Instructions to use dpevzner/CyberOps_Mistral_7B_LoRA with libraries, inference providers, notebooks, and local apps. Follow these links to get started.
- Libraries
- PEFT
How to use dpevzner/CyberOps_Mistral_7B_LoRA with PEFT:
from peft import PeftModel from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM base_model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained("mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3") model = PeftModel.from_pretrained(base_model, "dpevzner/CyberOps_Mistral_7B_LoRA") - Notebooks
- Google Colab
- Kaggle
CyberOps-Mistral-7B-LoRA
A LoRA fine-tuned adapter for Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3, specialized for cybersecurity IT-operations reasoning — dual-use command intent analysis, failure diagnosis, security scope assessment, tool correctness, and cross-shell translation.
Adapter only — requires
mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3as the base model.
Weights provenance: final_adapter from training run
LORA-MISTRAL_7B-20260709-232328 (latest). Best confirmed benchmark across the iterative
training loop: 88.1 (50-item rubric).
Model Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Base model | mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 |
| Adapter type | LoRA (PEFT 0.19.1) |
LoRA rank r |
16 |
lora_alpha |
32 |
lora_dropout |
0.05 |
bias |
none |
| Target modules | q_proj, k_proj, v_proj, o_proj, gate_proj, up_proj, down_proj (all linear) |
| Trainable parameters | |
| Task type | CAUSAL_LM |
| Training method | Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) via TRL; iterative single-epoch repair on prior best |
| Effective batch | 8 (per-device 1 × grad-accum 8) |
| Learning rate | 2e-4 |
| Max sequence length | 1024 |
| Training records | ~4,615 (123 curriculum files) |
| Frameworks | TRL 1.2.0 · Transformers 5.6.2 · PEFT 0.19.1 · PyTorch 2.5.1+cu121 |
| Hardware | NVIDIA RTX 4070 Laptop GPU (8 GB) · 64 GB RAM · ~5.56 GB peak VRAM |
| Best benchmark | 88.1 avg (50-item rubric) |
Model-Family Compatibility
Optimized for the Mistral / Llama instruction-tuned family. The training data uses the Alpaca-style instruct format:
### Instruction:
[prompt]
### Response:
[answer]
The binding is to this prompt format, not the architecture. The same dataset trained on three bases shows the format mismatch — not capability — drives the gap:
| Base model | Prompt format | Best benchmark |
|---|---|---|
mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 |
native (Alpaca) | 88.1 |
deepseek-ai/deepseek-llm-7b-chat |
mismatched | 47.38 |
microsoft/Phi-3.5-mini-instruct |
mismatched | early experiments |
Recommended base models for this adapter: mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3
(primary), other Mistral 7B Instruct point releases, or Llama-3/3.1 8B Instruct (compatible
format; requires retraining on that base). For DeepSeek/Gemma/ChatML/Qwen, use the
model-agnostic dataset (below) rendered in each family's native format.
Datasets
- Training data (format-specific):
dpevzner/Cybersecurity_Reasoning_Dataset_MistralFamily_7b— ~4,615 records in the Mistral/Llama### Instruction:/### Response:format. - Model-agnostic variant:
dpevzner/Cybersecurity_Reasoning_Dataset— neutral canonical corpus + Mistral/DeepSeek/ChatML/Gemma rendered variants (to train other families without the format-mismatch penalty).
Curriculum (hard-ordered, 3-epoch)
| Epoch | Folders | Records |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 03_toolknowledge, 05_detection_rules |
~1,077 |
| 2 | 04_goldens, 05_seedcases |
~1,508 |
| 3 | 06_contrast_pairs |
~2,030 |
New synthesis/repair records go in Epoch 3; placing them in Epoch 2 previously caused sharp regression in ambiguity reasoning (hard constraint). The benchmark is held out with zero overlap with training data.
Intended Use
For offline / air-gapped cybersecurity operations — a domain-specific reasoning assistant for authorized security testing and SOC support.
Capabilities: dual-use command intent analysis; failure diagnosis (privilege_failure,
syntax_failure, environment_mismatch, dependency_absence, stale_documentation);
security scope assessment; tool correctness (PowerShell/CMD/bash); cross-shell translation.
Out of scope: general threat intel, malware RE, CVE assessment, offensive automation,
general-purpose assistant use.
Benchmark
50-item rubric across five families. Best 88.1; stable 88.0 most recent.
| Family | Items | Baseline | Best |
|---|---|---|---|
| tool_correctness | 10 | ~73 | ~91.7 |
| cross_shell_translation | 10 | ~71 | ~97 |
| failure_diagnosis | 10 | ~30 | ~85 |
| ambiguity_reasoning | 10 | ~100 | ~95.8 |
| safety_scope | 10 | ~10 | ~70 |
| Overall | 50 | 56.28 | 88.1 |
Reached a capacity ceiling at ~88 (rank 16): further repairs fix targeted items but displace others ~1:1. Progressing requires higher LoRA rank, not more data.
Usage
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForCausalLM
from peft import PeftModel
import torch
BASE_MODEL = "mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3"
ADAPTER = "dpevzner/CyberOps_Mistral_7B_LoRA"
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(BASE_MODEL)
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(
BASE_MODEL, dtype=torch.float16, device_map="auto",
max_memory={0: "5GiB", "cpu": "20GiB"})
model = PeftModel.from_pretrained(model, ADAPTER)
model.eval()
prompt = """### Instruction:
Analyze the ambiguous command: `Get-Process lsass`
### Response:"""
inputs = tokenizer(prompt, return_tensors="pt").to(model.device)
with torch.no_grad():
out = model.generate(**inputs, max_new_tokens=256, do_sample=False, use_cache=False)
print(tokenizer.decode(out[0][inputs["input_ids"].shape[1]:], skip_special_tokens=True))
This adapter expects the ### Instruction: / ### Response: format; other formats degrade
output quality due to the format binding described above.
Limitations
- Adapter-capacity ceiling at ~88 (rank 16) — repairs fix items but regress others ~1:1.
- Safety scope is the weakest family (~70) — items ss_001/002/006/007/010 inconsistent.
- Ambiguity reasoning oscillates (ar_008/009/010) under heavy contrast-pair synthesis.
- Substring-based scoring — a correctly paraphrased answer can be scored a miss.
- GPU telemetry reads zero (NVML polling gap) — cosmetic; training is correct.
- Synthetic evaluation only — live-operations performance not measured.
Ethical Considerations
Trained to analyze dual-use commands for defensive security operations. Not for generating offensive tooling, attack automation, or unauthorized access. All training data was synthesized under operator oversight with explicit content-governance controls.
Citation
@misc{cyberops_mistral_7b_lora_2026,
title = {CyberOps-Mistral-7B-LoRA: A LoRA Adapter for Cybersecurity IT-Operations Reasoning},
author = {Pevzner, D.},
year = {2026},
note = {LoRA (r=16, alpha=32) adapter for Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3, trained on ~4,615
synthetic cybersecurity reasoning records; best benchmark 88.1 on a 50-item rubric.}
}
Training environment: Alienware M16R2 / RTX 4070 Laptop GPU / Windows 11. Weights from run
LORA-MISTRAL_7B-20260709-232328 (script v4.7).
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Base model
mistralai/Mistral-7B-v0.3