigning an attribution score to the action to measure its influence on the event. We then aggregate the attribution scores along the dimensions of time, agent, and behavior to quantify the risk contribution of each dimension. Finally, we design a set of metrics based on these contribution scores to characterize the features of extreme events. Experiments across diverse multi-agent system scenarios (economic, financial, and social) demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework and provide general insights into the emergence of extreme phenomena.

Existing benchmarks for Vision-Language Models (VLMs) primarily evaluate spatio-temporal understanding on simple single-action videos, closed attribute sets and restricted entity types, failing to capture the freeform, multi-action interactions between diverse entities which characterize real-world video understanding. Furthermore, the lack of a systematic framework for analyzing model failures across complementary spatio-temporal axes hinders comprehensive evaluation. To address these gaps, we introduce VISTA, a Video Interaction Spatio-Temporal Analysis benchmark designed for open-set, multi-entity and multi-action spatio-temporal understanding in VLMs. VISTA decomposes videos into interpretable entities, their associated actions, and relational dynamics, enabling multi-axis diagnostics and unified assessment of relational, spatial, and temporal understanding. Our benchmark integrates multiple datasets into a single interaction-aware taxonomy and comprises ~12K curated video-query pairs spanning diverse scenes and complexities. We systematically evaluate 11 state-of-the-art VLMs on VISTA, and break down aggregate performance across our taxonomy to reveal shortcomings and pronounced spatio-temporal biases obscured by traditional metrics. By providing detailed, taxonomy-driven diagnostics on a challenging dataset, VISTA offers a nuanced framework to guide advances in model design, pretraining strategies, and evaluation protocols. Overall, VISTA is the first, large-scale, interaction-aware diagnostic benchmark for spatio-temporal understanding in VLMs.

The rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems has intensified the challenge of efficiently allocating heterogeneous resources in highly dynamic, distributed environments. Conventional centralized mechanisms and single-objective auction models, focusing solely on metrics such as cost minimization or revenue maximization, struggle to deliver balanced system performance. This paper proposes the Multi-Objective Hierarchical Auction Framework (MOHAF), a distributed resource allocation mechanism that jointly optimizes cost, Quality of Service (QoS), energy efficiency, and fairness. MOHAF integrates hierarchical clustering to reduce computational complexity with a greedy, submodular optimization strategy that guarantees a (1-1/e) approximation ratio. A dynamic pricing mechanism adapts in real time to resource utilization, enhancing market stability and allocation quality. Extensive experiments on the Google Cluster Data trace, comprising 3,553 requests and 888 resources, demonstrate MOHAF's superior allocation efficiency (0.263) compared to Greedy (0.185), First-Price (0.138), and Random (0.101) auctions, while achieving perfect fairness (Jain's index = 1.000). Ablation studies reveal the critical influence of cost and QoS components in sustaining balanced multi-objective outcomes. With near-linear scalability, theoretical guarantees, and robust empirical performance, MOHAF offers a practical and adaptable solution for large-scale IoT deployments, effectively reconciling efficiency, equity, and sustainability in distributed resource coordination.

Affine Maximizer Auctions (AMAs), a generalized mechanism family from VCG, are widely used in automated mechanism design due to their inherent dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and individual rationality (IR). However, as the payment form is fixed, AMA's expressiveness is restricted, especially in distributions where bidders' valuations are correlated. In this paper, we propose Correlation-Aware AMA (CA-AMA), a novel framework that augments AMA with a new correlation-aware payment. We show that any CA-AMA preserves the DSIC property and formalize finding optimal CA-AMA as a constraint optimization problem subject to the IR constraint. Then, we theoretically characterize scenarios where classic AMAs can perform arbitrarily poorly compared to the optimal revenue, while the CA-AMA can reach the optimal revenue. For optimizing CA-AMA, we design a practical two-stage training algorithm. We derive that the target function's continuity and the generalization bound on the degree of deviation from strict IR. Finally, extensive experiments showcase that our algorithm can find an approximate optimal CA-AMA in various distributions with improved revenue and a low degree of violation of IR.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

We consider some classical optimization problems in path planning and network transport, and we introduce new auction-based algorithms for their optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are based on mathematical ideas that are related to competitive bidding by persons for objects and the attendant market equilibrium, which underlie auction processes. However, the starting point of our algorithms is different, namely weighted and unweighted path construction in directed graphs, rather than assignment of persons to objects. The new algorithms have several potential advantages over existing methods: they are empirically faster in some important contexts, such as max-flow, they are well-suited for on-line replanning, and they can be adapted to distributed asynchronous operation. Moreover, they allow arbitrary initial prices, without complementary slackness restrictions, and thus are better-suited to take advantage of reinforcement learning methods that use off-line training with data, as well as on-line training during real-time operation. The new algorithms may also find use in reinforcement learning contexts involving approximation, such as multistep lookahead and tree search schemes, and/or rollout algorithms.

We investigate factors contributing to LLM agents' success in competitive multi-agent environments, using auctions as a testbed where agents bid to maximize profit. The agents are equipped with bidding domain knowledge, distinct personas that reflect item preferences, and a memory of auction history. Our work extends the classic auction scenario by creating a realistic environment where multiple agents bid on houses, weighing aspects such as size, location, and budget to secure the most desirable homes at the lowest prices. Particularly, we investigate three key questions: (a) How does a persona influence an agent's behavior in a competitive setting? (b) Can an agent effectively profile its competitors' behavior during auctions? (c) How can persona profiling be leveraged to create an advantage using strategies such as theory of mind? Through a series of experiments, we analyze the behaviors of LLM agents and shed light on new findings. Our testbed, called HARBOR, offers a valuable platform for deepening our understanding of multi-agent workflows in competitive environments.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

Online allocation problems with resource constraints are central problems in revenue management and online advertising. In these problems, requests arrive sequentially during a finite horizon and, for each request, a decision maker needs to choose an action that consumes a certain amount of resources and generates reward. The objective is to maximize cumulative rewards subject to a constraint on the total consumption of resources. In this paper, we consider a data-driven setting in which the reward and resource consumption of each request are generated using an input model that is unknown to the decision maker. We design a general class of algorithms that attain good performance in various input models without knowing which type of input they are facing. In particular, our algorithms are asymptotically optimal under independent and identically distributed inputs as well as various non-stationary stochastic input models, and they attain an asymptotically optimal fixed competitive ratio when the input is adversarial. Our algorithms operate in the Lagrangian dual space: they maintain a dual multiplier for each resource that is updated using online mirror descent. By choosing the reference function accordingly, we recover the dual sub-gradient descent and dual multiplicative weights update algorithm. The resulting algorithms are simple, fast, and do not require convexity in the revenue function, consumption function and action space, in contrast to existing methods for online allocation problems. We discuss applications to network revenue management, online bidding in repeated auctions with budget constraints, online proportional matching with high entropy, and personalized assortment optimization with limited inventory.

Polymarket is a prediction market platform where users can speculate on future events by trading shares tied to specific outcomes, known as conditions. Each market is associated with a set of one or more such conditions. To ensure proper market resolution, the condition set must be exhaustive -- collectively accounting for all possible outcomes -- and mutually exclusive -- only one condition may resolve as true. Thus, the collective prices of all related outcomes should be \1, representing a combined probability of 1 of any outcome. Despite this design, Polymarket exhibits cases where dependent assets are mispriced, allowing for purchasing (or selling) a certain outcome for less than (or more than) 1, guaranteeing profit. This phenomenon, known as arbitrage, could enable sophisticated participants to exploit such inconsistencies. In this paper, we conduct an empirical arbitrage analysis on Polymarket data to answer three key questions: (Q1) What conditions give rise to arbitrage (Q2) Does arbitrage actually occur on Polymarket and (Q3) Has anyone exploited these opportunities. A major challenge in analyzing arbitrage between related markets lies in the scalability of comparisons across a large number of markets and conditions, with a naive analysis requiring O(2^{n+m}) comparisons. To overcome this, we employ a heuristic-driven reduction strategy based on timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial relationships, further validated by expert input. Our study reveals two distinct forms of arbitrage on Polymarket: Market Rebalancing Arbitrage, which occurs within a single market or condition, and Combinatorial Arbitrage, which spans across multiple markets. We use on-chain historical order book data to analyze when these types of arbitrage opportunities have existed, and when they have been executed by users. We find a realized estimate of 40 million USD of profit extracted.

In the field of computational advertising, the integration of ads into the outputs of large language models (LLMs) presents an opportunity to support these services without compromising content integrity. This paper introduces novel auction mechanisms for ad allocation and pricing within the textual outputs of LLMs, leveraging retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). We propose a segment auction where an ad is probabilistically retrieved for each discourse segment (paragraph, section, or entire output) according to its bid and relevance, following the RAG framework, and priced according to competing bids. We show that our auction maximizes logarithmic social welfare, a new notion of welfare that balances allocation efficiency and fairness, and we characterize the associated incentive-compatible pricing rule. These results are extended to multi-ad allocation per segment. An empirical evaluation validates the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach over several ad auction scenarios, and exhibits inherent tradeoffs in metrics as we allow the LLM more flexibility to allocate ads.

Small language models are increasingly viewed as a promising, cost-effective approach to agentic AI, with proponents claiming they are sufficiently capable for agentic workflows. However, while smaller agents can closely match larger ones on simple tasks, it remains unclear how their performance scales with task complexity, when large models become necessary, and how to better leverage small agents for long-horizon workloads. In this work, we empirically show that small agents' performance fails to scale with task complexity on deep search and coding tasks, and we introduce Strategy Auctions for Workload Efficiency (SALE), an agent framework inspired by freelancer marketplaces. In SALE, agents bid with short strategic plans, which are scored by a systematic cost-value mechanism and refined via a shared auction memory, enabling per-task routing and continual self-improvement without training a separate router or running all models to completion. Across deep search and coding tasks of varying complexity, SALE reduces reliance on the largest agent by 53%, lowers overall cost by 35%, and consistently improves upon the largest agent's pass@1 with only a negligible overhead beyond executing the final trace. In contrast, established routers that rely on task descriptions either underperform the largest agent or fail to reduce cost -- often both -- underscoring their poor fit for agentic workflows. These results suggest that while small agents may be insufficient for complex workloads, they can be effectively "scaled up" through coordinated task allocation and test-time self-improvement. More broadly, they motivate a systems-level view of agentic AI in which performance gains come less from ever-larger individual models and more from market-inspired coordination mechanisms that organize heterogeneous agents into efficient, adaptive ecosystems.

Prediction markets are used in real life to predict outcomes of interest such as presidential elections. This paper presents a mathematical theory of artificial prediction markets for supervised learning of conditional probability estimators. The artificial prediction market is a novel method for fusing the prediction information of features or trained classifiers, where the fusion result is the contract price on the possible outcomes. The market can be trained online by updating the participants' budgets using training examples. Inspired by the real prediction markets, the equations that govern the market are derived from simple and reasonable assumptions. Efficient numerical algorithms are presented for solving these equations. The obtained artificial prediction market is shown to be a maximum likelihood estimator. It generalizes linear aggregation, existent in boosting and random forest, as well as logistic regression and some kernel methods. Furthermore, the market mechanism allows the aggregation of specialized classifiers that participate only on specific instances. Experimental comparisons show that the artificial prediction markets often outperform random forest and implicit online learning on synthetic data and real UCI datasets. Moreover, an extensive evaluation for pelvic and abdominal lymph node detection in CT data shows that the prediction market improves adaboost's detection rate from 79.6% to 81.2% at 3 false positives/volume.

Online display advertising platforms service numerous advertisers by providing real-time bidding (RTB) for the scale of billions of ad requests every day. The bidding strategy handles ad requests cross multiple channels to maximize the number of clicks under the set financial constraints, i.e., total budget and cost-per-click (CPC), etc. Different from existing works mainly focusing on single channel bidding, we explicitly consider cross-channel constrained bidding with budget allocation. Specifically, we propose a hierarchical offline deep reinforcement learning (DRL) framework called ``HiBid'', consisted of a high-level planner equipped with auxiliary loss for non-competitive budget allocation, and a data augmentation enhanced low-level executor for adaptive bidding strategy in response to allocated budgets. Additionally, a CPC-guided action selection mechanism is introduced to satisfy the cross-channel CPC constraint. Through extensive experiments on both the large-scale log data and online A/B testing, we confirm that HiBid outperforms six baselines in terms of the number of clicks, CPC satisfactory ratio, and return-on-investment (ROI). We also deploy HiBid on Meituan advertising platform to already service tens of thousands of advertisers every day.

In machine learning, the notion of multi-armed bandits refers to a class of online learning problems, in which an agent is supposed to simultaneously explore and exploit a given set of choice alternatives in the course of a sequential decision process. In the standard setting, the agent learns from stochastic feedback in the form of real-valued rewards. In many applications, however, numerical reward signals are not readily available -- instead, only weaker information is provided, in particular relative preferences in the form of qualitative comparisons between pairs of alternatives. This observation has motivated the study of variants of the multi-armed bandit problem, in which more general representations are used both for the type of feedback to learn from and the target of prediction. The aim of this paper is to provide a survey of the state of the art in this field, referred to as preference-based multi-armed bandits or dueling bandits. To this end, we provide an overview of problems that have been considered in the literature as well as methods for tackling them. Our taxonomy is mainly based on the assumptions made by these methods about the data-generating process and, related to this, the properties of the preference-based feedback.

In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser's global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channels and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem. Finally, we argue that all our results hold for both single-item and multi-item auctions from which channels procure impressions on advertisers' behalf.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

We present a Spades bidding algorithm that is superior to recreational human players and to publicly available bots. Like in Bridge, the game of Spades is composed of two independent phases, bidding and playing. This paper focuses on the bidding algorithm, since this phase holds a precise challenge: based on the input, choose the bid that maximizes the agent's winning probability. Our Bidding-in-Spades (BIS) algorithm heuristically determines the bidding strategy by comparing the expected utility of each possible bid. A major challenge is how to estimate these expected utilities. To this end, we propose a set of domain-specific heuristics, and then correct them via machine learning using data from real-world players. The \BIS algorithm we present can be attached to any playing algorithm. It beats rule-based bidding bots when all use the same playing component. When combined with a rule-based playing algorithm, it is superior to the average recreational human.

This work introduces MultiTRON, an approach that adapts Pareto front approximation techniques to multi-objective session-based recommender systems using a transformer neural network. Our approach optimizes trade-offs between key metrics such as click-through and conversion rates by training on sampled preference vectors. A significant advantage is that after training, a single model can access the entire Pareto front, allowing it to be tailored to meet the specific requirements of different stakeholders by adjusting an additional input vector that weights the objectives. We validate the model's performance through extensive offline and online evaluation. For broader application and research, the source code is made available at https://github.com/otto-de/MultiTRON. The results confirm the model's ability to manage multiple recommendation objectives effectively, offering a flexible tool for diverse business needs.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

Multi-armed bandits a simple but very powerful framework for algorithms that make decisions over time under uncertainty. An enormous body of work has accumulated over the years, covered in several books and surveys. This book provides a more introductory, textbook-like treatment of the subject. Each chapter tackles a particular line of work, providing a self-contained, teachable technical introduction and a brief review of the further developments; many of the chapters conclude with exercises. The book is structured as follows. The first four chapters are on IID rewards, from the basic model to impossibility results to Bayesian priors to Lipschitz rewards. The next three chapters cover adversarial rewards, from the full-feedback version to adversarial bandits to extensions with linear rewards and combinatorially structured actions. Chapter 8 is on contextual bandits, a middle ground between IID and adversarial bandits in which the change in reward distributions is completely explained by observable contexts. The last three chapters cover connections to economics, from learning in repeated games to bandits with supply/budget constraints to exploration in the presence of incentives. The appendix provides sufficient background on concentration and KL-divergence. The chapters on "bandits with similarity information", "bandits with knapsacks" and "bandits and agents" can also be consumed as standalone surveys on the respective topics.

Can Large Language Models (LLMs) simulate human behavior in complex environments? LLMs have recently been shown to exhibit advanced reasoning skills but much of NLP evaluation still relies on static benchmarks. Answering this requires evaluation environments that probe strategic reasoning in competitive, dynamic scenarios that involve long-term planning. We introduce AucArena, a novel simulation environment for evaluating LLMs within auctions, a setting chosen for being highly unpredictable and involving many skills related to resource and risk management, while also being easy to evaluate. We conduct several controlled simulations using state-of-the-art LLMs as bidding agents. We find that through simple prompting, LLMs do indeed demonstrate many of the skills needed for effectively engaging in auctions (e.g., managing budget, adhering to long-term goals and priorities), skills that we find can be sharpened by explicitly encouraging models to be adaptive and observe strategies in past auctions. These results are significant as they show the potential of using LLM agents to model intricate social dynamics, especially in competitive settings. However, we also observe considerable variability in the capabilities of individual LLMs. Notably, even our most advanced models (GPT-4) are occasionally surpassed by heuristic baselines and human agents, highlighting the potential for further improvements in the design of LLM agents and the important role that our simulation environment can play in further testing and refining agent architectures.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is the marginal gain from paid exposure: even without winning a sponsored slot, an advertiser may still earn revenue via an organic search result (e.g., on Google or Amazon). Motivated by recent work, we model ad value as a treatment effect--the outcome difference between winning and losing the auction--and study online learning for bidding in second-price (Vickrey) auctions under this causal perspective. We develop algorithms that attain rate-optimal regret under several feedback models. A key ingredient exploits the information revealed by the second-price payment rule, which strictly improves regret relative to analogous learning problems in first-price auctions.

Multi-armed bandit problems are the predominant theoretical model of exploration-exploitation tradeoffs in learning, and they have countless applications ranging from medical trials, to communication networks, to Web search and advertising. In many of these application domains the learner may be constrained by one or more supply (or budget) limits, in addition to the customary limitation on the time horizon. The literature lacks a general model encompassing these sorts of problems. We introduce such a model, called "bandits with knapsacks", that combines aspects of stochastic integer programming with online learning. A distinctive feature of our problem, in comparison to the existing regret-minimization literature, is that the optimal policy for a given latent distribution may significantly outperform the policy that plays the optimal fixed arm. Consequently, achieving sublinear regret in the bandits-with-knapsacks problem is significantly more challenging than in conventional bandit problems. We present two algorithms whose reward is close to the information-theoretic optimum: one is based on a novel "balanced exploration" paradigm, while the other is a primal-dual algorithm that uses multiplicative updates. Further, we prove that the regret achieved by both algorithms is optimal up to polylogarithmic factors. We illustrate the generality of the problem by presenting applications in a number of different domains including electronic commerce, routing, and scheduling. As one example of a concrete application, we consider the problem of dynamic posted pricing with limited supply and obtain the first algorithm whose regret, with respect to the optimal dynamic policy, is sublinear in the supply.

The rapid adoption of autonomous AI agents is giving rise to a new economic layer where agents transact and coordinate at scales and speeds beyond direct human oversight. We propose the "sandbox economy" as a framework for analyzing this emergent system, characterizing it along two key dimensions: its origins (emergent vs. intentional) and its degree of separateness from the established human economy (permeable vs. impermeable). Our current trajectory points toward a spontaneous emergence of a vast and highly permeable AI agent economy, presenting us with opportunities for an unprecedented degree of coordination as well as significant challenges, including systemic economic risk and exacerbated inequality. Here we discuss a number of possible design choices that may lead to safely steerable AI agent markets. In particular, we consider auction mechanisms for fair resource allocation and preference resolution, the design of AI "mission economies" to coordinate around achieving collective goals, and socio-technical infrastructure needed to ensure trust, safety, and accountability. By doing this, we argue for the proactive design of steerable agent markets to ensure the coming technological shift aligns with humanity's long-term collective flourishing.

Audio-driven talking face generation has received growing interest, particularly for applications requiring expressive and natural human-avatar interaction. However, most existing emotion-aware methods rely on a single modality (either audio or image) for emotion embedding, limiting their ability to capture nuanced affective cues. Additionally, most methods condition on a single reference image, restricting the model's ability to represent dynamic changes in actions or attributes across time. To address these issues, we introduce SynchroRaMa, a novel framework that integrates a multi-modal emotion embedding by combining emotional signals from text (via sentiment analysis) and audio (via speech-based emotion recognition and audio-derived valence-arousal features), enabling the generation of talking face videos with richer and more authentic emotional expressiveness and fidelity. To ensure natural head motion and accurate lip synchronization, SynchroRaMa includes an audio-to-motion (A2M) module that generates motion frames aligned with the input audio. Finally, SynchroRaMa incorporates scene descriptions generated by Large Language Model (LLM) as additional textual input, enabling it to capture dynamic actions and high-level semantic attributes. Conditioning the model on both visual and textual cues enhances temporal consistency and visual realism. Quantitative and qualitative experiments on benchmark datasets demonstrate that SynchroRaMa outperforms the state-of-the-art, achieving improvements in image quality, expression preservation, and motion realism. A user study further confirms that SynchroRaMa achieves higher subjective ratings than competing methods in overall naturalness, motion diversity, and video smoothness. Our project page is available at <https://novicemm.github.io/synchrorama>.

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time t, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is PSPACE-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a 0.652-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is 0.5. Our main results are a 0.678-approximate algorithm and a 0.685-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the 0.666-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which 0.678-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum X of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, E[min(1,X)], of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

Test-time compute has emerged as a promising strategy to enhance the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, this strategy has in turn increased how much users pay cloud-based providers offering LLM-as-a-service, since providers charge users for the amount of test-time compute they use to generate an output. In our work, we show that the market of LLM-as-a-service is socially inefficient: providers have a financial incentive to increase the amount of test-time compute, even if this increase contributes little to the quality of the outputs. To address this inefficiency, we introduce a reverse second-price auction mechanism where providers bid their offered price and (expected) quality for the opportunity to serve a user, and users pay proportionally to the marginal value generated by the winning provider relative to the second-highest bidder. To illustrate and complement our theoretical results, we conduct experiments with multiple instruct models from the Llama and Qwen families, as well as reasoning models distilled from DeepSeek-R1, on math and science benchmark datasets.

How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control? Inspired by Friedrich Hayek's economic theory of decentralized coordination in markets, we study this question through an agent economy in which agents compete via auctions for the right to act, exchange payments, and accumulate wealth from environmental rewards. These simple economic signals induce decentralized credit assignment, driving planning without global orchestration or explicit communication protocols. The population evolves through economic selection: effective agents accumulate wealth and are mutated via exploitation, while ineffective ones go bankrupt and are replaced via exploration. We show that, initialized with weak agents, the economy produces emergent multi-step reasoning strategies and outperforms stronger monolithic baselines across five agentic tasks, including mathematical reasoning, financial research, scientific research, accelerator design, and distributed-system optimization. We further provide theoretical insights into how economic dynamics shape agent behaviors, linking local incentives to long-term global performance. Our results suggest a new path to multi-agent intelligence: rather than engineering coordination, we can design decentralized incentive structures under which it automatically emerges.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

As the capabilities of artificial agents improve, they are being increasingly deployed to service multiple diverse objectives and stakeholders. However, the composition of these objectives is often performed ad hoc, with no clear justification. This paper takes a normative approach to multi-objective agency: from a set of intuitively appealing axioms, it is shown that Markovian aggregation of Markovian reward functions is not possible when the time preference (discount factor) for each objective may vary. It follows that optimal multi-objective agents must admit rewards that are non-Markovian with respect to the individual objectives. To this end, a practical non-Markovian aggregation scheme is proposed, which overcomes the impossibility with only one additional parameter for each objective. This work offers new insights into sequential, multi-objective agency and intertemporal choice, and has practical implications for the design of AI systems deployed to serve multiple generations of principals with varying time preference.

Large-scale approximate nearest neighbor search commonly relies on partitions for indexing: database vectors are partitioned into clusters, and for each query a probing function selects the clusters to be scanned. The query probing function and the database partition are rarely treated as separate entities: most techniques assign queries with the same assignment function as the database vectors, which is suboptimal especially when database and query distributions differ. This paper introduces CwA (Cluster with Auctions), which addresses this limitation by jointly learning a balanced database partition and a neural probing function. CwA optimizes search performance directly for the query distribution. It minimizes its objective by alternating two steps: (i) gradient descent on the neural network of the probing function, and (ii) a large-scale combinatorial optimization of the cluster assignment for the database vectors. We solve the latter with a parallelizable auction algorithm that balances the partition by design. To further scale CwA, we extend the method to a Cartesian product of clusters that increases the partition's granularity. When database and query distributions differ, CwA achieves up to 4.7times throughput over the state-of-the-art at equal recall. In the in-distribution (ID) setting, even a simple linear probing function trained with CwA outperforms competing deep neural methods.

With local differential privacy (LDP), users can privatize their data and thus guarantee privacy properties before transmitting it to the server (a.k.a. the aggregator). One primary objective of LDP is frequency (or histogram) estimation, in which the aggregator estimates the number of users for each possible value. In practice, when a study with rich content on a population is desired, the interest is in the multiple attributes of the population, that is to say, in multidimensional data (d geq 2). However, contrary to the problem of frequency estimation of a single attribute (the majority of the works), the multidimensional aspect imposes to pay particular attention to the privacy budget. This one can indeed grow extremely quickly due to the composition theorem. To the authors' knowledge, two solutions seem to stand out for this task: 1) splitting the privacy budget for each attribute, i.e., send each value with fracε{d}-LDP (Spl), and 2) random sampling a single attribute and spend all the privacy budget to send it with ε-LDP (Smp). Although Smp adds additional sampling error, it has proven to provide higher data utility than the former Spl solution. However, we argue that aggregators (who are also seen as attackers) are aware of the sampled attribute and its LDP value, which is protected by a "less strict" e^ε probability bound (rather than e^{ε/d}). This way, we propose a solution named Random Sampling plus Fake Data (RS+FD), which allows creating uncertainty over the sampled attribute by generating fake data for each non-sampled attribute; RS+FD further benefits from amplification by sampling. We theoretically and experimentally validate our proposed solution on both synthetic and real-world datasets to show that RS+FD achieves nearly the same or better utility than the state-of-the-art Smp solution.

Consider a market of competing model providers selling query access to models with varying costs and capabilities. Customers submit problem instances and are willing to pay up to a budget for a verifiable solution. An arbitrageur efficiently allocates inference budget across providers to undercut the market, thus creating a competitive offering with no model-development risk. In this work, we initiate the study of arbitrage in AI model markets, empirically demonstrating the viability of arbitrage and illustrating its economic consequences. We conduct an in-depth case study of SWE-bench GitHub issue resolution using two representative models, GPT-5 mini and DeepSeek v3.2. In this verifiable domain, simple arbitrage strategies generate net profit margins of up to 40%. Robust arbitrage strategies that generalize across different domains remain profitable. Distillation further creates strong arbitrage opportunities, potentially at the expense of the teacher model's revenue. Multiple competing arbitrageurs drive down consumer prices, reducing the marginal revenue of model providers. At the same time, arbitrage reduces market segmentation and facilitates market entry for smaller model providers by enabling earlier revenue capture. Our results suggest that arbitrage can be a powerful force in AI model markets with implications for model development, distillation, and deployment.

We consider the problem of subset selection where one is given multiple rankings of items and the goal is to select the highest ``quality'' subset. Score functions from the multiwinner voting literature have been used to aggregate rankings into quality scores for subsets. We study this setting of subset selection problems when, in addition, rankings may contain systemic or unconscious biases toward a group of items. For a general model of input rankings and biases, we show that requiring the selected subset to satisfy group fairness constraints can improve the quality of the selection with respect to unbiased rankings. Importantly, we show that for fairness constraints to be effective, different multiwinner score functions may require a drastically different number of rankings: While for some functions, fairness constraints need an exponential number of rankings to recover a close-to-optimal solution, for others, this dependency is only polynomial. This result relies on a novel notion of ``smoothness'' of submodular functions in this setting that quantifies how well a function can ``correctly'' assess the quality of items in the presence of bias. The results in this paper can be used to guide the choice of multiwinner score functions for the subset selection setting considered here; we additionally provide a tool to empirically enable this.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

Optimizing the performance of many objectives (instantiated by tasks or clients) jointly with a few Pareto stationary solutions (models) is critical in machine learning. However, previous multi-objective optimization methods often focus on a few number of objectives and cannot scale to many objectives that outnumber the solutions, leading to either subpar performance or ignored objectives. We introduce Many-objective multi-solution Transport (MosT), a framework that finds multiple diverse solutions in the Pareto front of many objectives. Our insight is to seek multiple solutions, each performing as a domain expert and focusing on a specific subset of objectives while collectively covering all of them. MosT formulates the problem as a bi-level optimization of weighted objectives for each solution, where the weights are defined by an optimal transport between the objectives and solutions. Our algorithm ensures convergence to Pareto stationary solutions for complementary subsets of objectives. On a range of applications in federated learning, multi-task learning, and mixture-of-prompt learning for LLMs, MosT distinctly outperforms strong baselines, delivering high-quality, diverse solutions that profile the entire Pareto frontier, thus ensuring balanced trade-offs across many objectives.

Video action segmentation have been widely applied in many fields. Most previous studies employed video-based vision models for this purpose. However, they often rely on a large receptive field, LSTM or Transformer methods to capture long-term dependencies within videos, leading to significant computational resource requirements. To address this challenge, graph-based model was proposed. However, previous graph-based models are less accurate. Hence, this study introduces a graph-structured approach named Semantic2Graph, to model long-term dependencies in videos, thereby reducing computational costs and raise the accuracy. We construct a graph structure of video at the frame-level. Temporal edges are utilized to model the temporal relations and action order within videos. Additionally, we have designed positive and negative semantic edges, accompanied by corresponding edge weights, to capture both long-term and short-term semantic relationships in video actions. Node attributes encompass a rich set of multi-modal features extracted from video content, graph structures, and label text, encompassing visual, structural, and semantic cues. To synthesize this multi-modal information effectively, we employ a graph neural network (GNN) model to fuse multi-modal features for node action label classification. Experimental results demonstrate that Semantic2Graph outperforms state-of-the-art methods in terms of performance, particularly on benchmark datasets such as GTEA and 50Salads. Multiple ablation experiments further validate the effectiveness of semantic features in enhancing model performance. Notably, the inclusion of semantic edges in Semantic2Graph allows for the cost-effective capture of long-term dependencies, affirming its utility in addressing the challenges posed by computational resource constraints in video-based vision models.

Recent Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have made great progress in video understanding. However, their performance on videos involving human actions is still limited by the lack of high-quality data. To address this, we introduce a two-stage data annotation pipeline. First, we design strategies to accumulate videos featuring clear human actions from the Internet. Second, videos are annotated in a standardized caption format that uses human attributes to distinguish individuals and chronologically details their actions and interactions. Through this pipeline, we curate two datasets, namely HAICTrain and HAICBench. HAICTrain comprises 126K video-caption pairs generated by Gemini-Pro and verified for training purposes. Meanwhile, HAICBench includes 500 manually annotated video-caption pairs and 1,400 QA pairs, for a comprehensive evaluation of human action understanding. Experimental results demonstrate that training with HAICTrain not only significantly enhances human understanding abilities across 4 benchmarks, but can also improve text-to-video generation results. Both the HAICTrain and HAICBench are released at https://huggingface.co/datasets/KuaishouHAIC/HAIC.

Counting repetitive actions are widely seen in human activities such as physical exercise. Existing methods focus on performing repetitive action counting in short videos, which is tough for dealing with longer videos in more realistic scenarios. In the data-driven era, the degradation of such generalization capability is mainly attributed to the lack of long video datasets. To complement this margin, we introduce a new large-scale repetitive action counting dataset covering a wide variety of video lengths, along with more realistic situations where action interruption or action inconsistencies occur in the video. Besides, we also provide a fine-grained annotation of the action cycles instead of just counting annotation along with a numerical value. Such a dataset contains 1,451 videos with about 20,000 annotations, which is more challenging. For repetitive action counting towards more realistic scenarios, we further propose encoding multi-scale temporal correlation with transformers that can take into account both performance and efficiency. Furthermore, with the help of fine-grained annotation of action cycles, we propose a density map regression-based method to predict the action period, which yields better performance with sufficient interpretability. Our proposed method outperforms state-of-the-art methods on all datasets and also achieves better performance on the unseen dataset without fine-tuning. The dataset and code are available.

Auto-bidding plays a crucial role in facilitating online advertising by automatically providing bids for advertisers. Reinforcement learning (RL) has gained popularity for auto-bidding. However, most current RL auto-bidding methods are modeled through the Markovian Decision Process (MDP), which assumes the Markovian state transition. This assumption restricts the ability to perform in long horizon scenarios and makes the model unstable when dealing with highly random online advertising environments. To tackle this issue, this paper introduces AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB), a novel paradigm for auto-bidding through generative modeling. In this paradigm, we propose DiffBid, a conditional diffusion modeling approach for bid generation. DiffBid directly models the correlation between the return and the entire trajectory, effectively avoiding error propagation across time steps in long horizons. Additionally, DiffBid offers a versatile approach for generating trajectories that maximize given targets while adhering to specific constraints. Extensive experiments conducted on the real-world dataset and online A/B test on Alibaba advertising platform demonstrate the effectiveness of DiffBid, achieving 2.81% increase in GMV and 3.36% increase in ROI.

Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches face distinct limitations: control-based pacing reacts to deviations but cannot anticipate future conditions, while RL and generative methods fold constraints into reward signals, obscuring violations and degrading under distribution shift. We shift the learning target from actions to responses with the Generative Response Model (GRM), a history-conditioned sequence model that jointly predicts future traffic volume and horizon-aggregate cost/value curves as functions of a single bid multiplier. We show that under mild monotonicity conditions, the optimality gap relative to full per-tick control is bounded by the dispersion of per-tick marginal value-per-cost. Given predicted responses, a lightweight analytic controller enforces each active constraint via a 1D root-finding step. We prove this controller is exact for the single-multiplier problem and bound constraint violations under receding-horizon replanning in terms of prediction error. Experiments on AuctionNet show that GRM improves constraint stability and overall score compared to existing baselines.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as autonomous economic agents introduces systemic risks that extend beyond individual capability failures. As agents transition to directly interacting with marketplaces, their collective behavior can amplify volatility and mask deception at scale. We introduce the Agent Bazaar, a multi-agent simulation framework for evaluating Economic Alignment, the capacity of agentic systems to preserve market stability and integrity. We identify two failure modes: (1) Algorithmic Instability in a B2C market ("The Crash"), where firms amplify price volatility until the market collapses, and (2) Sybil Deception in a C2C market ("The Lemon Market"), where a single deceptive agent controlling multiple coordinated seller identities floods the market with fraudulent listings, eroding trust and consumer welfare. We evaluate frontier and open-weight models across both scenarios and find that models largely fail to self-regulate, with failure severity varying by model rather than by size. We propose economically aligned harnesses, Stabilizing Firms and Skeptical Guardians, that improve outcomes but remain fragile under harder market conditions. To close this gap, we train agents with REINFORCE++ using an adaptive curriculum, producing a 9B model that outperforms all evaluated frontier and open-weight models. We propose the Economic Alignment Score (EAS), a 4-component scalar metric aggregating stability, integrity, welfare, and profitability, enabling direct cross-model comparison. Our results show that economic alignment is orthogonal to general capability and can be directly trained with targeted RL.

We study Pareto optimality in multi-objective multi-armed bandit by providing a formulation of adversarial multi-objective multi-armed bandit and defining its Pareto regrets that can be applied to both stochastic and adversarial settings. The regrets do not rely on any scalarization functions and reflect Pareto optimality compared to scalarized regrets. We also present new algorithms assuming both with and without prior information of the multi-objective multi-armed bandit setting. The algorithms are shown optimal in adversarial settings and nearly optimal up to a logarithmic factor in stochastic settings simultaneously by our established upper bounds and lower bounds on Pareto regrets. Moreover, the lower bound analyses show that the new regrets are consistent with the existing Pareto regret for stochastic settings and extend an adversarial attack mechanism from bandit to the multi-objective one.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

This paper introduces Alympics (Olympics for Agents), a systematic simulation framework utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents for game theory research. Alympics creates a versatile platform for studying complex game theory problems, bridging the gap between theoretical game theory and empirical investigations by providing a controlled environment for simulating human-like strategic interactions with LLM agents. In our pilot case study, the "Water Allocation Challenge," we explore Alympics through a challenging strategic game focused on the multi-round auction on scarce survival resources. This study demonstrates the framework's ability to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze game determinants, strategies, and outcomes. Additionally, we conduct a comprehensive human assessment and an in-depth evaluation of LLM agents in strategic decision-making scenarios. Our findings not only expand the understanding of LLM agents' proficiency in emulating human strategic behavior but also highlight their potential in advancing game theory knowledge, thereby enriching our understanding of both game theory and empowering further research into strategic decision-making domains with LLM agents. Codes, prompts, and all related resources are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Alympics.

Sequential decision-making problems with multiple objectives arise naturally in practice and pose unique challenges for research in decision-theoretic planning and learning, which has largely focused on single-objective settings. This article surveys algorithms designed for sequential decision-making problems with multiple objectives. Though there is a growing body of literature on this subject, little of it makes explicit under what circumstances special methods are needed to solve multi-objective problems. Therefore, we identify three distinct scenarios in which converting such a problem to a single-objective one is impossible, infeasible, or undesirable. Furthermore, we propose a taxonomy that classifies multi-objective methods according to the applicable scenario, the nature of the scalarization function (which projects multi-objective values to scalar ones), and the type of policies considered. We show how these factors determine the nature of an optimal solution, which can be a single policy, a convex hull, or a Pareto front. Using this taxonomy, we survey the literature on multi-objective methods for planning and learning. Finally, we discuss key applications of such methods and outline opportunities for future work.

Online marketplaces will be transformed by autonomous AI agents acting on behalf of consumers. Rather than humans browsing and clicking, vision-language-model (VLM) agents can parse webpages, evaluate products, and transact. This raises a fundamental question: what do AI agents buy, and why? We develop ACES, a sandbox environment that pairs a platform-agnostic VLM agent with a fully programmable mock marketplace to study this question. We first conduct basic rationality checks in the context of simple tasks, and then, by randomizing product positions, prices, ratings, reviews, sponsored tags, and platform endorsements, we obtain causal estimates of how frontier VLMs actually shop. Models show strong but heterogeneous position effects: all favor the top row, yet different models prefer different columns, undermining the assumption of a universal "top" rank. They penalize sponsored tags and reward endorsements. Sensitivities to price, ratings, and reviews are directionally human-like but vary sharply in magnitude across models. Motivated by scenarios where sellers use AI agents to optimize product listings, we show that a seller-side agent that makes minor tweaks to product descriptions, targeting AI buyer preferences, can deliver substantial market-share gains if AI-mediated shopping dominates. We also find that modal product choices can differ across models and, in some cases, demand may concentrate on a few select products, raising competition questions. Together, our results illuminate how AI agents may behave in e-commerce settings and surface concrete seller strategy, platform design, and regulatory questions in an AI-mediated ecosystem.

Humans are highly adaptable, swiftly switching between different modes to progressively handle different tasks, situations and contexts. In Human-object interaction (HOI) activities, these modes can be attributed to two mechanisms: (1) the large-scale consistent plan for the whole activity and (2) the small-scale children interactive actions that start and end along the timeline. While neuroscience and cognitive science have confirmed this multi-mechanism nature of human behavior, machine modeling approaches for human motion are trailing behind. While attempted to use gradually morphing structures (e.g., graph attention networks) to model the dynamic HOI patterns, they miss the expeditious and discrete mode-switching nature of the human motion. To bridge that gap, this work proposes to model two concurrent mechanisms that jointly control human motion: the Persistent process that runs continually on the global scale, and the Transient sub-processes that operate intermittently on the local context of the human while interacting with objects. These two mechanisms form an interactive Persistent-Transient Duality that synergistically governs the activity sequences. We model this conceptual duality by a parent-child neural network of Persistent and Transient channels with a dedicated neural module for dynamic mechanism switching. The framework is trialed on HOI motion forecasting. On two rich datasets and a wide variety of settings, the model consistently delivers superior performances, proving its suitability for the challenge.

In the highly volatile and uncertain global financial markets, traditional quantitative trading models relying on statistical modeling or empirical rules often fail to adapt to dynamic market changes and black swan events due to rigid assumptions and limited generalization. To address these issues, this paper proposes QTMRL (Quantitative Trading Multi-Indicator Reinforcement Learning), an intelligent trading agent combining multi-dimensional technical indicators with reinforcement learning (RL) for adaptive and stable portfolio management. We first construct a comprehensive multi-indicator dataset using 23 years of S&P 500 daily OHLCV data (2000-2022) for 16 representative stocks across 5 sectors, enriching raw data with trend, volatility, and momentum indicators to capture holistic market dynamics. Then we design a lightweight RL framework based on the Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) algorithm, including data processing, A2C algorithm, and trading agent modules to support policy learning and actionable trading decisions. Extensive experiments compare QTMRL with 9 baselines (e.g., ARIMA, LSTM, moving average strategies) across diverse market regimes, verifying its superiority in profitability, risk adjustment, and downside risk control. The code of QTMRL is publicly available at https://github.com/ChenJiahaoJNU/QTMRL.git

AI agents are increasingly transacting on behalf of users -- delegating tasks, spending budgets, and negotiating with unfamiliar counterparties. Unlike human marketplaces, which operate under institutional designs refined over centuries, the rules governing emerging agent marketplaces are being built ad-hoc, and early choices tend to lock in. Understanding what dynamics these rules produce is urgent. We present diagon, a programmable market system serving as a rule-agnostic experimental testbed for institutional design in emerging agent cognitive-labour markets. diagon makes institutional choices experimentally manipulable: heterogeneous tool-using agents post jobs, bid, negotiate, execute, pay, and accumulate reputation, with every mechanism end-to-end observable. We instantiate one market form to demonstrate diagon. We find that market exchange generates more productivity gains over self-sufficient agents, but these gains depend strongly on institutional structure; for example, interventions such as identity transparency and stronger competitive selection can degrade market performance rather than improve it. These findings highlight concrete design requirements for the economic infrastructure of the agent era. Code and data are available at https://github.com/assassin808/diagon.

As computer vision systems become more widely deployed, there is increasing concern from both the research community and the public that these systems are not only reproducing but amplifying harmful social biases. The phenomenon of bias amplification, which is the focus of this work, refers to models amplifying inherent training set biases at test time. Existing metrics measure bias amplification with respect to single annotated attributes (e.g., computer). However, several visual datasets consist of images with multiple attribute annotations. We show models can learn to exploit correlations with respect to multiple attributes (e.g., {computer, keyboard}), which are not accounted for by current metrics. In addition, we show current metrics can give the erroneous impression that minimal or no bias amplification has occurred as they involve aggregating over positive and negative values. Further, these metrics lack a clear desired value, making them difficult to interpret. To address these shortcomings, we propose a new metric: Multi-Attribute Bias Amplification. We validate our proposed metric through an analysis of gender bias amplification on the COCO and imSitu datasets. Finally, we benchmark bias mitigation methods using our proposed metric, suggesting possible avenues for future bias mitigation

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Nudges are subtle changes to the way choices are presented to human decision-makers (e.g., opt-in vs. opt-out by default) that shift behavior without restricting options or changing incentives. As AI agents increasingly make decisions in the same environments as humans, the presentation of choices may be optimized for machines as well as people. We introduce mecha-nudges: changes to how choices are presented that systematically influence AI agents without degrading the decision environment for humans. To formalize mecha-nudges, we combine the Bayesian persuasion framework with V-usable information, a generalization of Shannon information that is observer-relative. This yields a common scale (bits of usable information) for comparing a wide range of interventions, contexts, and models. Applying our framework to product listings on Etsy -- a global marketplace for independent sellers -- we find that following ChatGPT's release, listings have significantly more machine-usable information about product selection, consistent with systematic mecha-nudging.

The black-box nature of deep neural networks (DNN) has brought to attention the issues of transparency and fairness. Deep Reinforcement Learning (Deep RL or DRL), which uses DNN to learn its policy, value functions etc, is thus also subject to similar concerns. This paper proposes a way to circumvent the issues through the bottom-up design of neural networks with detailed interpretability, where each neuron or layer has its own meaning and utility that corresponds to humanly understandable concept. The framework introduced in this paper is called the Self Reward Design (SRD), inspired by the Inverse Reward Design, and this interpretable design can (1) solve the problem by pure design (although imperfectly) and (2) be optimized like a standard DNN. With deliberate human designs, we show that some RL problems such as lavaland and MuJoCo can be solved using a model constructed with standard NN components with few parameters. Furthermore, with our fish sale auction example, we demonstrate how SRD is used to address situations that will not make sense if black-box models are used, where humanly-understandable semantic-based decision is required.

E-commerce applications such as faceted product search or product comparison are based on structured product descriptions like attribute/value pairs. The vendors on e-commerce platforms do not provide structured product descriptions but describe offers using titles or descriptions. To process such offers, it is necessary to extract attribute/value pairs from textual product attributes. State-of-the-art attribute/value extraction techniques rely on pre-trained language models (PLMs), such as BERT. Two major drawbacks of these models for attribute/value extraction are that (i) the models require significant amounts of task-specific training data and (ii) the fine-tuned models face challenges in generalizing to attribute values not included in the training data. This paper explores the potential of large language models (LLMs) as a training data-efficient and robust alternative to PLM-based attribute/value extraction methods. We consider hosted LLMs, such as GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, as well as open-source LLMs based on Llama2. We evaluate the models in a zero-shot scenario and in a scenario where task-specific training data is available. In the zero-shot scenario, we compare various prompt designs for representing information about the target attributes of the extraction. In the scenario with training data, we investigate (i) the provision of example attribute values, (ii) the selection of in-context demonstrations, and (iii) the fine-tuning of GPT-3.5. Our experiments show that GPT-4 achieves an average F1-score of 85% on the two evaluation datasets while the best PLM-based techniques perform on average 5% worse using the same amount of training data. GPT-4 achieves a 10% higher F1-score than the best open-source LLM. The fine-tuned GPT-3.5 model reaches a similar performance as GPT-4 while being significantly more cost-efficient.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

The development of state-of-the-art systems in different applied areas of machine learning (ML) is driven by benchmarks, which have shaped the paradigm of evaluating generalisation capabilities from multiple perspectives. Although the paradigm is shifting towards more fine-grained evaluation across diverse tasks, the delicate question of how to aggregate the performances has received particular interest in the community. In general, benchmarks follow the unspoken utilitarian principles, where the systems are ranked based on their mean average score over task-specific metrics. Such aggregation procedure has been viewed as a sub-optimal evaluation protocol, which may have created the illusion of progress. This paper proposes Vote'n'Rank, a framework for ranking systems in multi-task benchmarks under the principles of the social choice theory. We demonstrate that our approach can be efficiently utilised to draw new insights on benchmarking in several ML sub-fields and identify the best-performing systems in research and development case studies. The Vote'n'Rank's procedures are more robust than the mean average while being able to handle missing performance scores and determine conditions under which the system becomes the winner.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

This paper introduces RouteFinder, a comprehensive foundation model framework to tackle different Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP) variants. Our core idea is that a foundation model for VRPs should be able to represent variants by treating each as a subset of a generalized problem equipped with different attributes. We propose a unified VRP environment capable of efficiently handling any attribute combination. The RouteFinder model leverages a modern transformer-based encoder and global attribute embeddings to improve task representation. Additionally, we introduce two reinforcement learning techniques to enhance multi-task performance: mixed batch training, which enables training on different variants at once, and multi-variant reward normalization to balance different reward scales. Finally, we propose efficient adapter layers that enable fine-tuning for new variants with unseen attributes. Extensive experiments on 48 VRP variants show RouteFinder outperforms recent state-of-the-art learning methods. Code: https://github.com/ai4co/routefinder.

Predicting click and conversion probabilities when bidding on ad exchanges is at the core of the programmatic advertising industry. Two separated lines of previous works respectively address i) the prediction of user conversion probability and ii) the attribution of these conversions to advertising events (such as clicks) after the fact. We argue that attribution modeling improves the efficiency of the bidding policy in the context of performance advertising. Firstly we explain the inefficiency of the standard bidding policy with respect to attribution. Secondly we learn and utilize an attribution model in the bidder itself and show how it modifies the average bid after a click. Finally we produce evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed method on both offline and online experiments with data spanning several weeks of real traffic from Criteo, a leader in performance advertising.

Attribute value extraction refers to the task of identifying values of an attribute of interest from product information. Product attribute values are essential in many e-commerce scenarios, such as customer service robots, product ranking, retrieval and recommendations. While in the real world, the attribute values of a product are usually incomplete and vary over time, which greatly hinders the practical applications. In this paper, we introduce MAVE, a new dataset to better facilitate research on product attribute value extraction. MAVE is composed of a curated set of 2.2 million products from Amazon pages, with 3 million attribute-value annotations across 1257 unique categories. MAVE has four main and unique advantages: First, MAVE is the largest product attribute value extraction dataset by the number of attribute-value examples. Second, MAVE includes multi-source representations from the product, which captures the full product information with high attribute coverage. Third, MAVE represents a more diverse set of attributes and values relative to what previous datasets cover. Lastly, MAVE provides a very challenging zero-shot test set, as we empirically illustrate in the experiments. We further propose a novel approach that effectively extracts the attribute value from the multi-source product information. We conduct extensive experiments with several baselines and show that MAVE is an effective dataset for attribute value extraction task. It is also a very challenging task on zero-shot attribute extraction. Data is available at {\it https://github.com/google-research-datasets/MAVE}.

Organizations typically train large models individually. This is costly and time-consuming, particularly for large-scale foundation models. Such vertical production is known to be suboptimal. Inspired by this economic insight, we ask whether it is possible to leverage others' expertise by trading the constituent parts in models, i.e., sets of weights, as if they were market commodities. While recent advances in aligning and interpolating models suggest that doing so may be possible, a number of fundamental questions must be answered to create viable parameter markets. In this work, we address these basic questions, propose a framework containing the infrastructure necessary for market operations to take place, study strategies for exchanging parameters, and offer means for agents to monetize parameters. Excitingly, compared to agents who train siloed models from scratch, we show that it is possible to mutually gain by using the market, even in competitive settings. This suggests that the notion of parameter markets may be a useful paradigm for improving large-scale model training in the future.

Instruction-based image editing with diffusion models has achieved impressive results, yet existing methods struggle with fine-grained instructions specifying precise attributes such as colors, positions, and quantities. While recent approaches employ Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) for alignment, they optimize only at individual sampling steps, providing sparse feedback that limits trajectory-level control. We propose a unified framework CogniEdit, combining multi-modal reasoning with dense reward optimization that propagates gradients across consecutive denoising steps, enabling trajectory-level gradient flow through the sampling process. Our method comprises three components: (1) Multi-modal Large Language Models for decomposing complex instructions into actionable directives, (2) Dynamic Token Focus Relocation that adaptively emphasizes fine-grained attributes, and (3) Dense GRPO-based optimization that propagates gradients across consecutive steps for trajectory-level supervision. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets demonstrate that our CogniEdit achieves state-of-the-art performance in balancing fine-grained instruction following with visual quality and editability preservation

Decentralized prediction markets (DePMs) allow open participation in event-based wagering without fully relying on centralized intermediaries. We review the history of DePMs which date back to 2011 and includes hundreds of proposals. Perhaps surprising, modern DePMs like Polymarket deviate materially from earlier designs like Truthcoin and Augur v1. We use our review to present a modular workflow comprising eight stages: underlying infrastructure, market topic, share structure and pricing, market initialization, trading, market resolution, settlement, and archiving. For each module, we enumerate the design variants, analyzing trade-offs around decentralization, expressiveness, and manipulation resistance. We also identify open problems for researchers interested in this ecosystem.

Despite extensive safety alignment efforts, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that elicit harmful behavior. While existing studies predominantly focus on attack methods that require technical expertise, two critical questions remain underexplored: (1) Are jailbroken responses truly useful in enabling average users to carry out harmful actions? (2) Do safety vulnerabilities exist in more common, simple human-LLM interactions? In this paper, we demonstrate that LLM responses most effectively facilitate harmful actions when they are both actionable and informative--two attributes easily elicited in multi-step, multilingual interactions. Using this insight, we propose HarmScore, a jailbreak metric that measures how effectively an LLM response enables harmful actions, and Speak Easy, a simple multi-step, multilingual attack framework. Notably, by incorporating Speak Easy into direct request and jailbreak baselines, we see an average absolute increase of 0.319 in Attack Success Rate and 0.426 in HarmScore in both open-source and proprietary LLMs across four safety benchmarks. Our work reveals a critical yet often overlooked vulnerability: Malicious users can easily exploit common interaction patterns for harmful intentions.

We consider negotiation settings in which two agents use natural language to bargain on goods. Agents need to decide on both high-level strategy (e.g., proposing \50) and the execution of that strategy (e.g., generating "The bike is brand new. Selling for just 50."). Recent work on negotiation trains neural models, but their end-to-end nature makes it hard to control their strategy, and reinforcement learning tends to lead to degenerate solutions. In this paper, we propose a modular approach based on coarse di- alogue acts (e.g., propose(price=50)) that decouples strategy and generation. We show that we can flexibly set the strategy using supervised learning, reinforcement learning, or domain-specific knowledge without degeneracy, while our retrieval-based generation can maintain context-awareness and produce diverse utterances. We test our approach on the recently proposed DEALORNODEAL game, and we also collect a richer dataset based on real items on Craigslist. Human evaluation shows that our systems achieve higher task success rate and more human-like negotiation behavior than previous approaches.

This paper proposes a joint multi-task learning algorithm to better predict attributes in images using deep convolutional neural networks (CNN). We consider learning binary semantic attributes through a multi-task CNN model, where each CNN will predict one binary attribute. The multi-task learning allows CNN models to simultaneously share visual knowledge among different attribute categories. Each CNN will generate attribute-specific feature representations, and then we apply multi-task learning on the features to predict their attributes. In our multi-task framework, we propose a method to decompose the overall model's parameters into a latent task matrix and combination matrix. Furthermore, under-sampled classifiers can leverage shared statistics from other classifiers to improve their performance. Natural grouping of attributes is applied such that attributes in the same group are encouraged to share more knowledge. Meanwhile, attributes in different groups will generally compete with each other, and consequently share less knowledge. We show the effectiveness of our method on two popular attribute datasets.

Private and public organizations regularly collect and analyze digitalized data about their associates, volunteers, clients, etc. However, because most personal data are sensitive, there is a key challenge in designing privacy-preserving systems. To tackle privacy concerns, research communities have proposed different methods to preserve privacy, with Differential privacy (DP) standing out as a formal definition that allows quantifying the privacy-utility trade-off. Besides, with the local DP (LDP) model, users can sanitize their data locally before transmitting it to the server. The objective of this thesis is thus two-fold: O_1) To improve the utility and privacy in multiple frequency estimates under LDP guarantees, which is fundamental to statistical learning. And O_2) To assess the privacy-utility trade-off of machine learning (ML) models trained over differentially private data. For O_1, we first tackled the problem from two "multiple" perspectives, i.e., multiple attributes and multiple collections throughout time, while focusing on utility. Secondly, we focused our attention on the multiple attributes aspect only, in which we proposed a solution focusing on privacy while preserving utility. In both cases, we demonstrate through analytical and experimental validations the advantages of our proposed solutions over state-of-the-art LDP protocols. For O_2, we empirically evaluated ML-based solutions designed to solve real-world problems while ensuring DP guarantees. Indeed, we mainly used the input data perturbation setting from the privacy-preserving ML literature. This is the situation in which the whole dataset is sanitized independently and, thus, we implemented LDP algorithms from the perspective of the centralized data owner. In all cases, we concluded that differentially private ML models achieve nearly the same utility metrics as non-private ones.

The ethical concept of fairness has recently been applied in machine learning (ML) settings to describe a wide range of constraints and objectives. When considering the relevance of ethical concepts to subset selection problems, the concepts of diversity and inclusion are additionally applicable in order to create outputs that account for social power and access differentials. We introduce metrics based on these concepts, which can be applied together, separately, and in tandem with additional fairness constraints. Results from human subject experiments lend support to the proposed criteria. Social choice methods can additionally be leveraged to aggregate and choose preferable sets, and we detail how these may be applied.

Ensuring equitable treatment (fairness) across protected attributes (such as gender or ethnicity) is a critical issue in machine learning. Most existing literature focuses on binary classification, but achieving fairness in regression tasks-such as insurance pricing or hiring score assessments-is equally important. Moreover, anti-discrimination laws also apply to continuous attributes, such as age, for which many existing methods are not applicable. In practice, multiple protected attributes can exist simultaneously; however, methods targeting fairness across several attributes often overlook so-called "fairness gerrymandering", thereby ignoring disparities among intersectional subgroups (e.g., African-American women or Hispanic men). In this paper, we propose a distance covariance regularisation framework that mitigates the association between model predictions and protected attributes, in line with the fairness definition of demographic parity, and that captures both linear and nonlinear dependencies. To enhance applicability in the presence of multiple protected attributes, we extend our framework by incorporating two multivariate dependence measures based on distance covariance: the previously proposed joint distance covariance (JdCov) and our novel concatenated distance covariance (CCdCov), which effectively address fairness gerrymandering in both regression and classification tasks involving protected attributes of various types. We discuss and illustrate how to calibrate regularisation strength, including a method based on Jensen-Shannon divergence, which quantifies dissimilarities in prediction distributions across groups. We apply our framework to the COMPAS recidivism dataset and a large motor insurance claims dataset.

Although Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly used in financial trading, it remains unclear whether they can reason and adapt in live markets, as most studies test models instead of agents, cover limited periods and assets, and rely on unverified data. To address these gaps, we introduce Agent Market Arena (AMA), the first lifelong, real-time benchmark for evaluating LLM-based trading agents across multiple markets. AMA integrates verified trading data, expert-checked news, and diverse agent architectures within a unified trading framework, enabling fair and continuous comparison under real conditions. It implements four agents, including InvestorAgent as a single-agent baseline, TradeAgent and HedgeFundAgent with different risk styles, and DeepFundAgent with memory-based reasoning, and evaluates them across GPT-4o, GPT-4.1, Claude-3.5-haiku, Claude-sonnet-4, and Gemini-2.0-flash. Live experiments on both cryptocurrency and stock markets demonstrate that agent frameworks display markedly distinct behavioral patterns, spanning from aggressive risk-taking to conservative decision-making, whereas model backbones contribute less to outcome variation. AMA thus establishes a foundation for rigorous, reproducible, and continuously evolving evaluation of financial reasoning and trading intelligence in LLM-based agents.

In financial trading, large language model (LLM)-based agents demonstrate significant potential. However, the high sensitivity to market noise undermines the performance of LLM-based trading systems. To address this limitation, we propose a novel multi-agent system featuring an internal competitive mechanism inspired by modern corporate management structures. The system consists of two specialized teams: (1) Data Team - responsible for processing and condensing massive market data into diversified text factors, ensuring they fit the model's constrained context. (2) Research Team - tasked with making parallelized multipath trading decisions based on deep research methods. The core innovation lies in implementing a real-time evaluation and ranking mechanism within each team, driven by authentic market feedback. Each agent's performance undergoes continuous scoring and ranking, with only outputs from top-performing agents being adopted. The design enables the system to adaptively adjust to dynamic environment, enhances robustness against market noise and ultimately delivers superior trading performance. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed system significantly outperforms prevailing multi-agent systems and traditional quantitative investment methods across diverse evaluation metrics. ContestTrade is open-sourced on GitHub at https://github.com/FinStep-AI/ContestTrade.

This study evaluates Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents for Dhumbal, a culturally significant multiplayer card game with imperfect information, through a systematic comparison of rule-based, search-based, and learning-based strategies. We formalize Dhumbal's mechanics and implement diverse agents, including heuristic approaches (Aggressive, Conservative, Balanced, Opportunistic), search-based methods such as Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) and Information Set Monte Carlo Tree Search (ISMCTS), and reinforcement learning approaches including Deep Q-Network (DQN) and Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO), and a random baseline. Evaluation involves within-category tournaments followed by a cross-category championship. Performance is measured via win rate, economic outcome, Jhyap success, cards discarded per round, risk assessment, and decision efficiency. Statistical significance is assessed using Welch's t-test with Bonferroni correction, effect sizes via Cohen's d, and 95% confidence intervals (CI). Across 1024 simulated rounds, the rule-based Aggressive agent achieves the highest win rate (88.3%, 95% CI: [86.3, 90.3]), outperforming ISMCTS (9.0%) and PPO (1.5%) through effective exploitation of Jhyap declarations. The study contributes a reproducible AI framework, insights into heuristic efficacy under partial information, and open-source code, thereby advancing AI research and supporting digital preservation of cultural games.

Like generic multi-task learning, continual learning has the nature of multi-objective optimization, and therefore faces a trade-off between the performance of different tasks. That is, to optimize for the current task distribution, it may need to compromise performance on some previous tasks. This means that there exist multiple models that are Pareto-optimal at different times, each addressing a distinct task performance trade-off. Researchers have discussed how to train particular models to address specific trade-off preferences. However, existing algorithms require training overheads proportional to the number of preferences -- a large burden when there are multiple, possibly infinitely many, preferences. As a response, we propose Imprecise Bayesian Continual Learning (IBCL). Upon a new task, IBCL (1) updates a knowledge base in the form of a convex hull of model parameter distributions and (2) obtains particular models to address task trade-off preferences with zero-shot. That is, IBCL does not require any additional training overhead to generate preference-addressing models from its knowledge base. We show that models obtained by IBCL have guarantees in identifying the Pareto optimal parameters. Moreover, experiments on standard image classification and NLP tasks support this guarantee. Statistically, IBCL improves average per-task accuracy by at most 23% and peak per-task accuracy by at most 15% with respect to the baseline methods, with steadily near-zero or positive backward transfer. Most importantly, IBCL significantly reduces the training overhead from training 1 model per preference to at most 3 models for all preferences.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

This paper discusses the system architecture design and deployment of non-stationary multi-armed bandit approaches to determine a near-optimal payment routing policy based on the recent history of transactions. We propose a Routing Service architecture using a novel Ray-based implementation for optimally scaling bandit-based payment routing to over 10,000 transactions per second, adhering to the system design requirements and ecosystem constraints with Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). We first evaluate the effectiveness of multiple bandit-based payment routing algorithms on a custom simulator to benchmark multiple non-stationary bandit approaches and identify the best hyperparameters. We then conducted live experiments on the payment transaction system on a fantasy sports platform Dream11. In the live experiments, we demonstrated that our non-stationary bandit-based algorithm consistently improves the success rate of transactions by 0.92% compared to the traditional rule-based methods over one month.

Large language model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly expected to negotiate, coordinate, and transact autonomously, yet existing benchmarks lack principled settings for evaluating language-mediated economic interaction among multiple agents. We introduce AgenticPay, a benchmark and simulation framework for multi-agent buyer-seller negotiation driven by natural language. AgenticPay models markets in which buyers and sellers possess private constraints and product-dependent valuations, and must reach agreements through multi-round linguistic negotiation rather than numeric bidding alone. The framework supports a diverse suite of over 110 tasks ranging from bilateral bargaining to many-to-many markets, with structured action extraction and metrics for feasibility, efficiency, and welfare. Benchmarking state-of-the-art proprietary and open-weight LLMs reveals substantial gaps in negotiation performance and highlights challenges in long-horizon strategic reasoning, establishing AgenticPay as a foundation for studying agentic commerce and language-based market interaction. Code and dataset are available at the link: https://github.com/SafeRL-Lab/AgenticPay.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

In recent years, Local Differential Privacy (LDP), a robust privacy-preserving methodology, has gained widespread adoption in real-world applications. With LDP, users can perturb their data on their devices before sending it out for analysis. However, as the collection of multiple sensitive information becomes more prevalent across various industries, collecting a single sensitive attribute under LDP may not be sufficient. Correlated attributes in the data may still lead to inferences about the sensitive attribute. This paper empirically studies the impact of collecting multiple sensitive attributes under LDP on fairness. We propose a novel privacy budget allocation scheme that considers the varying domain size of sensitive attributes. This generally led to a better privacy-utility-fairness trade-off in our experiments than the state-of-art solution. Our results show that LDP leads to slightly improved fairness in learning problems without significantly affecting the performance of the models. We conduct extensive experiments evaluating three benchmark datasets using several group fairness metrics and seven state-of-the-art LDP protocols. Overall, this study challenges the common belief that differential privacy necessarily leads to worsened fairness in machine learning.

Text-to-image models produce images that align well with natural language prompts, but compositional generation has long been a central challenge. Models often struggle to satisfy multiple concepts within a single prompt, frequently omitting some concepts and resulting in partial success. Such failures highlight the difficulty of jointly optimizing multiple concepts during reward optimization, where competing concepts can interfere with one another. To address this limitation, we propose Correlation-Weighted Multi-Reward Optimization (\ours), a framework that leverages the correlation structure among concept rewards to adaptively weight each attribute concept in optimization. By accounting for interactions among concepts, \ours balances competing reward signals and emphasizes concepts that are partially satisfied yet inconsistently generated across samples, improving compositional generation. Specifically, we decompose multi-concept prompts into pre-defined concept groups (\eg, objects, attributes, and relations) and obtain reward signals from dedicated reward models for each concept. We then adaptively reweight these rewards, assigning higher weights to conflicting or hard-to-satisfy concepts using correlation-based difficulty estimation. By focusing optimization on the most challenging concepts within each group, \ours encourages the model to consistently satisfy all requested attributes simultaneously. We apply our approach to train state-of-the-art diffusion models, SD3.5 and FLUX.1-dev, and demonstrate consistent improvements on challenging multi-concept benchmarks, including ConceptMix, GenEval 2, and T2I-CompBench.

Ranking schemes drive many real-world decisions, like, where to study, whom to hire, what to buy, etc. Many of these decisions often come with high consequences. For example, a university can be deemed less prestigious if not featured in a top-k list, and consumers might not even explore products that do not get recommended to buyers. At the heart of most of these decisions are opaque ranking schemes, which dictate the ordering of data entities, but their internal logic is inaccessible or proprietary. Drawing inferences about the ranking differences is like a guessing game to the stakeholders, like, the rankees (i.e., the entities who are ranked, like product companies) and the decision-makers (i.e., who use the rankings, like buyers). In this paper, we aim to enable transparency in ranking interpretation by using algorithmic rankers that learn from available data and by enabling human reasoning about the learned ranking differences using explainable AI (XAI) methods. To realize this aim, we leverage the exploration-explanation paradigm of human-data interaction to let human stakeholders explore subsets and groupings of complex multi-attribute ranking data using visual explanations of model fit and attribute influence on rankings. We realize this explanation paradigm for transparent ranking interpretation in TRIVEA, a visual analytic system that is fueled by: i) visualizations of model fit derived from algorithmic rankers that learn the associations between attributes and rankings from available data and ii) visual explanations derived from XAI methods that help abstract important patterns, like, the relative influence of attributes in different ranking ranges. Using TRIVEA, end users not trained in data science have the agency to transparently reason about the global and local behavior of the rankings without the need to open black-box ranking models and develop confidence in the resulting attribute-based inferences. We demonstrate the efficacy of TRIVEA using multiple usage scenarios and subjective feedback from researchers with diverse domain expertise. Keywords: Visual Analytics, Learning-to-Rank, Explainable ML, Ranking

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) enable powerful multi-agent systems, but scaling them is economically unsustainable: coordinating heterogeneous agents under information asymmetry often spirals costs. Existing paradigms, such as Mixture-of-Agents and knowledge-based routers, rely on heuristic proxies that ignore costs and collapse uncertainty structure, leading to provably suboptimal coordination. We introduce Agora, a framework that reframes coordination as a decentralized market for uncertainty. Agora formalizes epistemic uncertainty into a structured, tradable asset (perceptual, semantic, inferential), and enforces profitability-driven trading among agents based on rational economic rules. A market-aware broker, extending Thompson Sampling, initiates collaboration and guides the system toward cost-efficient equilibria. Experiments on five multimodal benchmarks (MMMU, MMBench, MathVision, InfoVQA, CC-OCR) show that Agora outperforms strong VLMs and heuristic multi-agent strategies, e.g., achieving +8.5% accuracy over the best baseline on MMMU while reducing cost by over 3x. These results establish market-based coordination as a principled and scalable paradigm for building economically viable multi-agent visual intelligence systems.

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

We consider a class of assortment optimization problems in an offline data-driven setting. A firm does not know the underlying customer choice model but has access to an offline dataset consisting of the historically offered assortment set, customer choice, and revenue. The objective is to use the offline dataset to find an optimal assortment. Due to the combinatorial nature of assortment optimization, the problem of insufficient data coverage is likely to occur in the offline dataset. Therefore, designing a provably efficient offline learning algorithm becomes a significant challenge. To this end, we propose an algorithm referred to as Pessimistic ASsortment opTimizAtion (PASTA for short) designed based on the principle of pessimism, that can correctly identify the optimal assortment by only requiring the offline data to cover the optimal assortment under general settings. In particular, we establish a regret bound for the offline assortment optimization problem under the celebrated multinomial logit model. We also propose an efficient computational procedure to solve our pessimistic assortment optimization problem. Numerical studies demonstrate the superiority of the proposed method over the existing baseline method.

Product offers on e-commerce websites often consist of a product title and a textual product description. In order to enable features such as faceted product search or to generate product comparison tables, it is necessary to extract structured attribute-value pairs from the unstructured product titles and descriptions and to normalize the extracted values to a single, unified scale for each attribute. This paper explores the potential of using large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, to extract and normalize attribute values from product titles and descriptions. We experiment with different zero-shot and few-shot prompt templates for instructing LLMs to extract and normalize attribute-value pairs. We introduce the Web Data Commons - Product Attribute Value Extraction (WDC-PAVE) benchmark dataset for our experiments. WDC-PAVE consists of product offers from 59 different websites which provide schema.org annotations. The offers belong to five different product categories, each with a specific set of attributes. The dataset provides manually verified attribute-value pairs in two forms: (i) directly extracted values and (ii) normalized attribute values. The normalization of the attribute values requires systems to perform the following types of operations: name expansion, generalization, unit of measurement conversion, and string wrangling. Our experiments demonstrate that GPT-4 outperforms the PLM-based extraction methods SU-OpenTag, AVEQA, and MAVEQA by 10%, achieving an F1-score of 91%. For the extraction and normalization of product attribute values, GPT-4 achieves a similar performance to the extraction scenario, while being particularly strong at string wrangling and name expansion.

Whether pairing people with AI helps or hurts is usually reported as a single average effect. Using a real-money prediction market (Polymarket) as an objective, externally resolved benchmark, this pilot shows that the value of human-AI collaboration depends on a specific, measurable form of human capital. Analyzed at the level of the individual forecaster, hybrid performance is trimodal: most people either deferred to the model (matching it) or used it to rubber-stamp a prior guess (performing worse than the model alone), while a minority engaged in genuine complementary reasoning and reached accuracy matching or even exceeding (i.e., lower error than) the market itself. Collaborative traits (perspective-taking, intellectual humility, and curiosity) rather than raw cognitive ability or model benchmarks, distinguished who reached that mode. The results are preliminary but statistically robust, and motivate a pre-registered replication now in preparation.

This paper presents a reproducibility study and extension of "Cooperation, Competition, and Maliciousness: LLM-Stakeholders Interactive Negotiation." We validate the original findings using a range of open-weight models (1.5B-70B parameters) and GPT-4o Mini while introducing several novel contributions. We analyze the Pareto front of the games, propose a communication-free baseline to test whether successful negotiations are possible without agent interaction, evaluate recent small language models' performance, analyze structural information leakage in model responses, and implement an inequality metric to assess negotiation fairness. Our results demonstrate that smaller models (<10B parameters) struggle with format adherence and coherent responses, but larger open-weight models can approach proprietary model performance. Additionally, in many scenarios, single-agent approaches can achieve comparable results to multi-agent negotiations, challenging assumptions about the necessity of agent communication to perform well on the benchmark. This work also provides insights into the accessibility, fairness, environmental impact, and privacy considerations of LLM-based negotiation systems.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Recommendation fairness has attracted great attention recently. In real-world systems, users usually have multiple sensitive attributes (e.g. age, gender, and occupation), and users may not want their recommendation results influenced by those attributes. Moreover, which of and when these user attributes should be considered in fairness-aware modeling should depend on users' specific demands. In this work, we define the selective fairness task, where users can flexibly choose which sensitive attributes should the recommendation model be bias-free. We propose a novel parameter-efficient prompt-based fairness-aware recommendation (PFRec) framework, which relies on attribute-specific prompt-based bias eliminators with adversarial training, enabling selective fairness with different attribute combinations on sequential recommendation. Both task-specific and user-specific prompts are considered. We conduct extensive evaluations to verify PFRec's superiority in selective fairness. The source codes are released in https://github.com/wyqing20/PFRec.

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

Large multimodal models (LMMs) are increasingly adopted as judges in multimodal evaluation systems due to their strong instruction following and consistency with human preferences. However, their ability to follow diverse, fine-grained evaluation criteria remains underexplored. We develop Multi-Crit, a benchmark for evaluating multimodal judges on their capacity to follow pluralistic criteria and produce reliable criterion-level judgments. Covering both open-ended generation and verifiable reasoning tasks, Multi-Crit is built through a rigorous data curation pipeline that gathers challenging response pairs with multi-criterion human annotations. It further introduces three novel metrics for systematically assessing pluralistic adherence, criterion-switching flexibility, and the ability to recognize criterion-level preference conflicts. Comprehensive analysis of 25 LMMs reveals that 1) proprietary models still struggle to maintain consistent adherence to pluralistic criteria--especially in open-ended evaluation; 2) open-source models lag further behind in flexibly following diverse criteria; and 3) critic fine-tuning with holistic judgment signals enhances visual grounding but fails to generalize to pluralistic criterion-level judgment. Additional analyses on reasoning fine-tuning, test-time scaling, and boundary consistency between open-source and proprietary models further probe the limits of current multimodal judges. As a pioneering study, Multi-Crit lays the foundation for building reliable and steerable multimodal AI evaluation.

Alignment in artificial intelligence pursues the consistency between model responses and human preferences as well as values. In practice, the multifaceted nature of human preferences inadvertently introduces what is known as the "alignment tax" -a compromise where enhancements in alignment within one objective (e.g.,harmlessness) can diminish performance in others (e.g.,helpfulness). However, existing alignment techniques are mostly unidirectional, leading to suboptimal trade-offs and poor flexibility over various objectives. To navigate this challenge, we argue the prominence of grounding LLMs with evident preferences. We introduce controllable preference optimization (CPO), which explicitly specifies preference scores for different objectives, thereby guiding the model to generate responses that meet the requirements. Our experimental analysis reveals that the aligned models can provide responses that match various preferences among the "3H" (helpfulness, honesty, harmlessness) desiderata. Furthermore, by introducing diverse data and alignment goals, we surpass baseline methods in aligning with single objectives, hence mitigating the impact of the alignment tax and achieving improvements in multi-objective alignment.

Although machine learning tasks are highly sensitive to the quality of input data, relevant datasets can often be challenging for firms to acquire, especially when held privately by a variety of owners. For instance, if these owners are competitors in a downstream market, they may be reluctant to share information. Focusing on supervised learning for regression tasks, we develop a regression market to provide a monetary incentive for data sharing. Our mechanism adopts a Bayesian framework, allowing us to consider a more general class of regression tasks. We present a thorough exploration of the market properties, and show that similar proposals in literature expose the market agents to sizeable financial risks, which can be mitigated in our setup.

Multiobjective combinatorial optimization (MOCO) problems can be found in many real-world applications. However, exactly solving these problems would be very challenging, particularly when they are NP-hard. Many handcrafted heuristic methods have been proposed to tackle different MOCO problems over the past decades. In this work, we generalize the idea of neural combinatorial optimization, and develop a learning-based approach to approximate the whole Pareto set for a given MOCO problem without further search procedure. We propose a single preference-conditioned model to directly generate approximate Pareto solutions for any trade-off preference, and design an efficient multiobjective reinforcement learning algorithm to train this model. Our proposed method can be treated as a learning-based extension for the widely-used decomposition-based multiobjective evolutionary algorithm (MOEA/D). It uses a single model to accommodate all the possible preferences, whereas other methods use a finite number of solutions to approximate the Pareto set. Experimental results show that our proposed method significantly outperforms some other methods on the multiobjective traveling salesman problem, multiobjective vehicle routing problem, and multiobjective knapsack problem in terms of solution quality, speed, and model efficiency.

Online advertising has recently grown into a highly competitive and complex multi-billion-dollar industry, with advertisers bidding for ad slots at large scales and high frequencies. This has resulted in a growing need for efficient "auto-bidding" algorithms that determine the bids for incoming queries to maximize advertisers' targets subject to their specified constraints. This work explores efficient online algorithms for a single value-maximizing advertiser under an increasingly popular constraint: Return-on-Spend (RoS). We quantify efficiency in terms of regret relative to the optimal algorithm, which knows all queries a priori. We contribute a simple online algorithm that achieves near-optimal regret in expectation while always respecting the specified RoS constraint when the input sequence of queries are i.i.d. samples from some distribution. We also integrate our results with the previous work of Balseiro, Lu, and Mirrokni [BLM20] to achieve near-optimal regret while respecting both RoS and fixed budget constraints. Our algorithm follows the primal-dual framework and uses online mirror descent (OMD) for the dual updates. However, we need to use a non-canonical setup of OMD, and therefore the classic low-regret guarantee of OMD, which is for the adversarial setting in online learning, no longer holds. Nonetheless, in our case and more generally where low-regret dynamics are applied in algorithm design, the gradients encountered by OMD can be far from adversarial but influenced by our algorithmic choices. We exploit this key insight to show our OMD setup achieves low regret in the realm of our algorithm.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Ensuring that generative AI systems align with human values is essential but challenging, especially when considering multiple human values and their potential trade-offs. Since human values can be personalized and dynamically change over time, the desirable levels of value alignment vary across different ethnic groups, industry sectors, and user cohorts. Within existing frameworks, it is hard to define human values and align AI systems accordingly across different directions simultaneously, such as harmlessness, helpfulness, and positiveness. To address this, we develop a novel, first-principle approach called Multi-Human-Value Alignment Palette (MAP), which navigates the alignment across multiple human values in a structured and reliable way. MAP formulates the alignment problem as an optimization task with user-defined constraints, which define human value targets. It can be efficiently solved via a primal-dual approach, which determines whether a user-defined alignment target is achievable and how to achieve it. We conduct a detailed theoretical analysis of MAP by quantifying the trade-offs between values, the sensitivity to constraints, the fundamental connection between multi-value alignment and sequential alignment, and proving that linear weighted rewards are sufficient for multi-value alignment. Extensive experiments demonstrate MAP's ability to align multiple values in a principled manner while delivering strong empirical performance across various tasks.

Automated decision systems are increasingly used to make consequential decisions in people's lives. Due to the sensitivity of the manipulated data as well as the resulting decisions, several ethical concerns need to be addressed for the appropriate use of such technologies, in particular, fairness and privacy. Unlike previous work, which focused on centralized differential privacy (DP) or local DP (LDP) for a single sensitive attribute, in this paper, we examine the impact of LDP in the presence of several sensitive attributes (i.e., multi-dimensional data) on fairness. Detailed empirical analysis on synthetic and benchmark datasets revealed very relevant observations. In particular, (1) multi-dimensional LDP is an efficient approach to reduce disparity, (2) the multi-dimensional approach of LDP (independent vs. combined) matters only at low privacy guarantees, and (3) the outcome Y distribution has an important effect on which group is more sensitive to the obfuscation. Last, we summarize our findings in the form of recommendations to guide practitioners in adopting effective privacy-preserving practices while maintaining fairness and utility in ML applications.

Deep reinforcement learning (RL) has been applied extensively to solve complex decision-making problems. In many real-world scenarios, tasks often have several conflicting objectives and may require multiple agents to cooperate, which are the multi-objective multi-agent decision-making problems. However, only few works have been conducted on this intersection. Existing approaches are limited to separate fields and can only handle multi-agent decision-making with a single objective, or multi-objective decision-making with a single agent. In this paper, we propose MO-MIX to solve the multi-objective multi-agent reinforcement learning (MOMARL) problem. Our approach is based on the centralized training with decentralized execution (CTDE) framework. A weight vector representing preference over the objectives is fed into the decentralized agent network as a condition for local action-value function estimation, while a mixing network with parallel architecture is used to estimate the joint action-value function. In addition, an exploration guide approach is applied to improve the uniformity of the final non-dominated solutions. Experiments demonstrate that the proposed method can effectively solve the multi-objective multi-agent cooperative decision-making problem and generate an approximation of the Pareto set. Our approach not only significantly outperforms the baseline method in all four kinds of evaluation metrics, but also requires less computational cost.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

Despite recent advancements in AI and NLP, negotiation remains a difficult domain for AI agents. Traditional game theoretic approaches that have worked well for two-player zero-sum games struggle in the context of negotiation due to their inability to learn human-compatible strategies. On the other hand, approaches that only use human data tend to be domain-specific and lack the theoretical guarantees provided by strategies grounded in game theory. Motivated by the notion of fairness as a criterion for optimality in general sum games, we propose a negotiation framework called FDHC which incorporates fairness into both the reward design and search to learn human-compatible negotiation strategies. Our method includes a novel, RL+search technique called LGM-Zero which leverages a pre-trained language model to retrieve human-compatible offers from large action spaces. Our results show that our method is able to achieve more egalitarian negotiation outcomes and improve negotiation quality.

Traditional e-commerce search systems employ multi-stage cascading architectures (MCA) that progressively filter items through recall, pre-ranking, and ranking stages. While effective at balancing computational efficiency with business conversion, these systems suffer from fragmented computation and optimization objective collisions across stages, which ultimately limit their performance ceiling. To address these, we propose OneSearch, the first industrial-deployed end-to-end generative framework for e-commerce search. This framework introduces three key innovations: (1) a Keyword-enhanced Hierarchical Quantization Encoding (KHQE) module, to preserve both hierarchical semantics and distinctive item attributes while maintaining strong query-item relevance constraints; (2) a multi-view user behavior sequence injection strategy that constructs behavior-driven user IDs and incorporates both explicit short-term and implicit long-term sequences to model user preferences comprehensively; and (3) a Preference-Aware Reward System (PARS) featuring multi-stage supervised fine-tuning and adaptive reward-weighted ranking to capture fine-grained user preferences. Extensive offline evaluations on large-scale industry datasets demonstrate OneSearch's superior performance for high-quality recall and ranking. The rigorous online A/B tests confirm its ability to enhance relevance in the same exposure position, achieving statistically significant improvements: +1.67% item CTR, +2.40% buyer, and +3.22% order volume. Furthermore, OneSearch reduces operational expenditure by 75.40% and improves Model FLOPs Utilization from 3.26% to 27.32%. The system has been successfully deployed across multiple search scenarios in Kuaishou, serving millions of users, generating tens of millions of PVs daily.

Recently, neural networks have been widely used in e-commerce recommender systems, owing to the rapid development of deep learning. We formalize the recommender system as a sequential recommendation problem, intending to predict the next items that the user might be interacted with. Recent works usually give an overall embedding from a user's behavior sequence. However, a unified user embedding cannot reflect the user's multiple interests during a period. In this paper, we propose a novel controllable multi-interest framework for the sequential recommendation, called ComiRec. Our multi-interest module captures multiple interests from user behavior sequences, which can be exploited for retrieving candidate items from the large-scale item pool. These items are then fed into an aggregation module to obtain the overall recommendation. The aggregation module leverages a controllable factor to balance the recommendation accuracy and diversity. We conduct experiments for the sequential recommendation on two real-world datasets, Amazon and Taobao. Experimental results demonstrate that our framework achieves significant improvements over state-of-the-art models. Our framework has also been successfully deployed on the offline Alibaba distributed cloud platform.

Prediction markets allow users to trade on outcomes of real-world events, but are prone to fragmentation through overlapping questions, implicit equivalences, and hidden contradictions across markets. We present an agentic AI pipeline that autonomously (i) clusters markets into coherent topical groups using natural-language understanding over contract text and metadata, and (ii) identifies within-cluster market pairs whose resolved outcomes exhibit strong dependence, including same-outcome (correlated) and different-outcome (anti-correlated) relationships. Using a historical dataset of resolved markets on Polymarket, we evaluate the accuracy of the agent's relational predictions. We then translate discovered relationships into a simple trading strategy to quantify how these relationships map to actionable signals. Results show that agent-identified relationships achieve roughly 60-70% accuracy, and their induced trading strategies earn about 20% average returns over week-long horizons, highlighting the ability of agentic AI and large language models to uncover latent semantic structure in prediction markets.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.