Daily Papers

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures have advanced the scaling of Large Language Models (LLMs) by activating only a sparse subset of parameters per input, enabling state-of-the-art performance with reduced computational cost. As these models are increasingly deployed in critical domains, understanding and strengthening their alignment mechanisms is essential to prevent harmful outputs. However, existing LLM safety research has focused almost exclusively on dense architectures, leaving the unique safety properties of MoEs largely unexamined. The modular, sparsely-activated design of MoEs suggests that safety mechanisms may operate differently than in dense models, raising questions about their robustness. In this paper, we present GateBreaker, the first training-free, lightweight, and architecture-agnostic attack framework that compromises the safety alignment of modern MoE LLMs at inference time. GateBreaker operates in three stages: (i) gate-level profiling, which identifies safety experts disproportionately routed on harmful inputs, (ii) expert-level localization, which localizes the safety structure within safety experts, and (iii) targeted safety removal, which disables the identified safety structure to compromise the safety alignment. Our study shows that MoE safety concentrates within a small subset of neurons coordinated by sparse routing. Selective disabling of these neurons, approximately 3% of neurons in the targeted expert layers, significantly increases the averaged attack success rate (ASR) from 7.4% to 64.9% against the eight latest aligned MoE LLMs with limited utility degradation. These safety neurons transfer across models within the same family, raising ASR from 17.9% to 67.7% with one-shot transfer attack. Furthermore, GateBreaker generalizes to five MoE vision language models (VLMs) with 60.9% ASR on unsafe image inputs.

Safety alignment is critical for the ethical deployment of large language models (LLMs), guiding them to avoid generating harmful or unethical content. Current alignment techniques, such as supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback, remain fragile and can be bypassed by carefully crafted adversarial prompts. Unfortunately, such attacks rely on trial and error, lack generalizability across models, and are constrained by scalability and reliability. This paper presents NeuroStrike, a novel and generalizable attack framework that exploits a fundamental vulnerability introduced by alignment techniques: the reliance on sparse, specialized safety neurons responsible for detecting and suppressing harmful inputs. We apply NeuroStrike to both white-box and black-box settings: In the white-box setting, NeuroStrike identifies safety neurons through feedforward activation analysis and prunes them during inference to disable safety mechanisms. In the black-box setting, we propose the first LLM profiling attack, which leverages safety neuron transferability by training adversarial prompt generators on open-weight surrogate models and then deploying them against black-box and proprietary targets. We evaluate NeuroStrike on over 20 open-weight LLMs from major LLM developers. By removing less than 0.6% of neurons in targeted layers, NeuroStrike achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 76.9% using only vanilla malicious prompts. Moreover, Neurostrike generalizes to four multimodal LLMs with 100% ASR on unsafe image inputs. Safety neurons transfer effectively across architectures, raising ASR to 78.5% on 11 fine-tuned models and 77.7% on five distilled models. The black-box LLM profiling attack achieves an average ASR of 63.7% across five black-box models, including the Google Gemini family.

Text-to-image (T2I) models, such as Stable Diffusion, have exhibited remarkable performance in generating high-quality images from text descriptions in recent years. However, text-to-image models may be tricked into generating not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, particularly in sexual scenarios. Existing countermeasures mostly focus on filtering inappropriate inputs and outputs, or suppressing improper text embeddings, which can block explicit NSFW-related content (e.g., naked or sexy) but may still be vulnerable to adversarial prompts inputs that appear innocent but are ill-intended. In this paper, we present SafeGen, a framework to mitigate unsafe content generation by text-to-image models in a text-agnostic manner. The key idea is to eliminate unsafe visual representations from the model regardless of the text input. In this way, the text-to-image model is resistant to adversarial prompts since unsafe visual representations are obstructed from within. Extensive experiments conducted on four datasets demonstrate SafeGen's effectiveness in mitigating unsafe content generation while preserving the high-fidelity of benign images. SafeGen outperforms eight state-of-the-art baseline methods and achieves 99.1% sexual content removal performance. Furthermore, our constructed benchmark of adversarial prompts provides a basis for future development and evaluation of anti-NSFW-generation methods.

Hallucinations in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) -- where the model generates content inconsistent with the input image -- pose significant risks in real-world applications, from misinformation in visual question answering to unsafe errors in decision-making. Existing benchmarks primarily test recognition accuracy, i.e., evaluating whether models can select the correct answer among distractors. This overlooks an equally critical capability for trustworthy AI: recognizing when none of the provided options are correct, a behavior reflecting epistemic humility. We present HumbleBench, a new hallucination benchmark designed to evaluate MLLMs' ability to reject plausible but incorrect answers across three hallucination types: object, relation, and attribute. Built from a panoptic scene graph dataset, we leverage fine-grained scene graph annotations to extract ground-truth entities and relations, and prompt GPT-4-Turbo to generate multiple-choice questions, followed by a rigorous manual filtering process. Each question includes a "None of the above" option, requiring models not only to recognize correct visual information but also to identify when no provided answer is valid. We evaluate a variety of state-of-the-art MLLMs -- including both general-purpose and specialized reasoning models -- on HumbleBench and share valuable findings and insights with the community. By incorporating explicit false-option rejection, HumbleBench fills a key gap in current evaluation suites, providing a more realistic measure of MLLM reliability in safety-critical settings. Our code and dataset are released publicly and can be accessed at https://github.com/maifoundations/HumbleBench.

Video generation models (VGMs) have demonstrated the capability to synthesize high-quality output. It is important to understand their potential to produce unsafe content, such as violent or terrifying videos. In this work, we provide a comprehensive understanding of unsafe video generation. First, to confirm the possibility that these models could indeed generate unsafe videos, we choose unsafe content generation prompts collected from 4chan and Lexica, and three open-source SOTA VGMs to generate unsafe videos. After filtering out duplicates and poorly generated content, we created an initial set of 2112 unsafe videos from an original pool of 5607 videos. Through clustering and thematic coding analysis of these generated videos, we identify 5 unsafe video categories: Distorted/Weird, Terrifying, Pornographic, Violent/Bloody, and Political. With IRB approval, we then recruit online participants to help label the generated videos. Based on the annotations submitted by 403 participants, we identified 937 unsafe videos from the initial video set. With the labeled information and the corresponding prompts, we created the first dataset of unsafe videos generated by VGMs. We then study possible defense mechanisms to prevent the generation of unsafe videos. Existing defense methods in image generation focus on filtering either input prompt or output results. We propose a new approach called Latent Variable Defense (LVD), which works within the model's internal sampling process. LVD can achieve 0.90 defense accuracy while reducing time and computing resources by 10x when sampling a large number of unsafe prompts.