Daily Papers

Current models of representational reliability in neural populations focus on temporal stability: whether population centroids are preserved across sessions and days. This framing leaves a fundamental question unanswered: how reliably does the pairwise distance structure among stimuli reproduce across independent observations within a session? We argue that this property, geometric stability, constitutes an independent axis of representational analysis that existing frameworks do not capture. We formalize geometric stability as the Spearman rank correlation between split-half representational dissimilarity matrices (Shesha) and show that it is empirically dissociable from both temporal stability and decoding accuracy. Across 229 area-session observations spanning 68 brain regions in a visual discrimination task (Steinmetz et al. 2019), geometric stability predicts trial-by-trial neural-behavioral coupling (ρ= 0.18, p = 0.005) while centroid drift does not (ρ= 0.002, p = 0.976). The regional hierarchy, with striatum most stable (S = 0.44) and hippocampus least (S = 0.19), runs roughly opposite to the temporal stability hierarchy. Directionally consistent olfactory data (Bolding \& Franks 2018) motivate an attractor network model in which recurrent excitatory coupling amplifies split-half RDM consistency by completing stimulus patterns from sparse feedforward input (ρ= +0.64, p = 0.010), providing a circuit-level account of how geometric stability emerges. These results establish geometric stability as a functionally relevant, circuit-dependent property of neural population codes, orthogonal to temporal drift measures and complementary to recent accounts of how recurrent connectivity balances representational stability with sequential dynamics in hippocampal circuits.

Personalized large language models (LLMs) adapt model behavior to individual users to enhance user satisfaction, yet personalization can inadvertently distort factual reasoning. We show that when personalized LLMs face factual queries, there exists a phenomenon where the model generates answers aligned with a user's prior history rather than the objective truth, resulting in personalization-induced hallucinations that degrade factual reliability and may propagate incorrect beliefs, due to representational entanglement between personalization and factual representations. To address this issue, we propose Factuality-Preserving Personalized Steering (FPPS), a lightweight inference-time approach that mitigates personalization-induced factual distortions while preserving personalized behavior. We further introduce PFQABench, the first benchmark designed to jointly evaluate factual and personalized question answering under personalization. Experiments across multiple LLM backbones and personalization methods show that FPPS substantially improves factual accuracy while maintaining personalized performance.

We introduce an axiomatic evaluation framework for latent thought representations in LLMs, comprising metrics that are independent of downstream benchmark scores and reveal representational failures that benchmark accuracy masks. Existing evaluations conflate representation quality with model capacity. Therefore, failures cannot be attributed to the representation rather than to the model that processes it. We formalize four functional axioms (Causality, Minimality, Separability, and Stability) and define a quantitative measure for each, computed directly on the representation independently of downstream accuracy. We audit open-weight LLMs across 23 reasoning tasks (e.g., Spatial Reasoning, Factual QA). We find that no candidate satisfies all four axioms simultaneously, that the representations distinguish task type reliably but cannot distinguish between two questions within the same task, and that the representations encode little information beyond what is already present in the input embedding. The failure is consistent across dense, reasoning-distilled, and RL-trained model families, indicating that the gap is structural rather than a property of model size or training procedure.

If an AI agent makes decisions on a person's behalf, those decisions must align with its user. We introduce representational accuracy to measure how faithfully a system captures a person's interpretation. An interpretive layer is operationalized as a Behavioral Specification. Our reference implementation aggressively compresses a person's data into interpretive patterns, served as context to a language model. We evaluate the Specification on a prototype benchmark of held-out behavioral predictions scored by a calibrated 5-judge LLM panel. We test it independently and in composition with a range of context conditions: full raw corpus, full extracted facts, and four commercial memory systems (Mem0, Letta, Supermemory, Zep). Across 14 public-domain autobiographical corpora, the Specification lifts representational accuracy in aggregate and nearly eliminates model hedging. It recovers most of what the raw corpus delivers, at ~25x less context cost. The Specification lifts subjects toward a common predictive level regardless of pretraining baseline; the lift in absolute points is therefore largest where the baseline is lowest, suggesting the population of relevance is anyone not adequately represented in pretraining. Lift is greatest on interpretation-required questions, where providing an interpretive layer enables model behavior that extracted facts or raw corpus do not. Conversely, on recall-required questions, this layer can interfere rather than help. We conclude that representational accuracy is distinct from recall and that human-AI alignment is dependent on how accurately the user is represented. Representational accuracy makes that alignment testable.

LLMs are highly sensitive to prompt phrasing, yet standard benchmarks typically report performance using a single prompt, raising concerns about the reliability of such evaluations. In this work, we argue for a stochastic method of moments evaluation over the space of meaning-preserving prompt perturbations. We introduce a formal definition of reliable evaluation that accounts for prompt sensitivity, and suggest ReliableEval - a method for estimating the number of prompt resamplings needed to obtain meaningful results. Using our framework, we stochastically evaluate five frontier LLMs and find that even top-performing models like GPT-4o and Claude-3.7-Sonnet exhibit substantial prompt sensitivity. Our approach is model-, task-, and metric-agnostic, offering a recipe for meaningful and robust LLM evaluation.

Advanced LLMs have achieved near-ceiling instruction-following accuracy on benchmarks such as IFEval. However, these impressive scores do not necessarily translate to reliable services in real-world use, where users often vary their phrasing, contextual framing, and task formulations. In this paper, we study nuance-oriented reliability: whether models exhibit consistent competence across cousin prompts that convey analogous user intents but with subtle nuances. To quantify this, we introduce a new metric, reliable@k, and develop an automated pipeline that generates high-quality cousin prompts via data augmentation. Building upon this, we construct IFEval++ for systematic evaluation. Across 20 proprietary and 26 open-source LLMs, we find that current models exhibit substantial insufficiency in nuance-oriented reliability -- their performance can drop by up to 61.8% with nuanced prompt modifications. What's more, we characterize it and explore three potential improvement recipes. Our findings highlight nuance-oriented reliability as a crucial yet underexplored next step toward more dependable and trustworthy LLM behavior. Our code and benchmark are accessible: https://github.com/jianshuod/IFEval-pp.

Single-prompt accuracy is the dominant way to benchmark language models, but it can miss reliability failures that matter. We evaluate a 15-model open-weight corpus, with the main reliability analyses focused on 10 instruct models across five classification and reasoning benchmarks under five prompt variants each, measuring accuracy, token-probability calibration, verbal-confidence calibration, verbal parse rate, and prompt-perturbation spread for every (model x dataset x variant) cell. We find three broad results. First, evaluation design can materially change the conclusion. Switching Expected Calibration Error (ECE) token from a raw to a label-set-normalised definition changes per-cell calibration by a mean absolute 0.149. More strikingly, pairing a chain-of-thought prompt with a first-character evaluator on ARC-Challenge reduces apparent accuracy by 72-88% across all five primary models; two independent repair procedures recover 93.8% and 102.7% of the lost performance, indicating an evaluator-side rather than model-side failure. Second, confidence signals are fragile. On MMLU-Pro, every primary model verbally reports confidence substantially above both its accuracy and its token-probability confidence on the same rows, and verbal parse rate can collapse for a single model on a single prompt variant. Third, prompt robustness does not track parameter count reliably. Across 10 instruct models, the correlation between model size and prompt-perturbation spread ranges from -0.244 to 0.474 across benchmarks. Taken together, these results show that reliability conclusions for small language models depend not only on the model being evaluated, but also on the evaluation pipeline used to measure it. We argue that calibration definitions, evaluator logic, verbal parseability, and prompt robustness should be reported explicitly when making reliability claims.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce errors, including factual inaccuracies, biases, and reasoning failures, collectively referred to as "hallucinations". Recent studies have demonstrated that LLMs' internal states encode information regarding the truthfulness of their outputs, and that this information can be utilized to detect errors. In this work, we show that the internal representations of LLMs encode much more information about truthfulness than previously recognized. We first discover that the truthfulness information is concentrated in specific tokens, and leveraging this property significantly enhances error detection performance. Yet, we show that such error detectors fail to generalize across datasets, implying that -- contrary to prior claims -- truthfulness encoding is not universal but rather multifaceted. Next, we show that internal representations can also be used for predicting the types of errors the model is likely to make, facilitating the development of tailored mitigation strategies. Lastly, we reveal a discrepancy between LLMs' internal encoding and external behavior: they may encode the correct answer, yet consistently generate an incorrect one. Taken together, these insights deepen our understanding of LLM errors from the model's internal perspective, which can guide future research on enhancing error analysis and mitigation.

Understanding what defines a good representation in large language models (LLMs) is fundamental to both theoretical understanding and practical applications. In this paper, we investigate the quality of intermediate representations in various LLM architectures, including Transformers and State Space Models (SSMs). We find that intermediate layers often yield more informative representations for downstream tasks than the final layers. To measure the representation quality, we adapt and apply a suite of metrics - such as prompt entropy, curvature, and augmentation-invariance - originally proposed in other contexts. Our empirical study reveals significant architectural differences, how representations evolve throughout training, and how factors like input randomness and prompt length affect each layer. Notably, we observe a bimodal pattern in the entropy of some intermediate layers and consider potential explanations tied to training data. Overall, our results illuminate the internal mechanics of LLMs and guide strategies for architectural optimization and training.

Distributional word representation methods exploit word co-occurrences to build compact vector encodings of words. While these representations enjoy widespread use in modern natural language processing, it is unclear whether they accurately encode all necessary facets of conceptual meaning. In this paper, we evaluate how well these representations can predict perceptual and conceptual features of concrete concepts, drawing on two semantic norm datasets sourced from human participants. We find that several standard word representations fail to encode many salient perceptual features of concepts, and show that these deficits correlate with word-word similarity prediction errors. Our analyses provide motivation for grounded and embodied language learning approaches, which may help to remedy these deficits.

Hallucination, where models generate fluent text unsupported by visual evidence, remains a major flaw in vision-language models and is particularly critical in sign language translation (SLT). In SLT, meaning depends on precise grounding in video, and gloss-free models are especially vulnerable because they map continuous signer movements directly into natural language without intermediate gloss supervision that serves as alignment. We argue that hallucinations arise when models rely on language priors rather than visual input. To capture this, we propose a token-level reliability measure that quantifies how much the decoder uses visual information. Our method combines feature-based sensitivity, which measures internal changes when video is masked, with counterfactual signals, which capture probability differences between clean and altered video inputs. These signals are aggregated into a sentence-level reliability score, providing a compact and interpretable measure of visual grounding. We evaluate the proposed measure on two SLT benchmarks (PHOENIX-2014T and CSL-Daily) with both gloss-based and gloss-free models. Our results show that reliability predicts hallucination rates, generalizes across datasets and architectures, and decreases under visual degradations. Beyond these quantitative trends, we also find that reliability distinguishes grounded tokens from guessed ones, allowing risk estimation without references; when combined with text-based signals (confidence, perplexity, or entropy), it further improves hallucination risk estimation. Qualitative analysis highlights why gloss-free models are more susceptible to hallucinations. Taken together, our findings establish reliability as a practical and reusable tool for diagnosing hallucinations in SLT, and lay the groundwork for more robust hallucination detection in multimodal generation.

We present an empirical evaluation of various outputs generated by nine of the most widely-available large language models (LLMs). Our analysis is done with off-the-shelf, readily-available tools. We find a correlation between percentage of memorized text, percentage of unique text, and overall output quality, when measured with respect to output pathologies such as counterfactual and logically-flawed statements, and general failures like not staying on topic. Overall, 80.0% of the outputs evaluated contained memorized data, but outputs containing the most memorized content were also more likely to be considered of high quality. We discuss and evaluate mitigation strategies, showing that, in the models evaluated, the rate of memorized text being output is reduced. We conclude with a discussion on potential implications around what it means to learn, to memorize, and to evaluate quality text.

We introduce PerceptionRubrics, a rubric-based evaluation framework that addresses the gap between saturated benchmark scores and real-world brittleness. Shifting evaluation from holistic semantic matching to rigorous atomic auditing, PerceptionRubrics pairs 1,038 information-dense images with over 12,000 instance-specific rubrics. These criteria are derived from golden captions constructed via a novel Circular Peer-Review consensus pipeline and then distilled into a dual-stream system of Must-Right (essential facts) and Easy-Wrong (fine-grained details) rubrics. Crucially, PerceptionRubrics implements a Gated Scoring mechanism: unlike linear averages, failure on mandatory visual facts triggers sharp binary penalties. Extensive evaluation yields critical insights: (1) The Reliability Gap: models often verify fragmented elements correctly yet fail strict conjunctive constraints, exposing brittleness in dense domains; (2) Open-Closed Stratification: contrary to reasoning trends, we reveal a persistent 8% perception deficit between open-source and proprietary frontiers; and (3) Human-Aligned Rigor: our gated metrics substantially out-align conventional benchmarks, validating that strict perceptual fidelity is the prerequisite for reliable generation.

Benchmarks measure whether a model is correct. They do not measure whether a model is reliable. This distinction is largely academic for single-shot inference, but becomes critical for agentic AI systems, where a single rephrased prompt can trigger cascading failures in multi-step execution. Yet this form of instability is not captured by existing evaluations. Hallucinations live in variance: they arise when semantically equivalent prompts activate inconsistent internal pathways, producing divergent outputs. Consistent but incorrect outputs reflect bias or missing knowledge; confident guessing reflects calibration failure. Neither constitutes hallucination under this definition. When error is variance-dominated, reducing redundant pathways improves reliability without adding knowledge. We formalize this through Semantic Stability (SS), measured via Paraphrase Consistency (PC@k): generate k paraphrases, greedy decode each, compute mode agreement. SS is a diagnostic for variance-driven unreliability, not a method for improving correctness. We show that a dense Qwen3-0.6B agrees with itself only 23.8% of the time; at 32% sparsity, agreement jumps to 55.9%. A phase diagram reveals the sweet spot where variance reduction outpaces bias accumulation, and regimes where stability collapses onto wrong answers.

In this paper, we identify and characterize the emerging area of representation engineering (RepE), an approach to enhancing the transparency of AI systems that draws on insights from cognitive neuroscience. RepE places population-level representations, rather than neurons or circuits, at the center of analysis, equipping us with novel methods for monitoring and manipulating high-level cognitive phenomena in deep neural networks (DNNs). We provide baselines and an initial analysis of RepE techniques, showing that they offer simple yet effective solutions for improving our understanding and control of large language models. We showcase how these methods can provide traction on a wide range of safety-relevant problems, including honesty, harmlessness, power-seeking, and more, demonstrating the promise of top-down transparency research. We hope that this work catalyzes further exploration of RepE and fosters advancements in the transparency and safety of AI systems.

Previous work has shown correlations between the hidden states of large language models and fMRI brain responses, on language tasks. These correlations have been taken as evidence of the representational similarity of these models and brain states. This study tests whether these previous results are robust to several possible concerns. Specifically this study shows: (i) that the previous results are still found after dimensionality reduction, and thus are not attributable to the curse of dimensionality; (ii) that previous results are confirmed when using new measures of similarity; (iii) that correlations between brain representations and those from models are specific to models trained on human language; and (iv) that the results are dependent on the presence of positional encoding in the models. These results confirm and strengthen the results of previous research and contribute to the debate on the biological plausibility and interpretability of state-of-the-art large language models.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly used to evaluate outputs of other models, for image-to-text (I2T) tasks such as visual question answering, and text-to-image (T2I) generation tasks. Despite this growing reliance, the reliability of these Evaluator VLMs remains under explored. In this work, we systematically evaluate the reliability of Evaluator VLMs across both I2T and T2I tasks. We introduce targeted perturbations that degrade output quality along key error dimensions, including object hallucinations, spatial reasoning, factual grounding, and visual fidelity. These perturbations test whether Evaluator VLMs can reliably account for these quality degrading errors in their evaluations. Using a comprehensive benchmark of over 4000 perturbed instances spanning 40 perturbation dimensions, we evaluate 4 prominent VLMs using single-answer scoring, pairwise comparison, and reference-guided paradigms. Our findings reveal that current VLM evaluators exhibit substantial blind spots: they often fail to detect perturbed outputs - in some cases exceeding 50%, struggle particularly with fine-grained compositional and spatial errors, and are often insensitive to hallucinated content that contradicts the input image. Pairwise comparison proves more reliable, though failure rates persist. These results highlight the unreliable nature of current Evaluator VLMs and urge caution in their deployment for benchmarking and development decisions. Code and data have been made publicly available.

When deploying large language models (LLMs), it is important to ensure that these models are not only capable, but also reliable. Many benchmarks have been created to track LLMs' growing capabilities, however there has been no similar focus on measuring their reliability. To understand the potential ramifications of this gap, we investigate how well current benchmarks quantify model reliability. We find that pervasive label errors can compromise these evaluations, obscuring lingering model failures and hiding unreliable behavior. Motivated by this gap in the evaluation of reliability, we then propose the concept of so-called platinum benchmarks, i.e., benchmarks carefully curated to minimize label errors and ambiguity. As a first attempt at constructing such benchmarks, we revise examples from fifteen existing popular benchmarks. We evaluate a wide range of models on these platinum benchmarks and find that, indeed, frontier LLMs still exhibit failures on simple tasks such as elementary-level math word problems. Analyzing these failures further reveals previously unidentified patterns of problems on which frontier models consistently struggle. We provide code at https://github.com/MadryLab/platinum-benchmarks

We develop techniques to quantify the degree to which a given (training or testing) example is an outlier in the underlying distribution. We evaluate five methods to score examples in a dataset by how well-represented the examples are, for different plausible definitions of "well-represented", and apply these to four common datasets: MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet. Despite being independent approaches, we find all five are highly correlated, suggesting that the notion of being well-represented can be quantified. Among other uses, we find these methods can be combined to identify (a) prototypical examples (that match human expectations); (b) memorized training examples; and, (c) uncommon submodes of the dataset. Further, we show how we can utilize our metrics to determine an improved ordering for curriculum learning, and impact adversarial robustness. We release all metric values on training and test sets we studied.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Large Language Models (LLMs) do not differentially represent numbers, which are pervasive in text. In contrast, neuroscience research has identified distinct neural representations for numbers and words. In this work, we investigate how well popular LLMs capture the magnitudes of numbers (e.g., that 4 < 5) from a behavioral lens. Prior research on the representational capabilities of LLMs evaluates whether they show human-level performance, for instance, high overall accuracy on standard benchmarks. Here, we ask a different question, one inspired by cognitive science: How closely do the number representations of LLMscorrespond to those of human language users, who typically demonstrate the distance, size, and ratio effects? We depend on a linking hypothesis to map the similarities among the model embeddings of number words and digits to human response times. The results reveal surprisingly human-like representations across language models of different architectures, despite the absence of the neural circuitry that directly supports these representations in the human brain. This research shows the utility of understanding LLMs using behavioral benchmarks and points the way to future work on the number representations of LLMs and their cognitive plausibility.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are notorious for blending fact with fiction and generating non-factual content, known as hallucinations. To tackle this challenge, we propose an interactive system that helps users obtain insights into the reliability of the generated text. Our approach is based on the idea that the self-consistency of multiple samples generated by the same LLM relates to its confidence in individual claims in the generated texts. Using this idea, we design RELIC, an interactive system that enables users to investigate and verify semantic-level variations in multiple long-form responses. This allows users to recognize potentially inaccurate information in the generated text and make necessary corrections. From a user study with ten participants, we demonstrate that our approach helps users better verify the reliability of the generated text. We further summarize the design implications and lessons learned from this research for inspiring future studies on reliable human-LLM interactions.

Plenty of existing work has analyzed the abilities of the transformer architecture by describing its representational capacity with formal models of computation. However, the focus so far has been on analyzing the architecture in terms of language acceptance. We contend that this is an ill-suited problem in the study of language models (LMs), which are definitionally probability distributions over strings. In this paper, we focus on the relationship between transformer LMs and n-gram LMs, a simple and historically relevant class of language models. We show that transformer LMs using the hard or sparse attention mechanisms can exactly represent any n-gram LM, giving us a concrete lower bound on their probabilistic representational capacity. This provides a first step towards understanding the mechanisms that transformer LMs can use to represent probability distributions over strings.

Although demonstrating remarkable performance on reasoning tasks, Large Language Models (LLMs) still tend to fabricate unreliable responses when confronted with problems that are unsolvable or beyond their capability, severely undermining the reliability. Prior studies of LLM reliability have primarily focused on knowledge tasks to identify unanswerable questions, while mathematical reasoning tasks have remained unexplored due to the dearth of unsolvable math problems. To systematically investigate LLM reliability in mathematical reasoning tasks, we formulate the reliability evaluation for both solvable and unsolvable problems. We then develop a ReliableMath dataset which incorporates open-source solvable problems and high-quality unsolvable problems synthesized by our proposed construction workflow with human evaluations. Experiments are conducted on various LLMs with several key findings uncovered. LLMs fail to directly identify unsolvable problems and always generate fabricated responses. When instructing LLMs to indicate unsolvability using a reliable prompt, the reliability of larger-sized LLMs remains on solvable problems, but notably improves on unsolvable problems yet still falls short of solvable problems. However, small LLMs rarely show any progress despite employing reliable prompts. Therefore, we further propose an alignment strategy to enhance small LLMs' reliability, which can significantly improve LLM reliability performances on both in-domain and out-of-domain tasks.

We introduce a new test of how well language models capture meaning in children's books. Unlike standard language modelling benchmarks, it distinguishes the task of predicting syntactic function words from that of predicting lower-frequency words, which carry greater semantic content. We compare a range of state-of-the-art models, each with a different way of encoding what has been previously read. We show that models which store explicit representations of long-term contexts outperform state-of-the-art neural language models at predicting semantic content words, although this advantage is not observed for syntactic function words. Interestingly, we find that the amount of text encoded in a single memory representation is highly influential to the performance: there is a sweet-spot, not too big and not too small, between single words and full sentences that allows the most meaningful information in a text to be effectively retained and recalled. Further, the attention over such window-based memories can be trained effectively through self-supervision. We then assess the generality of this principle by applying it to the CNN QA benchmark, which involves identifying named entities in paraphrased summaries of news articles, and achieve state-of-the-art performance.

Research on Large Language Models (LLMs) studies output variation across generation, reasoning, alignment, and representational analysis, often under the umbrella of "diversity." Yet the terminology remains fragmented, largely because the normative objectives underlying tasks are rarely made explicit. We introduce the Magic, Madness, Heaven, Sin framework, which models output variation along a homogeneity-heterogeneity axis, where valuation is determined by the task and its normative objective. We organize tasks into four normative contexts: epistemic (factuality), interactional (user utility), societal (representation), and safety (robustness). For each, we examine the failure modes and vocabulary such as hallucination, mode collapse, bias, and erasure through which variation is studied. We apply the framework to analyze all pairwise cross-contextual interactions, revealing that optimizing for one objective, such as improving safety, can inadvertently harm demographic representation or creative diversity. We argue for context-aware evaluation of output variation, reframing it as a property shaped by task objectives rather than a model's intrinsic trait.

Despite their remarkable success and deployment across diverse workflows, language models sometimes produce untruthful responses. Our limited understanding of how truthfulness is mechanistically encoded within these models jeopardizes their reliability and safety. In this paper, we propose a method for identifying representations of truthfulness at the neuron level. We show that language models contain truth neurons, which encode truthfulness in a subject-agnostic manner. Experiments conducted across models of varying scales validate the existence of truth neurons, confirming that the encoding of truthfulness at the neuron level is a property shared by many language models. The distribution patterns of truth neurons over layers align with prior findings on the geometry of truthfulness. Selectively suppressing the activations of truth neurons found through the TruthfulQA dataset degrades performance both on TruthfulQA and on other benchmarks, showing that the truthfulness mechanisms are not tied to a specific dataset. Our results offer novel insights into the mechanisms underlying truthfulness in language models and highlight potential directions toward improving their trustworthiness and reliability.

Empirical evaluation serves as the primary compass guiding research progress in foundation models. Despite a large body of work focused on training frontier vision-language models (VLMs), approaches to their evaluation remain nascent. To guide their maturation, we propose three desiderata that evaluations should satisfy: (1) faithfulness to the modality and application, (2) discriminability between models of varying quality, and (3) efficiency in compute. Through this lens, we identify critical failure modes that violate faithfulness and discriminability, misrepresenting model capabilities: (i) multiple-choice formats reward guessing, poorly reflect downstream use cases, and saturate early as models improve; (ii) blindly solvable questions, which can be answered without images, constitute up to 70% of some evaluations; and (iii) mislabeled or ambiguous samples compromise up to 42% of examples in certain datasets. Regarding efficiency, the computational burden of evaluating frontier models has become prohibitive: by some accounts, nearly 20% of development compute is devoted to evaluation alone. Rather than discarding existing benchmarks, we curate them via transformation and filtering to maximize fidelity and discriminability. We find that converting multiple-choice questions to generative tasks reveals sharp capability drops of up to 35%. In addition, filtering blindly solvable and mislabeled samples improves discriminative power while simultaneously reducing computational cost. We release DatBench-Full, a cleaned evaluation suite of 33 datasets spanning nine VLM capabilities, and DatBench, a discriminative subset that achieves 13x average speedup (up to 50x) while closely matching the discriminative power of the original datasets. Our work outlines a path toward evaluation practices that are both rigorous and sustainable as VLMs continue to scale.

Modern generative search engines enhance the reliability of large language model (LLM) responses by providing cited evidence. However, evaluating the answer's attribution, i.e., whether every claim within the generated responses is fully supported by its cited evidence, remains an open problem. This verification, traditionally dependent on costly human evaluation, underscores the urgent need for automatic attribution evaluation methods. To bridge the gap in the absence of standardized benchmarks for these methods, we present AttributionBench, a comprehensive benchmark compiled from various existing attribution datasets. Our extensive experiments on AttributionBench reveal the challenges of automatic attribution evaluation, even for state-of-the-art LLMs. Specifically, our findings show that even a fine-tuned GPT-3.5 only achieves around 80% macro-F1 under a binary classification formulation. A detailed analysis of more than 300 error cases indicates that a majority of failures stem from the model's inability to process nuanced information, and the discrepancy between the information the model has access to and that human annotators do.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

Robust, faithful and harm-free pronoun use for individuals is an important goal for language models as their use increases, but prior work tends to study only one or two of these characteristics at a time. To measure progress towards the combined goal, we introduce the task of pronoun fidelity: given a context introducing a co-referring entity and pronoun, the task is to reuse the correct pronoun later. We present RUFF, a carefully-designed dataset of over 5 million instances to measure robust pronoun fidelity in English, and we evaluate 37 popular large language models across architectures (encoder-only, decoder-only and encoder-decoder) and scales (11M-70B parameters). When an individual is introduced with a pronoun, models can mostly faithfully reuse this pronoun in the next sentence, but they are significantly worse with she/her/her, singular they and neopronouns. Moreover, models are easily distracted by non-adversarial sentences discussing other people; even one additional sentence with a distractor pronoun causes accuracy to drop on average by 34%. Our results show that pronoun fidelity is neither robust, nor due to reasoning, in a simple, naturalistic setting where humans achieve nearly 100% accuracy. We encourage researchers to bridge the gaps we find and to carefully evaluate reasoning in settings where superficial repetition might inflate perceptions of model performance.

Recent literature shows that large-scale language modeling provides excellent reusable sentence representations with both recurrent and self-attentive architectures. However, there has been less clarity on the commonalities and differences in the representational properties induced by the two architectures. It also has been shown that visual information serves as one of the means for grounding sentence representations. In this paper, we present a meta-study assessing the representational quality of models where the training signal is obtained from different modalities, in particular, language modeling, image features prediction, and both textual and multimodal machine translation. We evaluate textual and visual features of sentence representations obtained using predominant approaches on image retrieval and semantic textual similarity. Our experiments reveal that on moderate-sized datasets, a sentence counterpart in a target language or visual modality provides much stronger training signal for sentence representation than language modeling. Importantly, we observe that while the Transformer models achieve superior machine translation quality, representations from the recurrent neural network based models perform significantly better over tasks focused on semantic relevance.

We conduct a systematic study of 18 widely used vision-language benchmarks and identify three major issues: 1) many items do not rely on visual cues and therefore fail to effectively measure multimodal understanding; 2) many items are already close to performance saturation for current LVLMs, which limits their discriminative power; 3) a small number of anomalous items affect the reliability of evaluation results. To this end, we propose MMGist, a curated benchmark that covers seven capability dimensions and contains 7,262 items. MMGist is constructed through a three-stage pipeline, which sequentially combines text-ablation filtering, cross-model saturation filtering, and anomaly detection filtering. We conduct extensive experiments on 27 leading LVLMs and compare MMGist with the raw pool of 23,250 items. The results show that MMGist preserves model rankings with high fidelity, with Spearman ρ= 0.98, while reducing evaluation items by 69\% and improving cross-model discrimination by 78\%. Further results indicate that Visual Logic remains a systematic weakness of current LVLMs, while knowledge-intensive dimensions such as Expert Knowledge dimensions remain important factors for distinguishing closed-source models from open-source models. These findings suggest that high-quality evaluation should prioritize visual dependency, discriminative power, and reliability, rather than simply pursuing benchmark scale.

Large language models perform strongly on benchmarks in mathematical reasoning, coding and document analysis, suggesting a broad ability to follow instructions. However, it remains unclear whether such success reflects general logical competence, repeated application of learned procedures, or pattern matching that mimics rule execution. We investigate this question by introducing Stable Counting Capacity, an assay in which models count repeated symbols until failure. The assay removes knowledge dependencies, semantics and ambiguity from evaluation, avoids lexical and tokenization confounds, and provides a direct measure of procedural reliability beyond standard knowledge-based benchmarks. Here we show, across more than 100 model variants, that stable counting capacity remains far below advertised context limits. Model behavior is consistent neither with open-ended logic nor with stable application of a learned rule, but instead with use of a finite set of count-like internal states, analogous to counting on fingers. Once this resource is exhausted, the appearance of rule following disappears and exact execution collapses into guessing, even with additional test-time compute. These findings show that fluent performance in current language models does not guarantee general, reliable rule following.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis suggests that representations from neural networks are converging to a common statistical model of reality. We show that the existing metrics used to measure representational similarity are confounded by network scale: increasing model depth or width can systematically inflate representational similarity scores. To correct these effects, we introduce a permutation-based null-calibration framework that transforms any representational similarity metric into a calibrated score with statistical guarantees. We revisit the Platonic Representation Hypothesis with our calibration framework, which reveals a nuanced picture: the apparent convergence reported by global spectral measures largely disappears after calibration, while local neighborhood similarity, but not local distances, retains significant agreement across different modalities. Based on these findings, we propose the Aristotelian Representation Hypothesis: representations in neural networks are converging to shared local neighborhood relationships.

Large language models (LLMs) are regularly evaluated using benchmark datasets. But what justifies making inferences about an LLM's capabilities based on its answers to a curated set of questions? This paper first introduces a formal framework to address this question. The key is to note that the benchmarks used to test LLMs -- such as AP exams -- are also those used to test people. However, this raises an implication: these benchmarks are only valid tests if LLMs misunderstand concepts in ways that mirror human misunderstandings. Otherwise, success on benchmarks only demonstrates potemkin understanding: the illusion of understanding driven by answers irreconcilable with how any human would interpret a concept. We present two procedures for quantifying the existence of potemkins: one using a specially designed benchmark in three domains, the other using a general procedure that provides a lower-bound on their prevalence. We find that potemkins are ubiquitous across models, tasks, and domains. We also find that these failures reflect not just incorrect understanding, but deeper internal incoherence in concept representations.

Large Language Models fail at implicit multi-hop reasoning: a model answers "When was X born?" and "Who is Y's closest friend?" correctly but fails on "When was Y's closest friend born?" in a single forward pass, even when both facts are perfectly memorized and individually retrievable. We study this failure in a controlled natural language setting with a strict separation between individuals exposed to compositional contexts during pretraining and those that never appear in any such context. We confirm that compositional failure persists even at 97% 1-hop accuracy, establishing the gap as a pretraining failure rather than a knowledge absence. We propose and test nine data-centric augmentation formats and find that compositional pretraining transfers to unseen questions for exposed individuals, but never to individuals absent from compositional pretraining, suggesting that exposure to compositional contexts during pretraining is a necessary condition for implicit multi-hop reasoning.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established standardized evaluation benchmarks as the primary instrument for model comparison. Yet, their reliability is increasingly questioned due to sensitivity to shallow variations in input prompts. This paper examines how controlled, truth-conditionally equivalent lexical and syntactic perturbations affect the absolute performance and relative ranking of 23 contemporary LLMs across three benchmarks: MMLU, SQuAD, and AMEGA. We employ two linguistically principled pipelines to generate meaning-preserving variations: one performing synonym substitution for lexical changes, and another using dependency parsing to determine applicable syntactic transformations. Results show that lexical perturbations consistently induce substantial, statistically significant performance degradation across nearly all models and tasks, while syntactic perturbations have more heterogeneous effects, occasionally improving results. Both perturbation types destabilize model leaderboards on complex tasks. Furthermore, model robustness did not consistently scale with model size, revealing strong task dependence. Overall, the findings suggest that LLMs rely more on surface-level lexical patterns than on abstract linguistic competence, underscoring the need for robustness testing as a standard component of LLM evaluation.

Reliable application of machine learning is of primary importance to the practical deployment of deep learning methods. A fundamental challenge is that models are often unreliable due to overconfidence. In this paper, we estimate a model's reliability by measuring the agreement between its latent space, and the latent space of a foundation model. However, it is challenging to measure the agreement between two different latent spaces due to their incoherence, \eg, arbitrary rotations and different dimensionality. To overcome this incoherence issue, we design a neighborhood agreement measure between latent spaces and find that this agreement is surprisingly well-correlated with the reliability of a model's predictions. Further, we show that fusing neighborhood agreement into a model's predictive confidence in a post-hoc way significantly improves its reliability. Theoretical analysis and extensive experiments on failure detection across various datasets verify the effectiveness of our method on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution settings.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) are increasingly applied to scientific research, yet it remains unclear whether they can reliably understand and reason over the multimodal complexity of papers. A central challenge lies in detecting and resolving inconsistencies across text, figures, tables, and equations, issues that are often subtle, domain-specific, and ultimately undermine clarity, reproducibility, and trust. Existing benchmarks overlook this issue, either isolating single modalities or relying on synthetic errors that fail to capture real-world complexity. We introduce PRISMM-Bench (Peer-Review-sourced Inconsistency Set for Multimodal Models), the first benchmark grounded in real reviewer-flagged inconsistencies in scientific papers. Through a multi-stage pipeline of review mining, LLM-assisted filtering and human verification, we curate 262 inconsistencies from 242 papers. Based on this set, we design three tasks, namely inconsistency identification, remedy and pair matching, which assess a model's capacity to detect, correct, and reason over inconsistencies across different modalities. Furthermore, to address the notorious problem of choice-only shortcuts in multiple-choice evaluation, where models exploit answer patterns without truly understanding the question, we further introduce structured JSON-based answer representations that minimize linguistic biases by reducing reliance on superficial stylistic cues. We benchmark 21 leading LMMs, including large open-weight models (GLM-4.5V 106B, InternVL3 78B) and proprietary models (Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-5 with high reasoning). Results reveal strikingly low performance (26.1-54.2%), underscoring the challenge of multimodal scientific reasoning and motivating progress towards trustworthy scientific assistants.

Despite their recent successes, Transformer-based large language models show surprising failure modes. A well-known example of such failure modes is their inability to length-generalize: solving problem instances at inference time that are longer than those seen during training. In this work, we further explore the root cause of this failure by performing a detailed analysis of model behaviors on the simple parity task. Our analysis suggests that length generalization failures are intricately related to a model's inability to perform random memory accesses within its context window. We present supporting evidence for this hypothesis by demonstrating the effectiveness of methodologies that circumvent the need for indexing or that enable random token access indirectly, through content-based addressing. We further show where and how the failure to perform random memory access manifests through attention map visualizations.

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

We consider representation misdirection (RM), a class of LLM unlearning methods that achieves forgetting by manipulating the forget-representations, that is, latent representations of forget samples. Despite being important, the roles of target vectors used in RM, however, remain underexplored. Here, we approach and revisit RM through the lens of the linear representation hypothesis. Specifically, if one can somehow identify a one-dimensional representation corresponding to a high-level concept, the linear representation hypothesis enables linear operations on this concept vector within the forget-representation space. Under this view, we hypothesize that, beyond forgetting, machine unlearning elicits controllable side behaviors and stronger side capabilities corresponding to the high-level concept. Our hypothesis is empirically validated across a wide range of tasks, including behavioral control (e.g., controlling unlearned models' truth, sentiment, and refusal) and capability enhancement (e.g., improving unlearned models' in-context learning capability). Our findings reveal that this fairly attractive phenomenon could be either a hidden risk if misused or a mechanism that can be harnessed for developing models that require stronger capabilities and controllable behaviors.

Through a controlled study, we identify a systematic deficiency in the multimodal grounding of Vision Language Models (VLMs). While VLMs can recall factual associations when provided a textual reference to an entity; their ability to do so is significantly diminished when the reference is visual instead. Forcing VLMs to rely on image representations of an entity halves their ability to recall factual knowledge, suggesting that VLMs struggle to link their internal knowledge of an entity with its image representation. We show that such linking failures are correlated with the expression of distinct patterns in model internal states, and that probes on these internal states achieve over 92% accuracy at flagging cases where the VLM response is unreliable. These probes can be applied, without retraining, to identify when a VLM will fail to correctly answer a question that requires an understanding of multimodal input. When used to facilitate selective prediction on a visual question answering task, the probes increase coverage by 7.87% (absolute) while also reducing the risk of error by 0.9% (absolute). Addressing the systematic, detectable deficiency is an important avenue in language grounding, and we provide informed recommendations for future directions.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are nondeterministic, the same input can generate different outputs, some of which may be incorrect or hallucinated. If run again, the LLM may correct itself and produce the correct answer. Unfortunately, most LLM-powered systems resort to single results which, correct or not, users accept. Having the LLM produce multiple outputs may help identify disagreements or alternatives. However, it is not obvious how the user will interpret conflicts or inconsistencies. To this end, we investigate how users perceive the AI model and comprehend the generated information when they receive multiple, potentially inconsistent, outputs. Through a preliminary study, we identified five types of output inconsistencies. Based on these categories, we conducted a study (N=252) in which participants were given one or more LLM-generated passages to an information-seeking question. We found that inconsistency within multiple LLM-generated outputs lowered the participants' perceived AI capacity, while also increasing their comprehension of the given information. Specifically, we observed that this positive effect of inconsistencies was most significant for participants who read two passages, compared to those who read three. Based on these findings, we present design implications that, instead of regarding LLM output inconsistencies as a drawback, we can reveal the potential inconsistencies to transparently indicate the limitations of these models and promote critical LLM usage.

The ability to translate diverse patterns of inputs into structured patterns of behavior has been thought to rest on both humans' and machines' ability to learn robust representations of relevant concepts. The rapid advancement of transformer-based large language models (LLMs) has led to a diversity of computational ingredients -- architectures, fine tuning methods, and training datasets among others -- but it remains unclear which of these ingredients are most crucial for building models that develop human-like representations. Further, most current LLM benchmarks are not suited to measuring representational alignment between humans and models, making benchmark scores unreliable for assessing if current LLMs are making progress towards becoming useful cognitive models. We address these limitations by first evaluating a set of over 70 models that widely vary in their computational ingredients on a triplet similarity task, a method well established in the cognitive sciences for measuring human conceptual representations, using concepts from the THINGS database. Comparing human and model representations, we find that models that undergo instruction-finetuning and which have larger dimensionality of attention heads are among the most human aligned, while multimodal pretraining and parameter size have limited bearing on alignment. Correlations between alignment scores and scores on existing benchmarks reveal that while some benchmarks (e.g., MMLU) are better suited than others (e.g., MUSR) for capturing representational alignment, no existing benchmark is capable of fully accounting for the variance of alignment scores, demonstrating their insufficiency in capturing human-AI alignment. Taken together, our findings help highlight the computational ingredients most essential for advancing LLMs towards models of human conceptual representation and address a key benchmarking gap in LLM evaluation.

Modelling compositional meaning for sentences using empirical distributional methods has been a challenge for computational linguists. We implement the abstract categorical model of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) using data from the BNC and evaluate it. The implementation is based on unsupervised learning of matrices for relational words and applying them to the vectors of their arguments. The evaluation is based on the word disambiguation task developed by Mitchell and Lapata (2008) for intransitive sentences, and on a similar new experiment designed for transitive sentences. Our model matches the results of its competitors in the first experiment, and betters them in the second. The general improvement in results with increase in syntactic complexity showcases the compositional power of our model.

We propose Representational Effective Theory (RET), a framework for describing large language model computation in terms of learned macrostates rather than microscopic details. RET learns these macrostates from hidden-state trajectories using a BYOL/JEPA-style self-supervised objective, coarse-graining activations into macrovariables that preserve higher-level structure relevant for prediction and interpretation. We evaluate whether these macrovariables are practically relevant for interpretability: RET yields temporally consistent states that reveal "mental-state" trajectories of reasoning, capture high-level semantic structure, support early prediction of behavioral outcomes such as sycophancy, and provide causal handles for steering generations toward interpretable computational phases. Together, these results suggest that LLM computation admits useful effective descriptions via RET: high-level, dynamically meaningful variables that support interpretation, prediction, and intervention.

Existing evaluation methods largely rely on clean, static benchmarks, which can overestimate true model performance by failing to capture the noise and variability inherent in real-world user inputs. This is especially true for language models, which can face human-generated text queries containing mistakes, typos, or alternative ways of phrasing the same question. In this work, we introduce a theoretical framework for quantifying model sensitivity to prompt variants, or brittleness, that can enable us to disentangle data-induced difficulty from prompt-related variability. Using this framework, we design a novel evaluation pipeline, Brittlebench, to holistically evaluate the sensitivity of frontier models. We apply semantics-preserving perturbations to a suite of popular benchmarks, and observe model performance to degrade as much as 12%. However, these perturbations do not affect all models equally: even a single perturbation alters the relative ranking of models in 63% of cases, impacting conclusions about comparative model performance. Decomposing the total variance of both state-of-the-art open-weight and commercial models, we find that semantics-preserving input perturbations can account for up to half of the performance variance for a given model. Brittlebench highlights the need for more robust evaluations and models, and allows us to systematically understand model brittleness.

We investigate the internal behavior of Transformer-based Large Language Models (LLMs) when they generate factually incorrect text. We propose modeling factual queries as Constraint Satisfaction Problems and use this framework to investigate how the model interacts internally with factual constraints. Specifically, we discover a strong positive relation between the model's attention to constraint tokens and the factual accuracy of its responses. In our curated suite of 11 datasets with over 40,000 prompts, we study the task of predicting factual errors with the Llama-2 family across all scales (7B, 13B, 70B). We propose SAT Probe, a method probing self-attention patterns, that can predict constraint satisfaction and factual errors, and allows early error identification. The approach and findings demonstrate how using the mechanistic understanding of factuality in LLMs can enhance reliability.

In this paper, we introduce a new distributional method for modeling predicate-argument thematic fit judgments. We use a syntax-based DSM to build a prototypical representation of verb-specific roles: for every verb, we extract the most salient second order contexts for each of its roles (i.e. the most salient dimensions of typical role fillers), and then we compute thematic fit as a weighted overlap between the top features of candidate fillers and role prototypes. Our experiments show that our method consistently outperforms a baseline re-implementing a state-of-the-art system, and achieves better or comparable results to those reported in the literature for the other unsupervised systems. Moreover, it provides an explicit representation of the features characterizing verb-specific semantic roles.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved unprecedented performance on many complex tasks, being able, for example, to answer questions on almost any topic. However, they struggle with other simple tasks, such as counting the occurrences of letters in a word, as illustrated by the inability of many LLMs to count the number of "r" letters in "strawberry". Several works have studied this problem and linked it to the tokenization used by LLMs, to the intrinsic limitations of the attention mechanism, or to the lack of character-level training data. In this paper, we conduct an experimental study to evaluate the relations between the LLM errors when counting letters with 1) the frequency of the word and its components in the training dataset and 2) the complexity of the counting operation. We present a comprehensive analysis of the errors of LLMs when counting letter occurrences by evaluating a representative group of models over a large number of words. The results show a number of consistent trends in the models evaluated: 1) models are capable of recognizing the letters but not counting them; 2) the frequency of the word and tokens in the word does not have a significant impact on the LLM errors; 3) there is a positive correlation of letter frequency with errors, more frequent letters tend to have more counting errors, 4) the errors show a strong correlation with the number of letters or tokens in a word and 5) the strongest correlation occurs with the number of letters with counts larger than one, with most models being unable to correctly count words in which letters appear more than twice.

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Interestingly, LLMs yet struggle with some basic tasks that humans find trivial to handle, e.g., counting the number of character r's in the word "strawberry". There are several popular conjectures (e.g., tokenization, architecture and training data) regarding the reason for deficiency of LLMs in simple word-based counting problems, sharing the similar belief that such failure stems from model pretraining hence probably inevitable during deployment. In this paper, we carefully design multiple evaluation settings to investigate validity of prevalent conjectures. Meanwhile, we measure transferability of advanced mathematical and coding reasoning capabilities from specialized LLMs to simple counting tasks. Although specialized LLMs suffer from counting problems as well, we find conjectures about inherent deficiency of LLMs invalid and further seek opportunities to elicit knowledge and capabilities from LLMs that are beneficial to counting tasks. Compared with strategies such as finetuning and in-context learning that are commonly adopted to enhance performance on new or challenging tasks, we show that engaging reasoning is the most robust and efficient way to help LLMs better perceive tasks with more accurate responses. We hope our conjecture validation design could provide insights into the study of future critical failure modes of LLMs. Based on challenges in transferring advanced capabilities to much simpler tasks, we call for more attention to model capability acquisition and evaluation. We also highlight the importance of cultivating consciousness of "reasoning before responding" during model pretraining.

A key requirement for the development of effective learning representations is their evaluation and comparison to representations we know to be effective. In natural sensory domains, the community has viewed the brain as a source of inspiration and as an implicit benchmark for success. However, it has not been possible to directly test representational learning algorithms directly against the representations contained in neural systems. Here, we propose a new benchmark for visual representations on which we have directly tested the neural representation in multiple visual cortical areas in macaque (utilizing data from [Majaj et al., 2012]), and on which any computer vision algorithm that produces a feature space can be tested. The benchmark measures the effectiveness of the neural or machine representation by computing the classification loss on the ordered eigendecomposition of a kernel matrix [Montavon et al., 2011]. In our analysis we find that the neural representation in visual area IT is superior to visual area V4. In our analysis of representational learning algorithms, we find that three-layer models approach the representational performance of V4 and the algorithm in [Le et al., 2012] surpasses the performance of V4. Impressively, we find that a recent supervised algorithm [Krizhevsky et al., 2012] achieves performance comparable to that of IT for an intermediate level of image variation difficulty, and surpasses IT at a higher difficulty level. We believe this result represents a major milestone: it is the first learning algorithm we have found that exceeds our current estimate of IT representation performance. We hope that this benchmark will assist the community in matching the representational performance of visual cortex and will serve as an initial rallying point for further correspondence between representations derived in brains and machines.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

In Natural Language Processing (NLP), the Elo rating system, originally designed for ranking players in dynamic games such as chess, is increasingly being used to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) through "A vs B" paired comparisons. However, while popular, the system's suitability for assessing entities with constant skill levels, such as LLMs, remains relatively unexplored. We study two fundamental axioms that evaluation methods should adhere to: reliability and transitivity. We conduct extensive evaluation of Elo behaviour, illustrating that individual Elo computations exhibit volatility and delving into the impact of varying the Elo rating system's hyperparameters. We show that these axioms are not always satisfied raising questions about the reliability of current comparative evaluations of LLMs. If the current use of Elo scores is intended to substitute the costly head-to-head comparison of LLMs, it is crucial to ensure the ranking is as robust as possible. Guided by the axioms, our findings offer concrete guidelines for enhancing the reliability of LLM evaluation methods, suggesting a need for reassessment of existing comparative approaches.

Post-training alignment often reduces LLM diversity, leading to a phenomenon known as mode collapse. Unlike prior work that attributes this effect to algorithmic limitations, we identify a fundamental, pervasive data-level driver: typicality bias in preference data, whereby annotators systematically favor familiar text as a result of well-established findings in cognitive psychology. We formalize this bias theoretically, verify it on preference datasets empirically, and show that it plays a central role in mode collapse. Motivated by this analysis, we introduce Verbalized Sampling, a simple, training-free prompting strategy to circumvent mode collapse. VS prompts the model to verbalize a probability distribution over a set of responses (e.g., ``Generate 5 jokes about coffee and their corresponding probabilities''). Comprehensive experiments show that VS significantly improves performance across creative writing (poems, stories, jokes), dialogue simulation, open-ended QA, and synthetic data generation, without sacrificing factual accuracy and safety. For instance, in creative writing, VS increases diversity by 1.6-2.1x over direct prompting. We further observe an emergent trend that more capable models benefit more from VS. In sum, our work provides a new data-centric perspective on mode collapse and a practical inference-time remedy that helps unlock pre-trained generative diversity.

We evaluate how well Large Language Models (LLMs) latently recall and compose facts to answer multi-hop queries like "In the year Scarlett Johansson was born, the Summer Olympics were hosted in the country of". One major challenge in evaluating this ability is that LLMs may have developed shortcuts by encounters of the head entity "Scarlett Johansson" and the answer entity "United States" in the same training sequences or merely guess the answer based on frequency-based priors. To prevent shortcuts, we exclude test queries where the head and answer entities co-appear in pretraining corpora. Through careful selection of relations and facts and systematic removal of cases where models might guess answers or exploit partial matches, we construct an evaluation dataset SOCRATES (ShOrtCut-fRee lATent rEaSoning). We observe that LLMs demonstrate promising latent multi-hop reasoning abilities without exploiting shortcuts, but only for certain types of queries. For queries requiring latent recall of countries as the intermediate answer, the best models achieve 80% latent composability, but this drops to just 5% for the recall of years. Comparisons with Chain-of-Thought composability highlight a significant gap between the ability of models to reason latently versus explicitly. Analysis reveals that latent representations of the intermediate answer are constructed more often in queries with higher latent composability, and shows the emergence of latent multi-hop reasoning during pretraining.

Evaluating the capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in following instructions has heavily relied on a powerful LLM as the judge, introducing unresolved biases that deviate the judgments from human judges. In this work, we reevaluate various choices for automatic evaluation on a wide range of instruction-following tasks. We experiment with methods that leverage human-written responses and observe that they enhance the reliability of automatic evaluations across a wide range of tasks, resulting in up to a 3.2% improvement in agreement with human judges. We also discovered that human-written responses offer an orthogonal perspective to model-generated responses in following instructions and should be used as an additional context when comparing model responses. Based on these observations, we develop a new evaluation benchmark, Human Response-Guided Evaluation of Instruction Following (HREF), comprising 4,258 samples across 11 task categories with a composite evaluation setup, employing a composite evaluation setup that selects the most reliable method for each category. In addition to providing reliable evaluation, HREF emphasizes individual task performance and is free from contamination. Finally, we study the impact of key design choices in HREF, including the size of the evaluation set, the judge model, the baseline model, and the prompt template. We host a live leaderboard that evaluates LLMs on the private evaluation set of HREF.

Running LLMs with extended reasoning on every problem is expensive, but determining which inputs actually require additional compute remains challenging. We investigate whether their own likelihood of success is recoverable from their internal representations before generation, and if this signal can guide more efficient inference. We train linear probes on pre-generation activations to predict policy-specific success on math and coding tasks, substantially outperforming surface features such as question length and TF-IDF. Using E2H-AMC, which provides both human and model performance on identical problems, we show that models encode a model-specific notion of difficulty that is distinct from human difficulty, and that this distinction increases with extended reasoning. Leveraging these probes, we demonstrate that routing queries across a pool of models can exceed the best-performing model whilst reducing inference cost by up to 70\% on MATH, showing that internal representations enable practical efficiency gains even when they diverge from human intuitions about difficulty. Our code is available at: https://github.com/KabakaWilliam/llms_know_difficulty

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis suggests that neural networks trained on different modalities (e.g., text and images) align and eventually converge toward the same representation of reality. If true, this has significant implications for whether modality choice matters at all. We show that the experimental evidence for this hypothesis is fragile and depends critically on the evaluation regime. Alignment is measured using mutual nearest neighbors on small datasets (approx1K samples) and degrades substantially as the dataset is scaled to millions of samples. The alignment that remains between model representations reflects coarse semantic overlap rather than consistent fine-grained structure. Moreover, the evaluations in Huh et al. are done in a one-to-one image-caption setting, a constraint that breaks down in realistic many-to-many settings and further reduces alignment. We also find that the reported trend of stronger language models increasingly aligning with vision does not appear to hold for newer models. Overall, our findings suggest that the current evidence for cross-modal representational convergence is considerably weaker than subsequent works have taken it to be. Models trained on different modalities may learn equally rich representations of the world, just not the same one.

Mechanistic interpretability identifies internal circuits responsible for model behaviors, yet translating these findings into human-understandable explanations remains an open problem. We present a pipeline that bridges circuit-level analysis and natural language explanations by (i) identifying causally important attention heads via activation patching, (ii) generating explanations using both template-based and LLM-based methods, and (iii) evaluating faithfulness using ERASER-style metrics adapted for circuit-level attribution. We evaluate on the Indirect Object Identification (IOI) task in GPT-2 Small (124M parameters), identifying six attention heads accounting for 61.4% of the logit difference. Our circuit-based explanations achieve 100% sufficiency but only 22% comprehensiveness, revealing distributed backup mechanisms. LLM-generated explanations outperform template baselines by 64% on quality metrics. We find no correlation (r = 0.009) between model confidence and explanation faithfulness, and identify three failure categories explaining when explanations diverge from mechanisms.

NLP models have progressed drastically in recent years, according to numerous datasets proposed to evaluate performance. Questions remain, however, about how particular dataset design choices may impact the conclusions we draw about model capabilities. In this work, we investigate this question in the domain of compositional generalization. We examine the performance of six modeling approaches across 4 datasets, split according to 8 compositional splitting strategies, ranking models by 18 compositional generalization splits in total. Our results show that: i) the datasets, although all designed to evaluate compositional generalization, rank modeling approaches differently; ii) datasets generated by humans align better with each other than they with synthetic datasets, or than synthetic datasets among themselves; iii) generally, whether datasets are sampled from the same source is more predictive of the resulting model ranking than whether they maintain the same interpretation of compositionality; and iv) which lexical items are used in the data can strongly impact conclusions. Overall, our results demonstrate that much work remains to be done when it comes to assessing whether popular evaluation datasets measure what they intend to measure, and suggest that elucidating more rigorous standards for establishing the validity of evaluation sets could benefit the field.

We investigate whether synthetic question-answer (QA) data generated by large language models (LLMs) can serve as an effective proxy for human-labeled benchmarks when such data is unavailable. We assess the reliability of synthetic benchmarks across two experiments: one varying retriever parameters while keeping the generator fixed, and another varying the generator with fixed retriever parameters. Across four datasets, of which two open-domain and two proprietary, we find that synthetic benchmarks reliably rank the RAGs varying in terms of retriever configuration, aligning well with human-labeled benchmark baselines. However, they fail to produce consistent RAG rankings when comparing generator architectures. The breakdown possibly arises from a combination of task mismatch between the synthetic and human benchmarks, and stylistic bias favoring certain generators.

Large language models often generate factually incorrect outputs, motivating efforts to detect the truthfulness of their content. Most existing approaches rely on training probes over internal activations, but these methods suffer from scalability and generalization issues. A recent training-free method, NoVo, addresses this challenge by exploiting statistical patterns from the model itself. However, it focuses exclusively on attention mechanisms, potentially overlooking the MLP module-a core component of Transformer models known to support factual recall. In this paper, we show that certain value vectors within MLP modules exhibit truthfulness-related statistical patterns. Building on this insight, we propose TruthV, a simple and interpretable training-free method that detects content truthfulness by leveraging these value vectors. On the NoVo benchmark, TruthV significantly outperforms both NoVo and log-likelihood baselines, demonstrating that MLP modules-despite being neglected in prior training-free efforts-encode rich and useful signals for truthfulness detection. These findings offer new insights into how truthfulness is internally represented in LLMs and motivate further research on scalable and interpretable truthfulness detection.

Topic model evaluation, like evaluation of other unsupervised methods, can be contentious. However, the field has coalesced around automated estimates of topic coherence, which rely on the frequency of word co-occurrences in a reference corpus. Contemporary neural topic models surpass classical ones according to these metrics. At the same time, topic model evaluation suffers from a validation gap: automated coherence, developed for classical models, has not been validated using human experimentation for neural models. In addition, a meta-analysis of topic modeling literature reveals a substantial standardization gap in automated topic modeling benchmarks. To address the validation gap, we compare automated coherence with the two most widely accepted human judgment tasks: topic rating and word intrusion. To address the standardization gap, we systematically evaluate a dominant classical model and two state-of-the-art neural models on two commonly used datasets. Automated evaluations declare a winning model when corresponding human evaluations do not, calling into question the validity of fully automatic evaluations independent of human judgments.

Measuring the coherence of text is a vital aspect of evaluating the quality of written content. Recent advancements in neural coherence modeling have demonstrated their efficacy in capturing entity coreference and discourse relations, thereby enhancing coherence evaluation. However, many existing methods heavily depend on static embeddings or focus narrowly on nearby context, constraining their capacity to measure the overarching coherence of long texts. In this paper, we posit that coherent texts inherently manifest a sequential and cohesive interplay among sentences, effectively conveying the central theme, purpose, or standpoint. To explore this abstract relationship, we introduce the "BBScore," a novel reference-free metric grounded in Brownian bridge theory for assessing text coherence. Our findings showcase that when synergized with a simple additional classification component, this metric attains a performance level comparable to state-of-the-art techniques on standard artificial discrimination tasks. We also establish in downstream tasks that this metric effectively differentiates between human-written documents and text generated by large language models under a specific domain. Furthermore, we illustrate the efficacy of this approach in detecting written styles attributed to diverse large language models, underscoring its potential for generalizability. In summary, we present a novel Brownian bridge coherence metric capable of measuring both local and global text coherence, while circumventing the need for end-to-end model training. This flexibility allows for its application in various downstream tasks.

As we consider entrusting Large Language Models (LLMs) with key societal and decision-making roles, measuring their alignment with human cognition becomes critical. This requires methods that can assess how these systems represent information and facilitate comparisons to human understanding across diverse tasks. To meet this need, we developed Turing Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA), a method that uses pairwise similarity ratings to quantify alignment between AIs and humans. We tested this approach on semantic alignment across text and image modalities, measuring how different Large Language and Vision Language Model (LLM and VLM) similarity judgments aligned with human responses at both group and individual levels. GPT-4o showed the strongest alignment with human performance among the models we tested, particularly when leveraging its text processing capabilities rather than image processing, regardless of the input modality. However, no model we studied adequately captured the inter-individual variability observed among human participants. This method helped uncover certain hyperparameters and prompts that could steer model behavior to have more or less human-like qualities at an inter-individual or group level. Turing RSA enables the efficient and flexible quantification of human-AI alignment and complements existing accuracy-based benchmark tasks. We demonstrate its utility across multiple modalities (words, sentences, images) for understanding how LLMs encode knowledge and for examining representational alignment with human cognition.

Large language models (LLMs) often present answers with high apparent confidence despite lacking an explicit mechanism for reasoning about certainty or truth. While existing benchmarks primarily evaluate single-turn accuracy, truthfulness or confidence calibration, they do not capture how models behave when their responses are challenged in interactive settings. We introduce the Certainty Robustness Benchmark, a two-turn evaluation framework that measures how LLMs balance stability and adaptability under self-challenging prompts such as uncertainty ("Are you sure?") and explicit contradiction ("You are wrong!"), alongside numeric confidence elicitation. Using 200 reasoning and mathematics questions from LiveBench, we evaluate four state-of-the-art LLMs and distinguish between justified self-corrections and unjustified answer changes. Our results reveal substantial differences in interactive reliability that are not explained by baseline accuracy alone: some models abandon correct answers under conversational pressure, while others demonstrate strong resistance to challenge and better alignment between confidence and correctness. These findings identify certainty robustness as a distinct and critical dimension of LLM evaluation, with important implications for alignment, trustworthiness and real-world deployment.

We investigate how self-referential inputs alter the internal matrix dynamics of large language models. Measuring 106 scalar metrics across up to 7 analysis passes on four models from three architecture families -- Qwen3-VL-8B, Llama-3.2-11B, Llama-3.3-70B, and Gemma-2-9B -- over 300 prompts in a 14-level hierarchy at three temperatures (T in {0.0, 0.3, 0.7}), we find that self-reference alone is not destabilizing: grounded self-referential statements and meta-cognitive prompts are markedly more stable than paradoxical self-reference on key collapse-related metrics, and on several such metrics can be as stable as factual controls. Instability concentrates in prompts inducing non-closing truth recursion (NCTR) -- truth-value computations with no finite-depth resolution. NCTR prompts produce anomalously elevated attention effective rank -- indicating attention reorganization with global dispersion rather than simple concentration collapse -- and key metrics reach Cohen's d = 3.14 (attention effective rank) to 3.52 (variance kurtosis) vs. stable self-reference in the 70B model; 281/397 metric-model combinations differentiate NCTR from stable self-reference after FDR correction (q < 0.05), 198 with |d| > 0.8. Per-layer SVD confirms disruption at every sampled layer (d > +1.0 in all three models analyzed), ruling out aggregation artifacts. A classifier achieves AUC 0.81-0.90; 30 minimal pairs yield 42/387 significant combinations; 43/106 metrics replicate across all four models. We connect these observations to three classical matrix-semigroup problems and propose, as a conjecture, that NCTR forces finite-depth transformers toward dynamical regimes where these problems concentrate. NCTR prompts also produce elevated contradictory output (+34-56 percentage points vs. controls), suggesting practical relevance for understanding self-referential failure modes.

We identify intrinsic limitations of Rotary Positional Embeddings (RoPE) in Transformer-based long-context language models. Our theoretical analysis abstracts away from the specific content of the context and depends only on its length. We prove that as context length increases, RoPE-based attention becomes unpredictable and loses two properties that are central to its effectiveness. First, it loses its locality bias: RoPE is no more likely to favor nearer positions than substantially farther ones. Second, it loses consistency in token relevance: a key vector that receives a higher attention score than an alternative at one position may receive a lower score at another. In both cases, the probability of failure approaches 0.5, no better than random guessing. We further prove that the attention score can remain unchanged when a key token is moved to a different position, or even replaced by a different token, indicating a failure to distinguish positions or tokens. Adjusting the RoPE base trades off distinguishing positions against distinguishing tokens but cannot preserve both at the same time. Increasing the RoPE base hyperparameter, a common practice in today's long-context models, helps distinguish different tokens, but inevitably sacrifices the ability to distinguish positions. Our empirical analysis shows that multi-head, multi-layer architectures are insufficient to overcome these limitations. Our findings suggest that fundamentally new mechanisms for encoding position and token order may be needed in future Transformer long-context language models.

Instruction embedding models have become common among state-of-the-art models, however are evaluated using a single prompt per task. The single-point evaluation ignores a main problem of the instruction-based approach namely: sensitivity to the phrasing of the instruction. We present an empirical study of prompt sensitivity across 6 embedding models, 11 datasets, and 15 task-specific prompts per dataset, a total of 990. We show that reported scores misrepresent the distribution of scores over plausible prompts. The default prompt can both systematically understate or overstate performance. Furthermore, we show that the leaderboard ranking is not robust to prompt selection: by choosing prompts favorably, any model in our study can be promoted to first place. Our findings suggest that single-prompt evaluation is insufficient for instruction-tuned embedding models and that benchmarks should incorporate prompt robustness, either by evaluating over multiple prompts or by reporting sensitivity alongside point estimates.

With the widespread application of Large Language Models (LLMs) to various domains, concerns regarding the trustworthiness of LLMs in safety-critical scenarios have been raised, due to their unpredictable tendency to hallucinate and generate misinformation. Existing LLMs do not have an inherent functionality to provide the users with an uncertainty/confidence metric for each response it generates, making it difficult to evaluate trustworthiness. Although several studies aim to develop uncertainty quantification methods for LLMs, they have fundamental limitations, such as being restricted to classification tasks, requiring additional training and data, considering only lexical instead of semantic information, and being prompt-wise but not response-wise. A new framework is proposed in this paper to address these issues. Semantic density extracts uncertainty/confidence information for each response from a probability distribution perspective in semantic space. It has no restriction on task types and is "off-the-shelf" for new models and tasks. Experiments on seven state-of-the-art LLMs, including the latest Llama 3 and Mixtral-8x22B models, on four free-form question-answering benchmarks demonstrate the superior performance and robustness of semantic density compared to prior approaches.

Neural text generation is a key tool in natural language applications, but it is well known there are major problems at its core. In particular, standard likelihood training and decoding leads to dull and repetitive outputs. While some post-hoc fixes have been proposed, in particular top-k and nucleus sampling, they do not address the fact that the token-level probabilities predicted by the model are poor. In this paper we show that the likelihood objective itself is at fault, resulting in a model that assigns too much probability to sequences containing repeats and frequent words, unlike those from the human training distribution. We propose a new objective, unlikelihood training, which forces unlikely generations to be assigned lower probability by the model. We show that both token and sequence level unlikelihood training give less repetitive, less dull text while maintaining perplexity, giving superior generations using standard greedy or beam search. According to human evaluations, our approach with standard beam search also outperforms the currently popular decoding methods of nucleus sampling or beam blocking, thus providing a strong alternative to existing techniques.

Today's probabilistic language generators fall short when it comes to producing coherent and fluent text despite the fact that the underlying models perform well under standard metrics, e.g., perplexity. This discrepancy has puzzled the language generation community for the last few years. In this work, we posit that the abstraction of natural language generation as a discrete stochastic process--which allows for an information-theoretic analysis--can provide new insights into the behavior of probabilistic language generators, e.g., why high-probability texts can be dull or repetitive. Humans use language as a means of communicating information, aiming to do so in a simultaneously efficient and error-minimizing manner; in fact, psycholinguistics research suggests humans choose each word in a string with this subconscious goal in mind. We formally define the set of strings that meet this criterion: those for which each word has an information content close to the expected information content, i.e., the conditional entropy of our model. We then propose a simple and efficient procedure for enforcing this criterion when generating from probabilistic models, which we call locally typical sampling. Automatic and human evaluations show that, in comparison to nucleus and top-k sampling, locally typical sampling offers competitive performance (in both abstractive summarization and story generation) in terms of quality while consistently reducing degenerate repetitions.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

For large language models (LLMs) to be trusted by humans they need to be well-calibrated in the sense that they can accurately assess and communicate how likely it is that their predictions are correct. Recent work has focused on the quality of internal LLM confidence assessments, but the question remains of how well LLMs can communicate this internal model confidence to human users. This paper explores the disparity between external human confidence in an LLM's responses and the internal confidence of the model. Through experiments involving multiple-choice questions, we systematically examine human users' ability to discern the reliability of LLM outputs. Our study focuses on two key areas: (1) assessing users' perception of true LLM confidence and (2) investigating the impact of tailored explanations on this perception. The research highlights that default explanations from LLMs often lead to user overestimation of both the model's confidence and its' accuracy. By modifying the explanations to more accurately reflect the LLM's internal confidence, we observe a significant shift in user perception, aligning it more closely with the model's actual confidence levels. This adjustment in explanatory approach demonstrates potential for enhancing user trust and accuracy in assessing LLM outputs. The findings underscore the importance of transparent communication of confidence levels in LLMs, particularly in high-stakes applications where understanding the reliability of AI-generated information is essential.

Recent years have witnessed a surge in the number of large language models (LLMs), yet efficiently managing and utilizing these vast resources remains a significant challenge. In this work, we explore how to learn compact representations of LLM abilities that can facilitate downstream tasks, such as model routing and performance prediction on new benchmarks. We frame this problem as estimating the probability that a given model will correctly answer a specific query. Inspired by the item response theory (IRT) in psychometrics, we model this probability as a function of three key factors: (i) the model's multi-skill ability vector, (2) the query's discrimination vector that separates models of differing skills, and (3) the query's difficulty scalar. To learn these parameters jointly, we introduce a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) network that couples model- and query-level embeddings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach leads to state-of-the-art performance in both model routing and benchmark accuracy prediction. Moreover, analysis validates that the learned parameters encode meaningful, interpretable information about model capabilities and query characteristics.

Recent work finds that retrieval-augmented generation with large language models is prone to be influenced by the order of retrieved documents in the context. However, the lack of in-depth analysis limits the use of this phenomenon for prompt engineering in practice. In this study, we posit that likelihoods serve as an effective gauge for language model performance. Through experiments on two question-answering datasets with a variety of state-of-the-art language models, we reveal correlations between answer accuracy and the likelihood of the question at both the corpus level and the instance level. In addition, we find that question likelihood can also indicate the position of the task-relevant information in the context. Based on these findings, we propose two methods that use question likelihood as a gauge for selecting and constructing prompts that lead to better performance. We demonstrate their effectiveness with experiments. In addition, our likelihood-based methods are efficient, as they only need to compute the likelihood of the input, requiring much fewer language model passes than heuristic prompt engineering methods that require generating responses. Our analysis deepens our understanding of how input prompts affect model performance and provides a promising direction for efficient prompt optimization.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

State of the art large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive performance on a variety of benchmark tasks and are increasingly used as components in larger applications, where LLM-based predictions serve as proxies for human judgements or decision. This raises questions about the human-likeness of LLM-derived information, alignment with human intuition, and whether LLMs could possibly be considered (parts of) explanatory models of (aspects of) human cognition or language use. To shed more light on these issues, we here investigate the human-likeness of LLMs' predictions for multiple-choice decision tasks from the perspective of Bayesian statistical modeling. Using human data from a forced-choice experiment on pragmatic language use, we find that LLMs do not capture the variance in the human data at the item-level. We suggest different ways of deriving full distributional predictions from LLMs for aggregate, condition-level data, and find that some, but not all ways of obtaining condition-level predictions yield adequate fits to human data. These results suggests that assessment of LLM performance depends strongly on seemingly subtle choices in methodology, and that LLMs are at best predictors of human behavior at the aggregate, condition-level, for which they are, however, not designed to, or usually used to, make predictions in the first place.

The recent proliferation of research into transformer based natural language processing has led to a number of studies which attempt to detect the presence of human-like cognitive behavior in the models. We contend that, as is true of human psychology, the investigation of cognitive behavior in language models must be conducted in an appropriate population of an appropriate size for the results to be meaningful. We leverage work in uncertainty estimation in a novel approach to efficiently construct experimental populations. The resultant tool, PopulationLM, has been made open source. We provide theoretical grounding in the uncertainty estimation literature and motivation from current cognitive work regarding language models. We discuss the methodological lessons from other scientific communities and attempt to demonstrate their application to two artificial population studies. Through population based experimentation we find that language models exhibit behavior consistent with typicality effects among categories highly represented in training. However, we find that language models don't tend to exhibit structural priming effects. Generally, our results show that single models tend to over estimate the presence of cognitive behaviors in neural models.

Self-supervised models have revolutionized speech processing, achieving new levels of performance in a wide variety of tasks with limited resources. However, the inner workings of these models are still opaque. In this paper, we aim to analyze the encoded contextual representation of these foundation models based on their inter- and intra-model similarity, independent of any external annotation and task-specific constraint. We examine different SSL models varying their training paradigm -- Contrastive (Wav2Vec2.0) and Predictive models (HuBERT); and model sizes (base and large). We explore these models on different levels of localization/distributivity of information including (i) individual neurons; (ii) layer representation; (iii) attention weights and (iv) compare the representations with their finetuned counterparts.Our results highlight that these models converge to similar representation subspaces but not to similar neuron-localized concepts\footnote{A concept represents a coherent fragment of knowledge, such as ``a class containing certain objects as elements, where the objects have certain properties. We made the code publicly available for facilitating further research, we publicly released our code.

Large Language Models (LLMs) effectiveness is usually evaluated by means of benchmarks such as MMLU, ARC-C, or HellaSwag, where questions are presented in their original wording, thus in a fixed, standardized format. However, real-world applications involve linguistic variability, requiring models to maintain their effectiveness across diverse rewordings of the same question or query. In this study, we systematically assess the robustness of LLMs to paraphrased benchmark questions and investigate whether benchmark-based evaluations provide a reliable measure of model capabilities. We systematically generate various paraphrases of all the questions across six different common benchmarks, and measure the resulting variations in effectiveness of 34 state-of-the-art LLMs, of different size and effectiveness. Our findings reveal that while LLM rankings remain relatively stable across paraphrased inputs, absolute effectiveness scores change, and decline significantly. This suggests that LLMs struggle with linguistic variability, raising concerns about their generalization abilities and evaluation methodologies. Furthermore, the observed performance drop challenges the reliability of benchmark-based evaluations, indicating that high benchmark scores may not fully capture a model's robustness to real-world input variations. We discuss the implications of these findings for LLM evaluation methodologies, emphasizing the need for robustness-aware benchmarks that better reflect practical deployment scenarios.

Representation learning has significantly driven the field to develop pretrained models that can act as a valuable starting point when transferring to new datasets. With the rising demand for reliable machine learning and uncertainty quantification, there is a need for pretrained models that not only provide embeddings but also transferable uncertainty estimates. To guide the development of such models, we propose the Uncertainty-aware Representation Learning (URL) benchmark. Besides the transferability of the representations, it also measures the zero-shot transferability of the uncertainty estimate using a novel metric. We apply URL to evaluate eleven uncertainty quantifiers that are pretrained on ImageNet and transferred to eight downstream datasets. We find that approaches that focus on the uncertainty of the representation itself or estimate the prediction risk directly outperform those that are based on the probabilities of upstream classes. Yet, achieving transferable uncertainty quantification remains an open challenge. Our findings indicate that it is not necessarily in conflict with traditional representation learning goals. Code is provided under https://github.com/mkirchhof/url .

Certain statistical models are capable of interpreting input strings as instructions, or prompts, and carry out tasks based on them. Many approaches to prompting and pre-training these models involve the automated generation of these prompts. We call these approaches meta-prompting, or prompting to obtain prompts. We propose a theoretical framework based on category theory to generalize and describe them. This framework is flexible enough to account for LLM stochasticity; and allows us to obtain formal results around task agnosticity and equivalence of various meta-prompting approaches. We experiment with meta-prompting in two active areas of model research: creativity and ideation. We find that user preference favors (p < 0.01) the prompts generated under meta-prompting, as well as their corresponding outputs, over a series of hardcoded baseline prompts that include the original task prompt. Using our framework, we argue that meta-prompting is more effective than basic prompting at generating desirable outputs.

Current preference learning methods achieve high accuracy on standard benchmarks but exhibit significant performance degradation when objective quality signals are removed. We introduce WritingPreferenceBench, a dataset of 1,800 human-annotated preference pairs (1,200 English, 600 Chinese) across 8 creative writing genres, where responses are matched for objective correctness, factual accuracy, and length. On this benchmark, sequence-based reward models--the standard architecture for RLHF--achieve only 52.7% mean accuracy, while zero-shot language model judges perform at 53.9%. In contrast, generative reward models that produce explicit reasoning chains achieve 81.8% accuracy. We observe high within-model variance across genres: individual models range from 18.2% to 81.8% accuracy across different writing categories, with standard deviations averaging 10.1%. This variance persists regardless of model scale, with 27B parameter models showing no consistent improvement over 8B variants. Our results suggest that current RLHF methods primarily learn to detect objective errors rather than capture subjective quality preferences (e.g., creativity, stylistic flair, and emotional resonance), and that successful preference modeling may require intermediate reasoning representations rather than direct classification.

Access to the right evidence does not guarantee that large language models (LLMs) will reason with it correctly. This gap between retrieval and reasoning is especially concerning in clinical settings, where outputs must align with structured protocols. We study this gap using Written Exposure Therapy (WET) guidelines as a testbed. In evaluating model responses to curated clinician-vetted questions, we find that errors persist even when authoritative passages are provided. To address this, we propose an evaluation framework that measures accuracy, consistency, and fidelity of reasoning. Our results highlight both the potential and the risks: retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) can constrain outputs, but safe deployment requires assessing reasoning as rigorously as retrieval.

Verbal confidence elicitation is widely used to extract uncertainty estimates from LLMs. We tested whether seven instruction-tuned open-weight models (3-9B parameters, four families) produce verbalised confidence that meets minimal validity criteria for item-level Type-2 discrimination under minimal numeric elicitation with greedy decoding. In a pre-registered study (OSF: osf.io/azbvx), 524 TriviaQA items were administered under numeric (0-100) and categorical (10-class) elicitation to eight models at Q5_K_M quantisation on consumer hardware, yielding 8,384 deterministic trials. A psychometric validity screen was applied to each model-format cell. All seven instruct models were classified Invalid on numeric confidence (H2 confirmed, 7/7 vs. predicted >=4/7), with a mean ceiling rate of 91.7% (H1 confirmed). Categorical elicitation did not rescue validity. Instead, it disrupted task performance in six of seven models, producing accuracy below 5% (H4 not confirmed). Token-level logprobability did not usefully predict verbalised confidence under the observed variance regime (H5 confirmed, mean cross-validated R^2 < 0.01). Within the reasoning-distilled model, reasoning-trace length showed a strong negative partial correlation with confidence (rho = -0.36, p < .001), consistent with the Reasoning Contamination Effect. These results do not imply that internal uncertainty representations are absent. They show that minimal verbal elicitation fails to preserve internal signals at the output interface in this model-size regime. Psychometric screening should precede any downstream use of such signals.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to document-based tasks - such as document summarization, question answering, and information extraction - where user requirements focus on retrieving information from provided documents rather than relying on the model's parametric knowledge, ensuring the trustworthiness and interpretability of these systems has become a critical concern. A central approach to addressing this challenge is attribution, which involves tracing the generated outputs back to their source documents. However, since LLMs can produce inaccurate or imprecise responses, it is crucial to assess the reliability of these citations. To tackle this, our work proposes two techniques. (1) A zero-shot approach that frames attribution as a straightforward textual entailment task. Our method using flan-ul2 demonstrates an improvement of 0.27% and 2.4% over the best baseline of ID and OOD sets of AttributionBench, respectively. (2) We also explore the role of the attention mechanism in enhancing the attribution process. Using a smaller LLM, flan-t5-small, the F1 scores outperform the baseline across almost all layers except layer 4 and layers 8 through 11.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) makes it important to recognize their strengths and limitations. We argue that in order to develop a holistic understanding of these systems we need to consider the problem that they were trained to solve: next-word prediction over Internet text. By recognizing the pressures that this task exerts we can make predictions about the strategies that LLMs will adopt, allowing us to reason about when they will succeed or fail. This approach - which we call the teleological approach - leads us to identify three factors that we hypothesize will influence LLM accuracy: the probability of the task to be performed, the probability of the target output, and the probability of the provided input. We predict that LLMs will achieve higher accuracy when these probabilities are high than when they are low - even in deterministic settings where probability should not matter. To test our predictions, we evaluate two LLMs (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on eleven tasks, and we find robust evidence that LLMs are influenced by probability in the ways that we have hypothesized. In many cases, the experiments reveal surprising failure modes. For instance, GPT-4's accuracy at decoding a simple cipher is 51% when the output is a high-probability word sequence but only 13% when it is low-probability. These results show that AI practitioners should be careful about using LLMs in low-probability situations. More broadly, we conclude that we should not evaluate LLMs as if they are humans but should instead treat them as a distinct type of system - one that has been shaped by its own particular set of pressures.

Evaluation efforts such as TREC, CLEF, NTCIR and FIRE, alongside public leaderboard such as MS MARCO, are intended to encourage research and track our progress, addressing big questions in our field. However, the goal is not simply to identify which run is "best", achieving the top score. The goal is to move the field forward by developing new robust techniques, that work in many different settings, and are adopted in research and practice. This paper uses the MS MARCO and TREC Deep Learning Track as our case study, comparing it to the case of TREC ad hoc ranking in the 1990s. We show how the design of the evaluation effort can encourage or discourage certain outcomes, and raising questions about internal and external validity of results. We provide some analysis of certain pitfalls, and a statement of best practices for avoiding such pitfalls. We summarize the progress of the effort so far, and describe our desired end state of "robust usefulness", along with steps that might be required to get us there.

Natural language is an appealing medium for explaining how large language models process and store information, but evaluating the faithfulness of such explanations is challenging. To help address this, we develop two modes of evaluation for natural language explanations that claim individual neurons represent a concept in a text input. In the observational mode, we evaluate claims that a neuron a activates on all and only input strings that refer to a concept picked out by the proposed explanation E. In the intervention mode, we construe E as a claim that the neuron a is a causal mediator of the concept denoted by E. We apply our framework to the GPT-4-generated explanations of GPT-2 XL neurons of Bills et al. (2023) and show that even the most confident explanations have high error rates and little to no causal efficacy. We close the paper by critically assessing whether natural language is a good choice for explanations and whether neurons are the best level of analysis.

While the successes of transformers across many domains are indisputable, accurate understanding of the learning mechanics is still largely lacking. Their capabilities have been probed on benchmarks which include a variety of structured and reasoning tasks -- but mathematical understanding is lagging substantially behind. Recent lines of work have begun studying representational aspects of this question: that is, the size/depth/complexity of attention-based networks to perform certain tasks. However, there is no guarantee the learning dynamics will converge to the constructions proposed. In our paper, we provide fine-grained mechanistic understanding of how transformers learn "semantic structure", understood as capturing co-occurrence structure of words. Precisely, we show, through a combination of experiments on synthetic data modeled by Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), Wikipedia data, and mathematical analysis that the embedding layer and the self-attention layer encode the topical structure. In the former case, this manifests as higher average inner product of embeddings between same-topic words. In the latter, it manifests as higher average pairwise attention between same-topic words. The mathematical results involve several assumptions to make the analysis tractable, which we verify on data, and might be of independent interest as well.

Concept guidance has emerged as a cheap and simple way to control the behavior of language models by probing their hidden representations for concept vectors and using them to perturb activations at inference time. While the focus of previous work has largely been on truthfulness, in this paper we extend this framework to a richer set of concepts such as appropriateness, humor, creativity and quality, and explore to what degree current detection and guidance strategies work in these challenging settings. To facilitate evaluation, we develop a novel metric for concept guidance that takes into account both the success of concept elicitation as well as the potential degradation in fluency of the guided model. Our extensive experiments reveal that while some concepts such as truthfulness more easily allow for guidance with current techniques, novel concepts such as appropriateness or humor either remain difficult to elicit, need extensive tuning to work, or even experience confusion. Moreover, we find that probes with optimal detection accuracies do not necessarily make for the optimal guides, contradicting previous observations for truthfulness. Our work warrants a deeper investigation into the interplay between detectability, guidability, and the nature of the concept, and we hope that our rich experimental test-bed for guidance research inspires stronger follow-up approaches.

Developing large language models is expensive and involves making decisions with small experiments, typically by evaluating on large, multi-task evaluation suites. In this work, we analyze specific properties which make a benchmark more reliable for such decisions, and interventions to design higher-quality evaluation benchmarks. We introduce two key metrics that show differences in current benchmarks: signal, a benchmark's ability to separate better models from worse models, and noise, a benchmark's sensitivity to random variability between training steps. We demonstrate that benchmarks with a better signal-to-noise ratio are more reliable when making decisions at small scale, and those with less noise have lower scaling law prediction error. These results suggest that improving signal or noise will lead to more useful benchmarks, so we introduce three interventions designed to directly affect signal or noise. For example, we propose that switching to a metric that has better signal and noise (e.g., perplexity rather than accuracy) leads to better reliability and improved scaling law error. We also find that filtering noisy subtasks, to improve an aggregate signal-to-noise ratio, leads to more reliable multi-task evaluations. We also find that averaging the output of a model's intermediate checkpoints to reduce noise leads to consistent improvements. We conclude by recommending that those creating new benchmarks, or selecting which existing benchmarks to use, aim for high signal and low noise. We use 30 benchmarks for these experiments, and 375 open-weight language models from 60M to 32B parameters, resulting in a new, publicly available dataset of 900K evaluation benchmark results, totaling 200M instances.

Most large language models are trained on linguistic input alone, yet humans appear to ground their understanding of words in sensorimotor experience. A natural solution is to augment LM representations with human judgments of a word's sensorimotor associations (e.g., the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms), but this raises another challenge: most words are ambiguous, and judgments of words in isolation fail to account for this multiplicity of meaning (e.g., "wooden table" vs. "data table"). We attempted to address this problem by building a new lexical resource of contextualized sensorimotor judgments for 112 English words, each rated in four different contexts (448 sentences total). We show that these ratings encode overlapping but distinct information from the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms, and that they also predict other measures of interest (e.g., relatedness), above and beyond measures derived from BERT. Beyond shedding light on theoretical questions, we suggest that these ratings could be of use as a "challenge set" for researchers building grounded language models.

Representations from large language models (LLMs) are known to be dominated by a small subset of dimensions with exceedingly high variance. Previous works have argued that although ablating these outlier dimensions in LLM representations hurts downstream performance, outlier dimensions are detrimental to the representational quality of embeddings. In this study, we investigate how fine-tuning impacts outlier dimensions and show that 1) outlier dimensions that occur in pre-training persist in fine-tuned models and 2) a single outlier dimension can complete downstream tasks with a minimal error rate. Our results suggest that outlier dimensions can encode crucial task-specific knowledge and that the value of a representation in a single outlier dimension drives downstream model decisions.

Human feedback has become the de facto standard for evaluating the performance of Large Language Models, and is increasingly being used as a training objective. However, it is not clear which properties of a generated output this single `preference' score captures. We hypothesise that preference scores are subjective and open to undesirable biases. We critically analyse the use of human feedback for both training and evaluation, to verify whether it fully captures a range of crucial error criteria. We find that while preference scores have fairly good coverage, they under-represent important aspects like factuality. We further hypothesise that both preference scores and error annotation may be affected by confounders, and leverage instruction-tuned models to generate outputs that vary along two possible confounding dimensions: assertiveness and complexity. We find that the assertiveness of an output skews the perceived rate of factuality errors, indicating that human annotations are not a fully reliable evaluation metric or training objective. Finally, we offer preliminary evidence that using human feedback as a training objective disproportionately increases the assertiveness of model outputs. We encourage future work to carefully consider whether preference scores are well aligned with the desired objective.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has shown promising practical results. However, their low interpretability often leads to errors in unforeseen circumstances, limiting their utility. Many works have focused on creating comprehensive evaluation systems, but previous benchmarks have primarily assessed problem-solving abilities while neglecting the response's uncertainty, which may result in unreliability. Recent methods for measuring LLM reliability are resource-intensive and unable to test black-box models. To address this, we propose UBENCH, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating LLM reliability. UBENCH includes 3,978 multiple-choice questions covering knowledge, language, understanding, and reasoning abilities. Experimental results show that UBENCH has achieved state-of-the-art performance, while its single-sampling method significantly saves computational resources compared to baseline methods that require multiple samplings. Additionally, based on UBENCH, we evaluate the reliability of 15 popular LLMs, finding GLM4 to be the most outstanding, closely followed by GPT-4. We also explore the impact of Chain-of-Thought prompts, role-playing prompts, option order, and temperature on LLM reliability, analyzing the varying effects on different LLMs.

A pervasive intuition holds that vision-language models (VLMs) are most trustworthy when their attention maps look sharp: concentrated attention on the queried region should imply a confident, calibrated answer. We test this Attention-Confidence Assumption directly. We instrument three open-weight VLM families (LLaVA-1.5, PaliGemma, Qwen2-VL; 3-7B parameters) with a unified mechanistic pipeline -- the VLM Reliability Probe (VRP) -- that compares attention structure, generation dynamics, and hidden-state geometry against a single correctness label. Three results emerge. (i) Attention structure is a near-zero predictor of correctness (R_pb(C_k,y)=0.001, 95% CI [-0.034,0.036]; R_pb(H_s,y)=-0.012, [-0.047,0.024] on a pooled n=3,090 split), even though attention remains causally necessary for feature extraction (top-30% patch masking drops accuracy by 8.2-11.3 pp, p<0.001). (ii) Reliability becomes legible later in the computation: a single hidden-state linear probe reaches AUROC>0.95 on POPE for two of three families, and self-consistency at K=10 is the strongest behavioral predictor we measure at 10x inference cost (R_pb=0.43). (iii) Causal neuron-level ablations expose a sharp architectural split with direct monitor-design implications: late-fusion LLaVA concentrates reliability in a fragile late bottleneck (-8.3 pp object-identification accuracy after top-5 probe-neuron ablation), whereas early-fusion PaliGemma and Qwen2-VL distribute it widely and absorb destruction of ~50% of their peak-layer hidden dimension with <=1 pp degradation. The takeaway is narrow but consequential: in 3-7B VLMs, reliability is read more reliably off hidden-state geometry, layer-wise margin formation, and sparse late-layer circuits than off attention-map sharpness.

Do brains and language models converge toward the same internal representations of the world? Recent years have seen a rise in studies of neural activations and model alignment. In this work, we review 25 fMRI-based studies published between 2023 and 2025 and explicitly confront their findings with two key hypotheses: (i) the Platonic Representation Hypothesis -- that as models scale and improve, they converge to a representation of the real world, and (ii) the Intermediate-Layer Advantage -- that intermediate (mid-depth) layers often encode richer, more generalizable features. Our findings provide converging evidence that models and brains may share abstract representational structures, supporting both hypotheses and motivating further research on brain-model alignment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have acquired ubiquitous attention for their performances across diverse domains. Our study here searches through LLMs' cognitive abilities and confidence dynamics. We dive deep into understanding the alignment between their self-assessed confidence and actual performance. We exploit these models with diverse sets of questionnaires and real-world scenarios and extract how LLMs exhibit confidence in their responses. Our findings reveal intriguing instances where models demonstrate high confidence even when they answer incorrectly. This is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger effect observed in human psychology. In contrast, there are cases where models exhibit low confidence with correct answers revealing potential underestimation biases. Our results underscore the need for a deeper understanding of their cognitive processes. By examining the nuances of LLMs' self-assessment mechanism, this investigation provides noteworthy revelations that serve to advance the functionalities and broaden the potential applications of these formidable language models.

Training language models with rationales augmentation has been shown to be beneficial in many existing works. In this paper, we identify that such a prevailing view does not hold consistently. We conduct comprehensive investigations to thoroughly inspect the impact of rationales on model performance as well as a novel perspective of model reliability. The results lead to several key findings that add new insights upon existing understandings: 1) Rationales can, at times, deteriorate model performance; 2) Rationales can, at times, improve model reliability, even outperforming their untrained counterparts; 3) A linear correspondence exists in between the performance and reliability improvements, while both are driven by the intrinsic difficulty of the task. These findings provide informative regulations on the broad utilization of rationales and raise critical implications on the procedure of explicitly aligning language models with implicit human thoughts. Codes can be found at https://github.com/Ignoramus0817/rationales.

Do larger and more capable language models learn to update their "beliefs" about propositions more consistently with Bayes' theorem when presented with evidence in-context? To test this, we formulate a Bayesian Coherence Coefficient (BCC) metric and generate a dataset with which to measure the BCC. We measure BCC for multiple pre-trained-only language models across five model families, comparing against the number of model parameters, the amount of training data, and model scores on common benchmarks. Our results provide evidence for our hypothesis that larger and more capable pre-trained language models assign credences that are more coherent with Bayes' theorem. These results have important implications for our understanding and governance of LLMs.

Analyzing the pattern of semantic variation in long real-world texts such as books or transcripts is interesting from the stylistic, cognitive, and linguistic perspectives. It is also useful for applications such as text segmentation, document summarization, and detection of semantic novelty. The recent emergence of several vector-space methods for sentence embedding has made such analysis feasible. However, this raises the issue of how consistent and meaningful the semantic representations produced by various methods are in themselves. In this paper, we compare several recent sentence embedding methods via time-series of semantic similarity between successive sentences and matrices of pairwise sentence similarity for multiple books of literature. In contrast to previous work using target tasks and curated datasets to compare sentence embedding methods, our approach provides an evaluation of the methods 'in the wild'. We find that most of the sentence embedding methods considered do infer highly correlated patterns of semantic similarity in a given document, but show interesting differences.

Marketers spend billions of dollars on advertisements, but to what end? At purchase time, if customers cannot recognize the brand for which they saw an ad, the money spent on the ad is essentially wasted. Despite its importance in marketing, until now, there has been no study on the memorability of ads in the ML literature. All previous memorability studies have been conducted on short-term recall on specific content types like object and action videos. On the other hand, the advertising industry only cares about long-term memorability, and ads are almost always highly multimodal. Therefore, we release the first memorability dataset, LAMDBA, consisting of 1749 participants and 2205 ads covering 276 brands. Running statistical tests over different participant subpopulations and ad types, we find many interesting insights into what makes an ad memorable, e.g., fast-moving ads are more memorable than those with slower scenes; people who use ad-blockers remember a lower number of ads than those who don't. Next, we present a novel model, Henry, to predict the memorability of a content which achieves state-of-the-art performance across all prominent literature memorability datasets. Henry shows strong generalization performance with better results in 0-shot on unseen datasets. Finally, with the intent of memorable ad generation, we present a scalable method to build a high-quality memorable ad generation model by leveraging automatically annotated data. Our approach, SEED (Self rEwarding mEmorability Modeling), starts with a language model trained on LAMBDA as seed data and progressively trains the LLM to generate more memorable ads. We show that the generated advertisements have 44\% higher memorability scores than the original ads. Further, we release a large-scale ad dataset, UltraLAMBDA, consisting of 5 million ads with their automatically-assigned memorability scores.

Warning: This paper studies stereotypes and biases, and contains potentially disturbing examples, used for illustration purposes only. Our findings should not be interpreted as an argument against alignment. Instead, this paper highlights the need for principled approaches to more advanced alignment. Alignment aims to ensure that large language models (LLMs) behave safely and reliably, including by avoiding unsafe inferences. However, we show that such safety-oriented behaviors can misfire: models may reject warranted conclusions even when they are explicitly supported by context. We call this failure mode misfired alignment, where alignment-induced changes cause LLMs to override explicit evidence. To quantify this phenomenon, specifically on stereotype-related alignment, we introduce VETO, a benchmark consisting of 2,032 BBQ-derived contrastive pairs, and define a new metric, Misfired Alignment Rate (MAR), which measures on a 0 to 100 scale how often a model fails on a stereotype-related question but succeeds on its contrastive counterpart. We benchmark 25 LLMs on VETO, and show that all LLMs, including the most recent ones, exhibit non-trivial (4.7 to 18.9%) MARs while all human participants achieve 0.0% MAR. Controlled priming experiments further show that alignment-induced cues can substantially amplify MAR across LLMs, indicating that these failures are not merely artifacts of individual examples but can be induced by safety-related framing. Mechanistic analyses on open-weight LLMs reveal late-layer suppression of evidence-supported answers, and comparisons between instruct and base LLMs suggest that this suppression emerges after instruction training. These findings show that current alignment methods can overgeneralize surface-level safety cues, to the point of overriding objective evidence, motivating more work on alignment objectives that better preserve contextual grounding.

Large Language Model (LLM) hallucinations are usually treated as defects of the model or its decoding strategy. Drawing on classical linguistics, we argue that a query's form can also shape a listener's (and model's) response. We operationalize this insight by constructing a 22-dimension query feature vector covering clause complexity, lexical rarity, and anaphora, negation, answerability, and intention grounding, all known to affect human comprehension. Using 369,837 real-world queries, we ask: Are there certain types of queries that make hallucination more likely? A large-scale analysis reveals a consistent "risk landscape": certain features such as deep clause nesting and underspecification align with higher hallucination propensity. In contrast, clear intention grounding and answerability align with lower hallucination rates. Others, including domain specificity, show mixed, dataset- and model-dependent effects. Thus, these findings establish an empirically observable query-feature representation correlated with hallucination risk, paving the way for guided query rewriting and future intervention studies.

Prompt sensitivity, referring to the phenomenon where paraphrasing (i.e., repeating something written or spoken using different words) leads to significant changes in large language model (LLM) performance, has been widely accepted as a core limitation of LLMs. In this work, we revisit this issue and ask: Is the widely reported high prompt sensitivity truly an inherent weakness of LLMs, or is it largely an artifact of evaluation processes? To answer this question, we systematically evaluate 7 LLMs (e.g., GPT and Gemini family) across 6 benchmarks, including both multiple-choice and open-ended tasks on 12 diverse prompt templates. We find that much of the prompt sensitivity stems from heuristic evaluation methods, including log-likelihood scoring and rigid answer matching, which often overlook semantically correct responses expressed through alternative phrasings, such as synonyms or paraphrases. When we adopt LLM-as-a-Judge evaluations, we observe a substantial reduction in performance variance and a consistently higher correlation in model rankings across prompts. Our findings suggest that modern LLMs are more robust to prompt templates than previously believed, and that prompt sensitivity may be more an artifact of evaluation than a flaw in the models.

We investigate the generalization capabilities of small language models under two popular adaptation paradigms: few-shot prompting and supervised fine-tuning. While prompting is often favored for its parameter efficiency and flexibility, it remains unclear how robust this approach is in low-resource settings and under distributional shifts. This paper presents a comparative study of prompting and fine-tuning across task formats, prompt styles, and model scales, with a focus on their behavior in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution (OOD) settings. Beyond accuracy, we analyze the internal representations learned by each approach to assess the stability and abstraction of task-specific features. Our findings highlight critical differences in how small models internalize and generalize knowledge under different adaptation strategies. This work offers practical guidance for model selection in low-data regimes and contributes empirical insight into the ongoing debate over prompting versus fine-tuning. Code for the experiments is available at the following

Large language models (LLMs) can perform remarkably complex tasks, yet the fine-grained details of how these capabilities emerge during pretraining remain poorly understood. Scaling laws on validation loss tell us how much a model improves with additional compute, but not what skills it acquires in which order. To remedy this, we propose the Implicit Curriculum Hypothesis: pretraining follows a compositional and predictable curriculum across models and data mixtures. We test this by designing a suite of simple, composable tasks spanning retrieval, morphological transformations, coreference, logical reasoning, and mathematics. Using these tasks, we track emergence points across four model families spanning sizes from 410M-13B parameters. We find that emergence orderings of when models reach fixed accuracy thresholds are strikingly consistent (ρ= .81 across 45 model pairs), and that composite tasks most often emerge after their component tasks. Furthermore, we find that this structure is encoded in model representations: tasks with similar function vector representations also tend to follow similar trajectories in training. By using the space of representations derived from our task set, we can effectively predict the training trajectories of simple held-out compositional tasks throughout the course of pretraining (R^2 = .68-.84 across models) without previously evaluating them. Together, these results suggest that pretraining is more structured than loss curves reveal: skills emerge in a compositional order that is consistent across models and readable from their internals.

The reliability of VLM-as-a-Judge is critical for the automatic evaluation of vision-language models (VLMs). Despite recent progress, our analysis reveals that VLM-as-a-Judge often pays limited attention to the image when making decisions. Instead, they often blindly favor the more informative answer, even when they can recognize it conflicts with the image content. We call this problem informativeness bias, which significantly undermines judge reliability. To address it, we propose BIRCH (Balanced Informativeness and CoRrectness with a Truthful AnCHor), a judging paradigm that first corrects inconsistencies with the image content in candidate answers, and then compares the answers against this corrected version. This shifts the judge's focus from informativeness to image-grounded correctness. Experiments on multiple models and benchmarks show that BIRCH reduces informativeness bias by up to 17%, resulting in performance gains of up to 9.8%. Our work reveals an overlooked but fundamental flaw in current VLM-as-a-Judge systems and highlights the need for more principled designs.

Despite considerable advancements with deep neural language models, the enigma of neural text degeneration persists when these models are tested as text generators. The counter-intuitive empirical observation is that even though the use of likelihood as training objective leads to high quality models for a broad range of language understanding tasks, using likelihood as a decoding objective leads to text that is bland and strangely repetitive. In this paper, we reveal surprising distributional differences between human text and machine text. In addition, we find that decoding strategies alone can dramatically effect the quality of machine text, even when generated from exactly the same neural language model. Our findings motivate Nucleus Sampling, a simple but effective method to draw the best out of neural generation. By sampling text from the dynamic nucleus of the probability distribution, which allows for diversity while effectively truncating the less reliable tail of the distribution, the resulting text better demonstrates the quality of human text, yielding enhanced diversity without sacrificing fluency and coherence.